The scale of Russia's current drone assault on civilians in Ukraine
- Matthew Parish
- Jul 12
- 3 min read
Recent weeks have witnessed a dramatic surge in Russian drone attacks:
On 12 July 2025 (i.e. last night at the time of writing), nearly 597 Shahed-class drones and 26 missiles were launched, with Ukraine’s air defence intercepting 319 drones, downing 25 missiles, and jamming around 258 others.
Earlier in July, Ukrainian cities have endured massive waves of over 700 drones in a single assault.
Total drone launches by Russia in June reached alarming levels, pushing 5,400+ in that period alone.
Weekly launch rates during spring and summer 2025 exceeded 1,100 drones, reflecting a capacity to sustain such offensives frequently.
Drone Capabilities and Production
Russia’s drone arsenal includes:
Shahed-style kamikaze drones (Geran‑2, Garpiya): low-cost, one-way systems carrying ~90 kg warheads and supported by Iranian‑derived production.
Loitering munitions like ZALA Lancet and KUB‑BLA, optimised for battlefield precision.
FPV attack drones for localised targeting (principally on the battlefield).
Production metrics include the following:
Domestic output has surged from ~1,000 to 6,000+ drones per month, with ambitions to hit 10,000 monthly.
Factory output is variable increasing. One such factory, Yelabuga in Tatarstan, is reported as producing some 310 drones/month at the current time.
Annual production may exceed 5,000–6,000 drones, with components sourced from Iran, China and North Korea.
Interception and Air Defence Requirements
Ukraine’s current air defence includes:
A combination of surface-to-air systems, electronic jammers, interceptor drones, and limited air cover.
During the 12 July assault, Ukraine is reported as having shot down about 53% of drones and jammed another 43%, leaving ~6% penetrating.
However continued saturation attacks are straining Ukraine’s inventory of missiles and manpower.
To reduce penetration to manageable levels (below ~5%), Ukraine needs:
Expanded short and medium-range air defence:
Hundreds of NASAMS, IRIS-T SLM, and Patriot batteries to address drone and missile saturation.
Mobile systems and interceptor drones in city networks.
Enhanced electronic warfare (EW):
Broad-spectrum jamming of GPS, uplinks, and control frequencies.
Drone-mounted EW payloads to disrupt Russian feeds.
Aerial ISR for early detection:
Recon drones and AWACS-style platforms to detect and cue defences prior to launch waves.
Financially, deploying and maintaining this would require billions in Western military aid — presenting a cost-share dilemma since Ukraine’s budget cannot absorb it alone.
Alternative Counter-Measures
Deep strikes on production sites
Ukraine has successfully targeted drone-warhead factories inside Russia (e.g. Sergiev Posad, a small city north-northeast of Moscow) via long-range drones.
Continued strikes on Yelabuga and Izhevsk (northeast of Tatarstan; in the Volga region) facilities can reduce Russia’s production capacity. Each strike costs ~$1–3 million; each destroyed factory reduces monthly output by hundreds.
Comprehensive GPS and radio jamming
Nationwide GPS jammers can force reliance on less accurate INS guidance, reducing penetration and accuracy.
Russia could retaliate with EW and decoy systems — requiring a technological counter-EW escalation.
Interceptor drones and counter-swarm technology
AI-powered swarm-interceptor drones — lower cost (~$5,000–10,000 each), reusable, suited for mass defence.
Turkey, Israel, and NATO powers are exploring such platforms for layered urban defence.
Deception and decoys
Russian drones often use decoy swarms. Ukraine can deploy false thermal/radar signatures by using civilian infrastructure decoys, causing drone diversion and ordnance waste.
Sanctioning drone supply chains
Pressuring Iran, China, North Korea, and intermediary supply chains to restrict drone components — though enforcement is challenging and slow.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s most cost-effective strategy combines targeted factory strikes, enhanced EW and GPS-jamming, and cheap drone swarms acting as both interceptors and decoys. This shifts the economic balance: Russia pours millions into long-range attrition; Ukraine leverages lower-cost asymmetric tools.
Russia’s drone campaign—now involving hundreds of launches per night—has become a central pillar of aerial bombardment as a pillar of contemporary warfare by a rogue regime. Still Ukraine’s adaptive defence, focused on scalable, cost-efficient technologies and precise counter-strikes, offers a viable path to reducing penetration to tolerable levels. Long-term sustainability, however, depends on continued Western aid and rapid deployment of interceptor and EW systems. Without them, saturation attacks may persist as a tool of terror and economic attrition—although Russia may overextend herself militarily and energetically in the process.
