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The Summit of Nothing? Shenzhen, the Return of Yalta and the Dangerous Illusion of Peace

1 day ago
21 min read

By Matthew Parish


Saturday 21 November 2026


There is something almost magnificent about the capacity of international diplomacy to transform very little into an event of supposedly historic importance. Three of the most powerful men in the world assemble around an expensive conference table, exchange elaborate compliments, pose for photographs, congratulate themselves upon their mutual wisdom and issue a declaration announcing their commitment to peace. Meanwhile the wars continue, the missiles fly and the bodies accumulate. The principal achievement of the occasion appears to be that everyone has enjoyed an agreeable succession of handshakes, accompanied by the reassuring conviction that something momentous has occurred.


The trilateral summit between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, held in Shenzhen, China on 19 November 2026, initially appeared to be a particularly spectacular example of this phenomenon. Advertised as an unprecedented meeting between the leaders of the United States, Russia and China, it was supposed to demonstrate that the world's greatest geopolitical antagonists could resolve their differences through personal diplomacy. After approximately eighty minutes, however, the three leaders emerged with a document that might charitably be described as an expression of good intentions. Less charitably, it was an exercise in collective political evasion.


The declaration contained four broad subjects of agreement. The participants wanted reform of the United Nations, increased supplies of refined petroleum products, greater restraint upon the jurisdiction of international criminal courts and measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war. These were propositions of such extraordinary generality that one might reasonably wonder why three heads of state needed to travel across the world to agree upon them. Much of the declaration could have been produced by any competent committee of junior diplomats without requiring the personal attendance of their political masters.


Most remarkable was what the declaration did not contain. There was no reference to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, now approaching the conclusion of its fifth calendar year, nor to the American-led war against Iran. There was no proposed ceasefire, no peacekeeping mechanism, no negotiated security arrangement and no timetable for further substantive discussions about either conflict. One might have imagined that a gathering dedicated to international peace would find some occasion to mention the international wars that threaten it.


Yet during the twenty-four hours following the summit, a more complicated picture emerged. The assembled leaders had discussed Ukraine, notwithstanding its exclusion from their written declaration. Trump subsequently revealed that he had held what he described as very good discussions with Putin, while his representatives, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, simultaneously engaged in substantial negotiations with Ukraine's European allies in Berlin. Putin announced a willingness, at least in principle, to involve European governments in future negotiations about Ukraine and the wider security architecture of Europe.


Suddenly the Shenzhen summit began to look rather different. It might not have been a meaningless exercise after all, but rather the opening movement in an attempt to renegotiate the European security order, with consequences extending far beyond Ukraine. Whether this represents progress towards peace or an invitation to geopolitical catastrophe remains profoundly uncertain. The events that followed the summit suggest that the danger may lie less in its apparent lack of substance than in the political ambitions concealed beneath its diplomatic generalities.


The return of the great-power concert


The first question is what the three participants actually believed they were doing in Shenzhen. Their public statements suggest that they regard international relations increasingly as a matter principally for powerful states, whose leaders possess some special entitlement to determine the general arrangements under which smaller nations must live.


Xi Jinping emphasised the historical responsibilities of China, Russia and the United States as victorious powers of the Second World War. Putin echoed the same theme, arguing that the three countries shared a particular responsibility for maintaining international stability. Trump celebrated the unprecedented character of the gathering and the supposed opportunities created by personal diplomacy. Beneath these apparently innocuous declarations lies a common assumption that international order is best secured through understandings between the most powerful governments.


This language recalls the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe, under which the principal continental powers attempted to preserve international stability through understandings between themselves. It also recalls the darker aspects of the Yalta Conference of February 1945, at which Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed the arrangements under which post-war Europe would be governed. In both cases, the preservation of stability amongst the strongest states could come at the expense of the political independence of smaller ones. The language of order and security has often concealed arrangements in which the interests of weaker nations are treated as negotiable commodities.


