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The Disappearance of the Emotional Self: Michel Foucault and the Tyranny of Technological Rationality

27 minutes ago
16 min read

By Matthew Parish


Sunday 22 November 2026


Are human beings becoming less emotional as technology progressively eliminates the spaces in which irrationality, spontaneity and unregulated expressions of the self can flourish? The philosophy of Michel Foucault suggests that technological progress may be transforming not merely how we live but the very nature of what it means to be human.


There is an unsettling paradox at the centre of modern civilisation. As human beings become progressively more intelligent in their collective capacity to understand and manipulate the world, they appear to be losing something of their individual capacity to experience it. The extraordinary advances in technology over the last century, culminating in artificial intelligence systems capable of performing intellectual tasks previously considered exclusively human, have brought unprecedented efficiencies to almost every aspect of existence. Yet these efficiencies come at a price that is difficult to measure. They progressively eliminate the spaces in which human beings may behave irrationally, experience emotions without explanation or pursue activities whose value cannot be expressed in rational or economic terms.


Consider the ordinary experiences of contemporary life. We increasingly arrange our romantic encounters through algorithms, measure our physical health through wearable devices, manage our friendships through digital communications and optimise our professional activities according to numerical indicators of productivity. Even our leisure is becoming subject to technological organisation. Music is recommended according to our listening histories, books according to our previous preferences and holidays according to patterns inferred from our past behaviour. There is less and less room for the unexpected, the inexplicable or the spontaneous.


This raises a profound philosophical question. Are we becoming less emotional as technology advances, or are our emotions merely being reorganised into forms that technological systems can comprehend, classify and control? The distinction is of considerable importance, because the disappearance of emotional experience is something very different from the suppression or regulation of its expression.


The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984) provides a particularly powerful intellectual framework within which to consider this problem. Although he died long before the emergence of contemporary artificial intelligence, his investigations into the relationships between knowledge, power, discipline and human subjectivity anticipated many of the most disturbing characteristics of our technological civilisation. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the increasingly comprehensive rationalisation of human life represents the culmination of historical processes that Foucault spent his intellectual career attempting to understand.


The rationalisation of the human being


The starting point for Foucault's analysis was a rejection of the comforting Enlightenment assumption that increases in human knowledge necessarily produce increases in human freedom. The history of Western civilisation, he argued, suggests a substantially more complicated relationship between rationality and emancipation. The same intellectual developments that permit human beings to understand their environment also furnish institutions with increasingly sophisticated means of regulating their behaviour.


In his celebrated work Discipline and Punish, published in 1975, Foucault explored the transformation of punishment from the spectacular physical violence of earlier centuries into the apparently more humane disciplinary institutions of modern society. The public execution, with its dreadful emotional intensity, gradually yielded to the prison, the timetable, the examination and the systematic observation of individuals. What appeared to be progress towards a more rational and compassionate social order also involved the creation of institutions capable of exercising unprecedented control over human conduct.


Foucault's argument was not that these historical transformations were simply undesirable. Few sensible people would prefer the public tortures of the eighteenth century to the comparative procedural protections of contemporary criminal justice systems. Rather, his insight was that modern institutions exercise power through techniques that are often invisible precisely because they present themselves as rational, scientific and benevolent.

The school teaches children to regulate their attention, their movements and their emotions. The workplace requires adults to subordinate their personal impulses to collective schedules and measurable objectives. The hospital translates subjective experiences of suffering into diagnostic categories, while psychiatric institutions distinguish acceptable emotional behaviour from pathological disturbance. In each case, a process of rational classification transforms the unpredictable individual into an object that can be observed, understood and administered.


The cumulative effect is the production of what Foucault described as docile bodies: human beings whose conduct has been organised to make them simultaneously productive and governable. This discipline does not necessarily operate through explicit coercion. More often, individuals internalise the expectations imposed upon them, eventually coming to experience externally defined standards of behaviour as expressions of their own identities.

It is here that Foucault's philosophy becomes especially relevant to contemporary technological society. What earlier institutions accomplished through physical supervision, modern technology can increasingly accomplish through continuous measurement, digital surveillance and algorithmic prediction. The rationalisation of human existence is no longer confined to particular institutions. It accompanies us everywhere.


