The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Friday 27 February 2026

The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan that has erupted into open hostilities in early 2026 is the latest chapter in a long and fraught relationship between two neighbours whose histories have been intertwined since the middle of the twentieth century. What began as longstanding diplomatic and border disputes has now escalated into cross-border confrontation involving airstrikes, artillery exchanges and reciprocal military operations. To understand how this crisis unfolded, one must look both to deep historical roots and to the immediate triggers that have brought the two nations to the brink of sustained war.

At the heart of Afghan–Pakistani tensions lies a dispute over the Durand Line — the 2,600-kilometre demarcation first drawn by the British in 1893 to separate British India from the Emirate of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has long considered this boundary to be imposed and illegitimate, particularly because it divides Pashtun and Baloch tribal homelands on either side of the frontier. Pakistan’s acceptance of the Durand Line as her international border has been a recurring source of distrust and antagonism. In the twentieth century this led to episodes such as the 1955 riots at the Pakistani embassy and consulates in Kabul, prompted in part by Afghan opposition to Pakistan’s internal administrative changes in the Pashtun-dominated regions. These early flashpoints demonstrated the persistence of deep set grievances that would resurface repeatedly in subsequent decades.

The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries introduced further complexity. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the subsequent civil war and the rise of militant Islamist groups created fertile ground for non-state actors whose activities spilled across borders. During the Afghan Civil War in the 1990s and later during the United States’ intervention beginning in 2001, Pakistan was widely perceived — both within Afghanistan and internationally — as a sanctuary and supporter for certain Afghan militia factions, most notably the Taliban. Although Islamabad denied direct support, this perception bred deep resentment and mistrust in Kabul.

The withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in 2021 and the rapid return of the Taliban to power did not ease these tensions. Islamabad initially welcomed the Taliban government, expecting that ideological affinity and Pakistan’s influence would make Kabul a predictable partner. Instead the Taliban asserted a degree of independence that surprised many in Islamabad, and relations gradually cooled as Pakistan faced a rising insurgency by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan — a Pakistani militant group that uses Afghan border areas as operational space. Islamabad has repeatedly accused Kabul of failing to prevent these fighters from organising and launching attacks on Pakistani soil, a charge the Taliban government has consistently denied.

By late 2025 these simmering frictions boiled over into open confrontation. Pakistan conducted airstrikes inside Afghanistan, including in eastern provinces bordering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, asserting that they were targeting TTP leadership and militant hideouts. Afghan authorities described the strikes as violations of sovereignty and condemned resultant civilian casualties. In retaliation, Afghan Taliban forces attacked Pakistani military positions along the frontier, illuminating the fragility of diplomatic understandings and ceasefires.

The conflict has continued into 2026 with intermittent exchanges of fire and further air operations. Pakistan frames her actions as defensive counter-terrorism measures; Afghanistan frames hers as resistance to aggression. Both narratives contain elements of truth — and both omit inconvenient realities. Pakistan does face a serious insurgent threat emanating from the frontier regions. Afghanistan, however, remains a sovereign state whose rulers are unlikely to tolerate repeated violations of territorial integrity without response.

What, then, are the likely future scenarios?

The first — and most probable in the short term — is controlled escalation followed by tacit stabilisation. Under this scenario, Pakistan continues limited cross-border strikes aimed at specific militant targets, while avoiding sustained ground incursions. Afghanistan responds symbolically, perhaps with artillery or border raids, but refrains from full mobilisation. Behind the scenes, intermediaries — likely Qatar, China or regional Gulf states — facilitate de-escalatory dialogue. Neither Kabul nor Islamabad benefits from a prolonged conventional war. Pakistan’s economy is fragile and her armed forces are already stretched; Afghanistan’s Taliban government seeks international recognition and cannot afford total isolation. This scenario resembles a managed hostility rather than a declared war.

The second scenario is gradual escalation into a sustained frontier conflict. Should civilian casualties mount or a high-profile attack inside Pakistan be attributed — rightly or wrongly — to Afghan-based militants, Islamabad could expand air operations or deploy ground forces into Afghan territory. Kabul, in turn, might mobilise tribal fighters and integrate them into a broader defensive campaign. The mountainous geography of the borderlands favours insurgent warfare rather than conventional manoeuvre, raising the prospect of a drawn-out, low-intensity conflict reminiscent of earlier Afghan wars. In this scenario, the Durand Line becomes not merely disputed but actively militarised, with fortified crossings, economic strangulation and chronic instability.

A third, more strategically transformative scenario involves internal fracture rather than interstate war. The Taliban government is not monolithic. Divergent factions exist within its leadership, some more closely aligned with transnational militant networks than others. Sustained Pakistani pressure might empower hard-line elements within the Taliban who advocate a more confrontational stance. Conversely, it might strengthen pragmatists who see accommodation with Pakistan as necessary for economic survival. Should factional tensions sharpen, Afghanistan could experience internal instability that spills across the border — not through deliberate aggression but through fragmentation of authority. For Pakistan this would present a paradox: military pressure intended to impose order might instead generate greater chaos.

A fourth scenario introduces wider regional entanglement. China, which maintains significant economic interests in Pakistan through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, has an interest in frontier stability. Iran, sharing a border with Afghanistan, watches developments closely. India, historically adversarial towards Pakistan, observes any weakening of Pakistani internal security with strategic interest. None of these powers is likely to intervene directly, but diplomatic alignments and security assistance could subtly shift the balance. In such a scenario, what appears as a bilateral border dispute acquires a broader geopolitical dimension.

Finally, there remains a narrow but significant possibility of negotiated recalibration. This would require both sides to address the core issue: the presence and activity of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Afghan territory. A structured mechanism for joint monitoring of the frontier, intelligence sharing and phased demilitarisation could emerge. For this to succeed, Kabul would need to demonstrate credible action against militant actors; Islamabad would need to reduce unilateral cross-border strikes. The obstacle is mutual distrust — a legacy stretching back to 1893.

The human cost of all these scenarios is substantial. Civilians in Kunar, Paktika, Khyber and Balochistan bear the brunt of artillery exchanges and aerial bombardment. Border closures disrupt trade and entrench poverty. Refugee flows could intensify if violence spreads. A frontier that has long been economically marginal risks becoming permanently securitised.

The current Afghan–Pakistani conflict is not an isolated eruption but the culmination of more than a century of contested boundaries, shifting alliances and unresolved insurgencies. Whether the present crisis settles into managed hostility, escalates into sustained confrontation or catalyses internal fragmentation will depend upon political calculations in Kabul and Islamabad — and upon whether either capital is willing to confront the underlying realities of militant sanctuary and contested sovereignty. Without such reckoning, the Durand Line will remain not merely a line on a map, but a fault line in the geopolitics of South Asia.