The historical analogy should not be exaggerated. The Shenzhen summit reached no agreement dividing Europe into spheres of influence, nor is there evidence of a secret settlement disposing of Ukraine's territory or independence. Nevertheless, the underlying temptation is unmistakable: powerful governments may find it convenient to imagine that peace consists of an accommodation between themselves, regardless of whether the states most immediately affected consent to the result. This conception of international affairs has repeatedly produced settlements that appear stable from the perspective of great capitals but are experienced as intolerable injustices by the people living under them.


This is particularly dangerous in the case of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine is not an unfortunate administrative complication in the construction of a new European security order, but a sovereign state whose independence is protected by international law and whose people have resisted invasion for almost five years. Its government cannot simply be excluded from discussions concerning the country's future. The danger of a new Yalta is not necessarily that three men will draw lines on a map and sign an agreement, but that they might gradually establish the assumption that Russia has some entitlement to dictate the military and political arrangements of its neighbours in exchange for promising to cease doing what international law already prohibits.


Such an arrangement would not constitute a durable peace settlement. It would amount to the institutionalisation of a threat, creating a permanent incentive for Russia to employ military force whenever it wished to extract further political concessions. The supposed stability achieved through great-power compromise would therefore rest upon the continuing insecurity of smaller states. History provides ample reason to doubt the durability of any international order constructed upon such foundations.


Trump's discovery that Putin wants peace


On 20 November, Trump returned to Washington and announced that his discussions with Putin concerning Ukraine had been extremely promising. He asserted that the Russian President had expressed a desire to conclude the war through diplomatic means and suggested that a negotiated settlement might now be within reach. These remarks followed a remarkable intervention during the Berlin meeting of the Coalition of the Willing, at which Ukraine's European allies were discussing the next stages of diplomatic engagement with Russia. Trump telephoned the assembled leaders from Air Force One, communicating through his representatives and expressing his conviction that Putin genuinely wanted to end the conflict.


There is an obvious difficulty with this proposition. Putin has repeatedly declared his willingness to achieve peace while simultaneously demanding conditions that would substantially compromise Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity or national security. The assertion that he wants peace is consequently ambiguous unless it is accompanied by a description of the terms upon which he proposes to achieve it. Almost every belligerent in history has professed some desire for peace, although the peace envisaged has frequently involved the complete submission of the opposing party.


A government may sincerely desire the conclusion of a war because it has achieved its objectives. A government may equally desire a cessation of hostilities because it requires time to replenish its military resources. Neither circumstance necessarily implies a commitment to a lasting and just settlement. The relevant question is therefore not whether Putin desires an end to the fighting in some abstract sense, but what political and military arrangements he would accept in return.


Trump appears to attach considerable importance to his personal assessment of Putin's intentions. The President evidently believes that his ability to establish a cordial relationship with the Russian leader gives him privileged insight into the prospects for an agreement. But diplomacy cannot ultimately rest upon the proposition that one politician thinks another politician is a decent fellow. International agreements must be assessed by their terms, their enforceability and the incentives they create for subsequent behaviour.


The central question is not whether Putin has persuaded Trump that he wishes to end the war. It is whether Putin is prepared to abandon the military and political objectives that caused the war, or at least accept a settlement that leaves Ukraine genuinely capable of defending its independence. On this question, Shenzhen has yet to produce persuasive evidence of progress. Indeed, developments on the battlefield suggest that Russia continues to regard military coercion as an indispensable instrument of its diplomatic strategy.


Putin's invitation to Europe


A more interesting development concerns Putin's announcement that European governments might participate in future peace negotiations. Speaking after the summit, the Russian President acknowledged that questions involving European security could not sensibly be resolved without European participation. He suggested that European representatives might travel to Moscow to explain their positions, after which Russia would consider the format of further discussions.


At first sight, this seems an important concession. European governments have complained repeatedly that the Trump administration has engaged in discussions with Moscow concerning European security without adequately involving the countries whose interests are at stake. The possibility that Russia might now accept European participation is therefore welcome in principle. Yet the terms of Putin's invitation deserve close scrutiny, particularly because they may conceal ambitions considerably broader than the settlement of the war in Ukraine.