The disappearance of unobserved life


One of Foucault's most influential intellectual devices was his discussion of the Panopticon, an architectural scheme proposed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham. The Panopticon was a prison in which inmates could be observed from a central location without knowing whether they were being watched at any particular moment. Its genius lay in the psychological effects of potential observation. Prisoners would eventually discipline themselves because they could never be certain when supervision was taking place.


Contemporary digital technology has created something resembling a universalised Panopticon, although one considerably more complicated than Bentham's original design. We carry devices that continuously generate records of our movements, communications, preferences and activities. Our employers may measure our productivity through computer systems. Our social relationships unfold increasingly upon platforms where expressions of personality become permanent or retrievable records. Even when nobody is deliberately watching us, the possibility of observation influences our behaviour.


The consequences for emotional spontaneity deserve particular attention. Many of the most important expressions of human personality occur when individuals believe themselves to be unobserved. We sing badly in empty rooms, speak nonsense with intimate friends, indulge in unreasonable enthusiasms and entertain fantasies that we would never wish to explain to another person. These activities are not deficiencies awaiting technological correction. They are essential expressions of a personality that does not exist exclusively to satisfy external standards.


Yet the expansion of digital observation makes such experiences increasingly difficult to preserve. A drunken remark might be recorded, an unfortunate joke circulated internationally or an impulsive expression of anger retained indefinitely. The knowledge that one's conduct may become part of a permanent record encourages emotional caution. People learn to present themselves as controlled, consistent and publicly defensible individuals, even when their internal lives are anything but.


The danger is not simply that we become more reluctant to express ourselves. Over time, the persistent regulation of emotional expression may influence the emotions themselves. Human identity is partly constituted through habitual conduct, and a person who continually suppresses spontaneity may eventually lose some of the capacity to experience it.


A society organised around permanent accountability may therefore produce human beings who are outwardly reasonable but inwardly impoverished. They become skilled at explaining themselves, yet increasingly uncertain what they actually feel.


The colonisation of the irrational


There is something fundamentally peculiar about the modern ambition to make every aspect of human life intelligible. Human beings are not exclusively rational creatures, and much of what makes existence valuable arises precisely from our capacity to behave in ways that cannot be justified by instrumental reasoning.


Love is an obvious example. The decision to fall in love is rarely the outcome of a sensible comparison of available alternatives. Indeed, love frequently involves embracing emotional commitments that appear irrational when measured against considerations of convenience, stability or material advantage. The intensity of romantic attachment derives partly from its resistance to calculation. We love particular people not necessarily because they satisfy an objectively desirable collection of characteristics but because something about their individuality exercises an inexplicable power over us.


Technological systems increasingly attempt to rationalise this process. Dating applications classify individuals according to stated preferences, geographical proximity and behavioural patterns. Such services may be socially useful, especially for people who otherwise struggle to meet potential partners. Nevertheless, their organising principle treats romantic possibility as a problem of matching characteristics, thereby encouraging a conception of intimacy in which human beings are evaluated according to measurable attributes.


Something similar occurs in friendship. An accidental encounter in a café, a spontaneous conversation between strangers or the development of an unlikely companionship may produce experiences of profound emotional significance. These encounters cannot easily be predicted or optimised because their value often depends upon precisely those unexpected qualities that rational systems tend to exclude.


Art presents an even more striking example. Much of the greatest literature, music and painting is valuable because it communicates experiences that resist straightforward intellectual explanation. A piece of music may move us to tears without our being able to identify a rational proposition that it expresses. A poem may transform our understanding of existence through an arrangement of words whose emotional effects exceed their literal meaning.


The danger of technological rationalisation is that such experiences become increasingly understood through the language of utility. Music becomes content, friendship becomes networking, romance becomes compatibility and leisure becomes recovery from productive activity. Even happiness is converted into a measurable objective towards which individuals are encouraged to organise their lives.


In such a society, the irrational is not necessarily forbidden. It is progressively deprived of an independent justification for existing.


