The United States prepares to strike Iran

Friday 27 February 2026

As Washington considers preparatory measures for possible military strikes against Iran — whether in response to attacks upon American forces, Iranian nuclear advances or escalating confrontation between Israel and her regional adversaries — the Middle East once again stands at the edge of systemic crisis. The triangle formed by the United States, Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran has long defined the region’s strategic geometry. What is different now is not hostility, but proximity — proximity to direct state-on-state war.

The consequences of escalation would not be confined to the Levant or the Persian Gulf. They would reverberate through global energy markets, maritime trade routes, alliance structures and fragile domestic political systems already strained by inflation, war fatigue and great-power competition.

To understand the risks, we must consider not one war, but several possible wars — each with its own speed, geography and political logic.

The strategic triangle

At the heart of the confrontation are three actors with profoundly different threat perceptions.

The United States seeks to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability while maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and protecting her regional allies. Israel views Iran not merely as a rival but as an existential adversary — particularly if Tehran crosses the nuclear threshold. Iran, for her part, regards American military presence and Israeli covert action as instruments of encirclement and regime destabilisation.

Escalation could occur through several pathways.

Scenario I: Limited punitive strikes

In this scenario, the United States conducts targeted air and missile strikes against Iranian military infrastructure — perhaps Revolutionary Guard bases, missile depots or nuclear facilities — in response to proxy attacks or intelligence indicating imminent threat.

Iran retaliates, but in calibrated fashion: missile launches against American bases in Iraq or Syria, cyber operations, harassment of shipping, and intensified proxy activity through Hezbollah, Iraqi militias or the Houthis.

This is the most likely short-term trajectory because it allows all sides to demonstrate resolve without committing to total war. Yet even “limited” strikes carry grave risks. Iran’s missile inventory is vast. Israel’s air defences — including the Iron Dome and Arrow systems — are formidable but not impermeable. A single successful strike on civilian infrastructure in Tel Aviv or Haifa could force Jerusalem into broader action.

Regionally, Gulf monarchies would attempt neutrality while quietly bolstering air defence. Iraq would face renewed instability. Lebanon, already economically shattered, could become the battlefield of Hezbollah–Israel confrontation once more.

Globally, oil prices would spike sharply — perhaps temporarily exceeding 120 dollars per barrel — as insurance premiums on Gulf shipping soar. Inflationary pressures in Europe and Asia would intensify. For Ukraine, already reliant upon sustained Western support, political bandwidth in Washington and Brussels could narrow.

Scenario II: Israeli pre-emptive strike on nuclear facilities

Should intelligence indicate that Iran is nearing weapons-grade uranium enrichment, Israel might act independently — as she did against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s Al-Kibar facility in 2007.

However Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is dispersed and hardened. Facilities such as Natanz and Fordow lie underground, protected by air defences and geography. A successful Israeli strike would likely require sustained operations, possibly drawing in American logistical support whether acknowledged or not.

Iranian retaliation in this scenario would be more severe. Hezbollah possesses an estimated arsenal of over 100,000 rockets. A multi-front war involving Lebanon, Gaza and potentially Syria could follow. The scale of civilian displacement would be immense.

Politically, Arab governments that have cautiously normalised relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords would face domestic unrest. Saudi–Israeli rapprochement would likely freeze. Turkey would exploit the crisis rhetorically. Russia — already entrenched in Syria — would seek leverage through diplomatic manoeuvre.

The economic consequences would be deeper than in Scenario I. Even absent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, markets would price in sustained risk. Energy importers such as India and Japan would scramble for alternative supply. European states — still recalibrating from the loss of Russian gas — would confront renewed vulnerability.

Scenario III: Regional conflagration and maritime disruption

The most dangerous escalation would involve Iranian attempts to close or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supply passes. Mining operations, anti-ship missiles and swarm attacks on tankers could paralyse traffic.

The United States Navy would respond forcefully. Maritime skirmishes could expand into sustained naval warfare. Simultaneously Iranian-aligned groups might escalate attacks in the Red Sea, threatening the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint — already destabilised by Houthi activity.

Such a crisis would send oil well beyond 150 dollars per barrel. Global recession would become plausible. Emerging markets heavily dependent on imported energy would face balance-of-payments crises. Western central banks, already constrained by debt burdens, would struggle to respond.

China, the largest purchaser of Gulf energy, would face a dilemma: whether to remain diplomatically cautious or intervene economically and politically to stabilise supply. Beijing’s expanding naval presence could acquire new strategic relevance.

Political consequences inside Iran

Military escalation does not automatically weaken the Islamic Republic. External attack often consolidates nationalist sentiment. The Revolutionary Guard would tighten control. Reformist voices would be marginalised.

Yet prolonged conflict combined with economic collapse could produce unpredictable outcomes. Iran’s young population is restless. Urban dissent has not disappeared. War might delay internal reckoning — or accelerate it.

Israel’s domestic calculus

For Israel the stakes are existential and psychological. The trauma of 7 October reshaped public opinion regarding deterrence. A decisive blow against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could be seen as restoring strategic initiative.

But a prolonged missile war causing sustained civilian casualties could erode domestic unity. Israel’s economy, highly integrated into global technology and financial markets, is resilient but sensitive to sustained disruption.

The American political dimension

For Washington, escalation intersects with electoral politics and alliance management. A limited strike framed as defence of American forces may command bipartisan support. A drawn-out regional war would test public patience.

Simultaneously, American credibility in Europe and Asia would be scrutinised. Allies would ask whether Washington can manage simultaneous theatres — Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East — without strategic overextension.

The global economic system

The international economy remains fragile. Debt levels are historically high. Supply chains are partially re-regionalised but not insulated from energy shock. Insurance markets, shipping finance and commodity derivatives would all experience acute stress in a Hormuz crisis.

Energy exporters outside the region — including Norway, the United States and certain African producers — would benefit from price spikes. Energy importers would suffer. Inflation would return just as central banks hope to declare victory over it.

The war in Ukraine would not pause while attention shifts south. Indeed, Moscow might calculate that Western distraction offers opportunity — whether on the battlefield or through renewed energy diplomacy.

Conclusion: escalation without victory

The tragedy of this triangle is that none of its vertices truly desires total war — yet each believes deterrence requires visible resolve.

The most probable outcome of American preparatory measures is not regime change in Tehran nor decisive strategic transformation, but controlled escalation punctuated by intermittent violence — a conflict managed at the edge of catastrophe.

Yet history teaches that wars rarely unfold according to design. Miscalculation — a missile that strikes deeper than intended, a civilian vessel sunk, a symbolic target destroyed — can convert calibrated signalling into uncontrollable spiral.

The Middle East has long been a theatre where local grievances intersect with global consequence. In an era of brittle supply chains and polarised politics, the margin for error is thinner than at any point in recent memory.

Should escalation occur, the consequences will not be confined to deserts and straits. They will be felt in the price of bread in Cairo, the cost of fuel in Berlin, the stability of currencies in Asia and the strategic bandwidth available to defend Ukraine.

The triangle’s geometry is simple. Its consequences are not.