Putin is not merely proposing European involvement in negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. He is also proposing a discussion of the wider European security architecture, an objective that would potentially encompass the future of NATO, the military arrangements of Eastern Europe and the strategic relationships between Russia and its neighbours. This is a substantially more ambitious undertaking than negotiating a ceasefire. It creates the possibility that Russia will attempt to exchange limited concessions concerning Ukraine for far-reaching changes to the European order.


Russia has long opposed the enlargement of NATO and has sought constraints upon the military relationships of states formerly subject to Soviet influence. The Kremlin has repeatedly presented the choices of sovereign European governments concerning their defence alliances as threats to Russian security. There is nothing inherently objectionable about discussions concerning mutual military security, since arms control, confidence-building measures and mechanisms for preventing accidental escalation are legitimate subjects of negotiation between adversarial states. But it would be deeply objectionable if Russia were permitted to transform her war against Ukraine into an opportunity to renegotiate the sovereignty of its neighbours.


Nor is an invitation to Moscow necessarily evidence of a genuine concession. It places the diplomatic initiative firmly in Russian hands and implicitly invites European governments to present themselves before the Kremlin for examination. A neutral negotiating venue would carry a different symbolism and avoid some of the political disadvantages of appearing to seek admission to discussions on Moscow's terms. Putin's announcement may represent the beginning of a constructive diplomatic process, but equally it may be an effort to exchange a limited willingness to talk for recognition of Russia as an indispensable architect of Europe's future.


Europe would be unwise to confuse these two possibilities. The language of negotiation may be identical in each case, but the consequences could scarcely be more different. One would provide a route towards restoring the security arrangements that Russia has violated, while the other would reward that violation by granting Moscow a privileged role in determining the future independence of its neighbours.


Europe's rejection of another Yalta


One of the most significant developments following Shenzhen has been the unusually forthright response of European leaders meeting in Berlin. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz rejected the proposition that European security could be resolved through another Yalta-style arrangement, while French President Emmanuel Macron similarly insisted that European states must determine their own future rather than become the passive subjects of negotiations between outside powers. British Prime Minister Andy Burnham emphasised that Ukraine must participate in decisions concerning its own future and that European states must be represented in discussions about the security of their continent.


This is not merely diplomatic indignation. It reflects a genuine change in the structure of contemporary international relations and the growing recognition that Europe may increasingly need to exercise strategic independence from Washington. For much of the post-war period, Western European governments operated on the assumption that the United States would remain the ultimate guarantor of their collective security. The transatlantic alliance survived successive crises because its members shared a reasonably consistent understanding of their fundamental strategic interests.


Trump's approach to Russia has placed that assumption under considerable strain. European leaders can no longer be entirely confident that Washington will consistently prioritise the defence of European sovereignty over the attractions of a negotiated accommodation with Moscow. The Berlin meeting therefore acquired an importance that the Shenzhen summit itself lacked. Whereas the three great powers produced a declaration of generalities, European governments attempted to define a coherent negotiating position.


The Coalition of the Willing reaffirmed substantial military and financial commitments to Ukraine, including the objective of maintaining at least €70 billion annually in military equipment, assistance and training during 2027. It also discussed new financial arrangements, additional air defence capabilities and mechanisms for strengthening Ukraine's position before negotiations. Perhaps most importantly, it set out the principle that the settlement of the war must be accompanied by credible security guarantees, rather than merely promises of Russian restraint. This distinction goes to the heart of whether any eventual agreement can be expected to endure.


The Europeans have also begun organising themselves for direct participation in future negotiations. A common negotiating representation involving the principal European powers, European institutions and NATO would substantially strengthen their capacity to resist arrangements imposed without their consent. Whether this emerging unity survives the pressures of actual negotiations remains uncertain, especially given the differing strategic interests and domestic political circumstances of European governments. Nevertheless, its significance should not be underestimated, because an organised European diplomatic position may be the principal obstacle to the emergence of another great-power settlement conducted over the heads of those most directly affected.


