The Road from Dnipro: Can Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Reignite?

Since the dramatic days of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive — when brigades pushed southward from Orikhiv and eastward from Kupiansk — military momentum on the battlefield has shifted into a slow grind of attrition. Russia’s entrenchment, extensive fortifications, and growing adaptation to Ukrainian drone tactics have created a difficult landscape for manoeuvre warfare. Yet as the world’s attention is drawn to other theatres — from the Middle East to East Asia — many in Kyiv and in Ukraine’s military command are asking the urgent question: can the counteroffensive be reignited, and if so, where?

One potential answer lies along the strategic corridor of the Dnipro River.

Dnipro as a Strategic Axis

The city of Dnipro — Ukraine’s fourth-largest — has long been the logistical and industrial heartbeat of the country’s east. Located just 70km from the front line in Zaporizhzhia oblast, she sits at the gateway to southern Ukraine. Dnipro has served as a triage centre for wounded soldiers, a marshalling point for reinforcements, and a hub for drone development and artillery resupply. She is not merely a rear base, but the antechamber to a theatre that includes Melitopol, Tokmak, and ultimately Crimea.

Ukrainian commanders are aware that any renewed large-scale operation must come with a refreshed strategy, better adapted to the evolving realities of the war. The mistake of 2023 was to believe that rapid advances with light mechanised brigades could punch through minefields and artillery kill-zones. Those hopes were dashed. But the terrain south of Dnipro — although heavily defended — offers the opportunity for cumulative pressure, gradual positional gains, and a potential opening in 2025.

New Tools, New Doctrine

Since late 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have invested heavily in adaptation. A new doctrine of “assault-by-fire” has emerged, fusing long-range strike capability — including repurposed S-200s and Western-supplied ATACMS — with precision drone swarms and dismounted infantry. In areas like Krynky on the eastern bank of the Dnipro in Kherson oblast, Ukrainian marines have demonstrated that limited-scale river crossings can establish bridgeheads even under extreme Russian bombardment.

Importantly, the area between the front lines and Dnipro’s southern corridor is within effective range of Ukrainian HIMARS, Storm Shadows, and indigenously produced Neptune cruise missiles. Russian command and logistics nodes around Tokmak and Melitopol remain vulnerable, and Ukraine’s drone campaign has gradually begun to wear down Russian air defences and radar coverage in occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast.

Reinforcement from Western partners — including recent pledges of F-16s, German artillery, and deep-strike munitions — may allow Ukraine to suppress Russian rear areas more effectively in 2025, creating the conditions for renewed movement on the ground. Meanwhile, defensive improvements, including newly developed trench-clearing robots and counter-mine equipment, suggest Ukraine’s General Staff has not given up on manoeuvre.

Political Winds and Operational Timing

However strategy is only part of the equation. The political climate matters, too. With the United States seemingly uninterested in the conflict in Ukraine, European leaders preoccupied with their own defence strategies, and many NATO partners entering a period of fiscal caution, Ukraine’s window for a major renewed offensive may be limited. Yet there is also a contrary political reality: each symbolic Ukrainian gain boosts Western morale and reinforces the logic of continued support. A breakthrough, even a modest one — a push toward Tokmak, for instance — would shift the narrative at a critical moment.

The Ukrainian command, aware of this, has already begun discreetly reinforcing sectors along the southern axis. Satellite imagery indicates increased fortification upgrades and the movement of reserve formations west of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian intelligence and special forces operations behind enemy lines have intensified in Zaporizhzhia and southern Donetsk. Russian media outlets have reported increased partisan sabotage along supply routes — a likely precursor to a shaping campaign.

Risks and Realities

Yet even a successful push from Dnipro faces enormous challenges. Russian forces have had over three years to entrench themselves, layering minefields, dugouts, and artillery nests over every metre of potential advance. Ukrainian troops would likely suffer heavy casualties. Moreover without overwhelming air superiority — which Ukraine still lacks — any push would remain vulnerable to Russian helicopter gunships and glide-bomb strikes.

There is also the danger of attrition fatigue. Ukraine has already mobilised and remobilised tens of thousands of men. While public support for the war remains high, sustaining a major counteroffensive without visible early results could carry political costs for President Zelenskyy and his administration.

A Deliberate Advance

For now, Ukrainian military planners appear to be favouring gradual attritional pressure: salami-slicing enemy positions, probing for weak points, and deploying drones and long-range artillery to exhaust Russian logistics. The road from Dnipro may not lead to a lightning offensive, but rather a campaign of erosion — until one day, the front collapses not with a bang, but a crack.

Whether that crack appears in the Zaporizhzhia sector, the Kherson riverbank, or even in Russian-occupied Donetsk depends on many factors, including Western resolve, Russian missteps, and the adaptability of Ukrainian field leadership. But one thing is certain: Dnipro remains a vital artery in Ukraine’s war effort — and from her industrial avenues and battered hospitals may yet rise the momentum to drive south again.