The dangerous ambiguity of NATO-style guarantees


Amongst the most intriguing reports emerging from Berlin was Jared Kushner's suggestion that Russia might be prepared to accept security guarantees for Ukraine resembling Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 establishes the principle of collective defence, under which an armed attack against one NATO member is treated as an attack against all. It does not automatically require every member to undertake military action, but its political significance rests upon the expectation that aggression against one member will trigger a collective response.


An arrangement providing Ukraine with comparable protection, even without immediate NATO membership, could theoretically become an important component of a lasting peace. Yet the details would be decisive, because a guarantee that depends upon a future American President choosing to assist Ukraine would be weaker than a binding collective defence commitment. A promise of continued military supplies is different from an obligation to intervene in the event of renewed aggression, while an international monitoring mission is different again. The various possible meanings of a security guarantee must therefore be distinguished with precision before Ukraine is asked to make concessions in reliance upon them.


Kushner's suggestion must also be contrasted with the statements emerging from Moscow. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has rejected the prospect of a quasi-NATO arrangement for Ukraine, while Putin himself has insisted that Russian security concerns must be considered alongside those of Ukraine. Furthermore, Trump stated on 20 November that he did not wish to discuss security guarantees in the absence of an agreement to end the war. The resulting picture is one of profound uncertainty concerning the commitments that might ultimately underpin a settlement.


The contradiction is significant. Washington's representatives appear interested in the possibility of NATO-style protection, while the President remains unwilling to make firm commitments before a settlement has been reached. Russia, meanwhile, has offered no unequivocal acceptance of the arrangements apparently being contemplated. The very subject that should form the foundation of a lasting peace therefore remains among the least clearly defined elements of the proposed diplomatic process.


For Ukraine, this ambiguity is potentially disastrous. It would be dangerous to agree to territorial or military concessions in reliance upon security guarantees whose precise terms, legal status and enforcement mechanisms remain undetermined. Ukraine's experience of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 provides a historical warning, since political assurances concerning sovereignty and existing frontiers did not prevent subsequent Russian aggression. Any new arrangement must therefore distinguish between diplomatic reassurance and enforceable security commitments.


The former may provide a comforting paragraph in a treaty, but the latter requires military capabilities, institutional obligations and a credible willingness to respond to violations. Peace cannot be secured by an assurance that everything will probably be all right, particularly when the party offering such reassurance may not be the government required to honour it in the future. Ukraine needs security arrangements that survive elections, changes of government and shifts in the diplomatic preferences of foreign leaders. Anything less risks repeating the failures of the international assurances upon which Ukraine once relied.


The missiles that followed the peace declaration


If any event illustrates the distance between diplomatic rhetoric and military reality, it is Russia's conduct during the night following the Shenzhen summit. Within hours of the three leaders announcing their commitment to international peace, Russian forces launched one of the largest aerial attacks of the war against Ukraine. The assault involved hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles, including cruise missiles and more advanced weapons.


Ukrainian authorities reported substantial damage to energy infrastructure, disruption to electricity supplies and civilian casualties across the country. By the afternoon of 20 November, reports indicated that twelve people had been killed and eighty-two injured in Russian attacks over the preceding day. The bombardment was particularly disturbing because of its geographical extent, with Kyiv suffering attacks upon important infrastructure while western Ukrainian regions experienced renewed disruption to their electricity supplies.


Lviv, a city far removed from the principal front lines, was not spared. Russian strikes reportedly killed two people and injured others, including victims at the city's railway infrastructure. Emergency power restrictions were introduced across parts of western Ukraine, including Lviv, Zakarpattia and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts. For millions of Ukrainians, the practical consequences of international diplomacy were therefore invisible beside the immediate realities of damaged infrastructure, interrupted electricity and the renewed fear of aerial attack.


There is a bitter irony in these events. The assembled leaders had found time to discuss the international supply of refined petroleum products, but not to secure the electricity supply of Ukrainian households facing another winter under Russian bombardment. They had declared their general commitment to international peace while failing to make any public commitment to restrain the military campaign that continued during their discussions. The contrast between the diplomatic language of Shenzhen and the destruction unfolding across Ukraine could scarcely have been more grotesque.


The attacks followed Putin's threats of retaliation for Ukrainian operations against the strategic bridge linking Russia with occupied Crimea. They demonstrate that Moscow continues to regard large-scale military violence as an instrument of political pressure even while engaging in discussions about peace. Indeed the timing raises an uncomfortable question about whether the bombardment was simply another manifestation of Russia's established military strategy or was also intended to remind Ukraine and its allies of the costs of refusing Moscow's demands. Although the intentions behind individual military operations cannot always be established, their political effects are unmistakable.


Russia continues to inflict civilian suffering while simultaneously presenting itself as a constructive participant in international peace negotiations. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Putin's negotiating strategy, since military coercion and diplomacy can be complementary instruments of statecraft. A government may intensify attacks precisely because it believes that increasing the pressure upon its opponent will improve the terms available at the negotiating table. The danger is that Western governments, eager for an agreement, may mistake this combination of diplomacy and violence for evidence of Russian flexibility when it may demonstrate precisely the opposite.


Peace through exhaustion


There is a further complication in the Trump administration's apparent preference for a rapid settlement. Reports from the Berlin meeting suggest that Trump questioned the continuing expenditure of enormous sums upon Ukraine, arguing that a peace agreement would allow European governments to devote their resources elsewhere. This argument has considerable superficial appeal, since wars are extraordinarily expensive and Europe has other substantial economic and social priorities. A settlement that ended the fighting would undoubtedly relieve immense financial pressures upon governments across the continent.


But this reasoning becomes dangerous when it treats the cost of resisting aggression as greater than the cost of permitting aggression to succeed. The relevant comparison is not between an expensive war and a cost-free peace, but between the present expenditure required to resist Russia and the potentially greater costs of a settlement that leaves Europe exposed to further military threats. The economic consequences of a defective peace agreement may be less immediately visible than the financial demands of continued military assistance, but they may ultimately be considerably more severe.


If Russia emerges from the conflict having established that armed aggression can secure territorial concessions and restrictions upon the sovereign choices of neighbouring states, the resulting precedent may prove enormously expensive. European governments would be obliged to strengthen their own armed forces, reinforce vulnerable frontiers and prepare for the possibility of renewed Russian military action. Ukraine itself would face the permanent threat that a temporary ceasefire might become an opportunity for Moscow to replenish its military resources.


The economic case for ending the war cannot therefore be separated from the strategic conditions under which it ends. A settlement that leaves Russia free to resume military operations after a period of recuperation may merely postpone the costs of the conflict while increasing their eventual magnitude. A cheap peace that leads to another war is not cheap, but merely an instalment arrangement for future catastrophe. The prudent management of public finances requires governments to consider the costs of insecurity as well as the immediate expense of resisting it.


The unfinished business of international justice


One of the most troubling aspects of the Shenzhen declaration remains its criticism of the International Criminal Court and other international judicial institutions. The three governments emphasised the need for judicial restraint, state consent and respect for the immunities of public officials. On the surface, these are legitimate legal concerns, since international courts must exercise jurisdiction within the limits established by the instruments creating them and the law of state immunity remains an important component of international relations. But the political setting in which these declarations were made is impossible to ignore.


Putin is personally subject to an ICC arrest warrant concerning the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. The United States has longstanding objections to aspects of the Court's jurisdiction, while China has traditionally emphasised national sovereignty as a restraint upon international legal intervention. The three governments consequently possess overlapping interests in limiting the authority of international criminal institutions, although their legal positions are not identical. Their agreement upon the importance of judicial restraint should therefore be understood in light of their respective political concerns about international accountability.


There is an important distinction between insisting that courts obey jurisdictional limits and suggesting that heads of state should enjoy effective immunity from accountability for international crimes. The Rome Statute expressly rejects the proposition that official position necessarily exempts an individual from criminal responsibility before the Court. These legal questions cannot be resolved simply through declarations issued by political leaders who may have personal or institutional reasons to prefer a narrower conception of international criminal responsibility.


This matters particularly if negotiations about Ukraine eventually encompass questions of sanctions relief, reconstruction, reparations and the treatment of alleged war crimes. International peace agreements sometimes require difficult compromises concerning responsibility for past conduct, but there is a profound moral danger in allowing the leaders responsible for military aggression to establish rules protecting themselves against subsequent judicial scrutiny. A peace settlement that disregards the rights of victims may end immediate hostilities without achieving justice. Nor is there any guarantee that the resulting political arrangement will prove durable.


The inclusion of international judicial immunity in the Shenzhen declaration, while Ukraine itself was omitted, remains one of the most revealing features of the gathering. Three powerful governments found common ground in restricting the possible reach of international justice, even as they failed publicly to address the military violence that makes such justice necessary. It is difficult to imagine a more uncomfortable illustration of the distance between the interests of statesmen and those of the populations affected by their decisions.


China's victory without responsibility


China's position is perhaps the easiest to understand. Xi Jinping hosted an unprecedented meeting of the leaders of the other two principal nuclear powers, positioning Beijing at the centre of global diplomatic attention. This was a considerable symbolic achievement, because China's growing economic and political influence has long encouraged its leadership to present the country as an indispensable participant in the management of international affairs. The summit strengthened the impression that major international questions can no longer be resolved without Beijing's participation.


Yet the summit also demonstrated the limits of China's willingness to assume the responsibilities of mediation. Beijing showed little inclination to press Russia towards meaningful concessions over Ukraine, just as it avoided commitments that might draw it directly into efforts to resolve the war involving Iran. The advantages of this position are obvious, since China obtains the prestige associated with convening the world's most powerful governments without accepting responsibility for the failure of negotiations between them.


China can present herself as a responsible defender of global stability while maintaining its strategic partnership with Moscow and preserving important economic relationships with the United States. The fact that Ukraine and Iran were discussed without appearing in the final declaration is entirely consistent with such an approach. Beijing can facilitate dialogue without becoming accountable for its results, thereby preserving considerable diplomatic flexibility while strengthening its international prestige.


China's willingness to engage in discussions about nuclear risk reduction may ultimately prove important, particularly following the expiration of the New START treaty in February 2026. Any serious process involving the three major nuclear powers would deserve encouragement, especially as technological developments are creating new uncertainties concerning strategic stability. But expressions of support for nuclear restraint are not substitutes for negotiated limits upon weapons, verification mechanisms or binding commitments concerning strategic stability. The history of arms control demonstrates that durable achievements depend upon painstaking technical negotiations rather than the general goodwill expressed in summit declarations.


China has demonstrated that it can assemble the world's most powerful men around a table. It has not yet demonstrated that it can persuade them to change their behaviour or accept politically costly obligations in the interests of international peace. Hosting a summit and resolving a conflict are fundamentally different diplomatic achievements. Beijing has accomplished the former, while the latter remains an aspiration rather than an established result.


A diplomatic process or a dangerous illusion?


The events following Shenzhen require a modification of the original judgement that the summit was simply an expensive failure. Although its formal declaration was remarkably insubstantial, the subsequent conversations indicate that a more consequential diplomatic process may be developing. There are grounds for limited encouragement, since Trump has evidently maintained direct contact with Putin, European governments are moving towards a more unified negotiating position, Ukraine remains engaged with its principal partners and discussions about credible post-war security guarantees have become more prominent.


Even Putin's suggestion that European governments should participate in negotiations may prove valuable if it results in a genuine multilateral process conducted on reasonable terms. Direct communication between adversarial governments is not inherently objectionable, and the history of successful diplomacy demonstrates that preliminary conversations can eventually produce significant agreements. But there are equally substantial reasons for alarm, particularly because the objectives of the respective participants remain profoundly different.


Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities while claiming to desire peace. Trump appears persuaded of Putin's sincerity without having secured public evidence of meaningful concessions, while the United States has offered mixed signals concerning the security commitments it might ultimately undertake. China has achieved diplomatic prestige without assuming significant responsibility for resolving the conflicts under discussion. Europe, meanwhile, faces the possibility that Russia will attempt to use negotiations over Ukraine to reopen fundamental questions concerning the security order established after the Cold War.


The danger is not simply that negotiations may fail. It is that negotiations may succeed on terms that reward aggression, weaken Ukrainian sovereignty and establish precedents capable of destabilising Europe for decades. International relations occasionally require compromises between unpleasant alternatives, and it would be foolish to insist that every conceivable peace agreement must satisfy an abstract conception of perfect justice. But there is a difference between recognising the compromises imposed by military reality and accepting the proposition that the strongest states are entitled to organise the political affairs of their weaker neighbours.


Ukraine has spent almost five years demonstrating that sovereignty is not a commodity to be exchanged casually between great powers. Its survival has depended upon military resistance, national solidarity and the support of states that continue to regard the prohibition of aggressive war as a fundamental principle of international order. These achievements must not be sacrificed merely because three political leaders have discovered that they enjoy one another's company. Personal diplomacy may assist the settlement of international disputes, but it cannot substitute for respect for sovereignty, credible security arrangements and the practical enforcement of agreements.


The true meaning of Shenzhen


The Shenzhen summit may eventually be remembered as the beginning of an important diplomatic process. If it contributes to a sustainable settlement of the war in Ukraine, credible international security arrangements and renewed efforts at nuclear arms control, historians may regard its disappointing declaration as a modest beginning to something more consequential. Great diplomatic achievements have sometimes emerged from meetings that appeared inconclusive at the time, and the subsequent history of this summit remains unwritten.


Yet an alternative interpretation remains equally plausible. Shenzhen may prove to have been an attempt to revive a system of international relations in which a handful of powerful states establish understandings among themselves while the rights and security of smaller nations become matters of secondary importance. Such an arrangement might satisfy the immediate political ambitions of the governments involved while creating conditions for future instability. The language of peace would then become a means of legitimising the distribution of power rather than restraining its abuse.


The distinction will not be determined by subsequent declarations. It will be determined by what happens on the battlefield, whether Russia accepts meaningful limitations upon its future conduct and whether Ukraine emerges from negotiations with its independence intact and its security substantially improved. There is also a more immediate test, because the Coalition of the Willing has called for a winter ceasefire concerning Ukraine's energy infrastructure, alongside measures protecting navigation and food exports in the Black Sea. These are limited objectives, but they are concrete and capable of verification.


If Putin genuinely wishes to demonstrate the sincerity of his diplomatic intentions, he might begin by ceasing the deliberate destruction of Ukraine's electricity infrastructure during the winter. Such an undertaking would not resolve the conflict, but it would provide tangible evidence that the Kremlin is prepared to exercise restraint for purposes other than improving its negotiating position. Until then, the spectacle of the Russian President discussing international peace while his armed forces continue to attack Ukrainian cities will remain an illustration of the hypocrisy that has come to characterise so much of modern diplomacy.


On 19 November, three men gathered in Shenzhen and proclaimed their shared commitment to peace. On 20 November, Donald Trump returned to Washington proclaiming that Vladimir Putin wanted a deal, European governments began organising themselves against the possibility of another Yalta and Russian missiles continued to fall upon Ukrainian cities. The diplomats have therefore obtained something more substantial than the photographs that originally appeared to be the summit's only achievement. They have obtained the beginnings of another negotiation, accompanied by all the familiar contradictions, ambiguities and dangers of international diplomacy.


For the people of Ukraine, however, the fundamental position remains unchanged. The electricity fails, the air raid sirens sound and civilians continue to die while powerful men debate the meaning of peace. The distance between international diplomacy and the experience of those living under bombardment remains as enormous as ever, notwithstanding the agreeable words spoken by the assembled leaders in China.


The difference between the two days is that the world has acquired another diplomatic process, with all the opportunities and perils that such a development entails. It has not yet acquired any more peace, and until the negotiations produce something that alters the daily experience of Ukrainians, the summit's claim to historical significance must remain a matter of profound scepticism.

 
 

Note from Matthew Parish, Editor-in-Chief. The Lviv Herald is a unique and independent source of analytical journalism about the war in Ukraine and its aftermath, and all the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the war as well as the tremendous advances in military technology the war has yielded. To achieve this independence, we rely exclusively on donations. Please donate if you can, with the buttons at the top of this page.

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