Foucault and the manufacture of normality


Foucault's contribution to this discussion goes beyond the proposition that institutions suppress individual freedom. His more radical suggestion was that social power actively participates in constructing the very forms of individuality that human beings believe to be natural.


We tend to imagine that there exists an authentic individual somewhere beneath the conventions and restrictions imposed by society. From this perspective, emotional liberation consists of removing external constraints so that our true personalities may emerge. Foucault was deeply suspicious of this conception. He argued that our understandings of ourselves are historically produced through systems of knowledge and social practices.


In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, he challenged the assumption that modern Western societies had simply repressed sexuality. On the contrary, he observed that modern institutions had generated an extraordinary proliferation of discourse about sexual behaviour, desire and identity. Medicine, psychiatry, education and law increasingly encouraged individuals to describe, classify and interpret their intimate experiences.


This was not merely a process of prohibiting certain forms of conduct. It was also a process of constructing categories through which human beings came to understand themselves. The individual was increasingly expected to possess an intelligible sexual identity, to explain its origins and to situate personal desires within a framework of socially recognised classifications.


The same argument can be extended to contemporary emotional life. We inhabit a culture that is remarkably enthusiastic about discussing feelings. People are encouraged to identify their emotional states, articulate their psychological needs, establish personal boundaries and seek therapeutic explanations for their behaviour. Mental health awareness has produced important benefits, not least by reducing some of the stigma associated with psychological suffering. Yet the universalisation of therapeutic language can also encourage the assumption that every emotional experience ought to be classified, interpreted and managed.


We may be witnessing not the disappearance of emotion but its transformation into an administrative object. Sadness becomes a condition to be monitored, anger an impulse to be regulated, anxiety a problem to be managed and happiness an objective to be pursued through deliberate techniques.


In this respect, technological rationality does not eliminate the emotional self. It requires the emotional self to become transparent to systems of knowledge.


Artificial intelligence and the perfectly reasonable personality


The development of artificial intelligence extends these processes into territory that Foucault could scarcely have imagined. Machines are increasingly capable of producing language, reasoning through complex problems, identifying patterns in human conduct and offering suggestions about almost every aspect of our lives. Their intellectual capacities are becoming extraordinary, and there is every reason to expect continued improvements in their ability to assist human beings with both professional and personal activities.


The philosophical problem is not that artificial intelligence is inherently hostile to emotional experience. On the contrary, these systems can help people express feelings that they otherwise struggle to articulate. They can assist with creative writing, provide intellectual companionship, encourage reflection and expand the range of cultural experiences available to individuals. Their capacity to liberate human beings from repetitive intellectual labour may create additional opportunities for the pursuit of activities motivated by pleasure rather than necessity.


Nevertheless, there is a danger that the increasing presence of artificial intelligence in everyday life may establish new expectations about the proper conduct of human beings. When machines can produce immediate, coherent and apparently reasonable responses to almost any question, human beings may come under increasing pressure to exhibit comparable qualities. Intellectual inconsistency, emotional hesitation and the inability to articulate one's thoughts may gradually become less socially tolerable.


Consider the ordinary experience of an argument between friends. Human disagreements are often untidy affairs involving misunderstanding, wounded pride, conflicting memories and emotional reactions that neither participant can adequately explain. The reconciliation that follows may depend less upon establishing who is objectively correct than upon recognising the peculiar emotional importance of the relationship.


An artificial intelligence system may help clarify the disagreement, identify logical inconsistencies and suggest a mutually satisfactory resolution. Yet there remains something irreducibly human about the fact that people sometimes need to be unreasonable with one another. Emotional relationships are not legal disputes requiring definitive settlement, and the imperfections of communication are often inseparable from intimacy itself.


The danger arises when the methods of technological reasoning cease to be instruments that serve human relationships and instead become standards against which those relationships are judged. We may begin to expect emotional life to possess the logical consistency of a well-constructed argument.


A perfectly reasonable personality might also be an extraordinarily boring one.


The management of the self


In his later writings and lectures, Foucault increasingly examined what he called the technologies of the self: practices through which individuals seek to transform their own conduct, identities and ways of living. These investigations complicated his earlier emphasis upon disciplinary institutions by examining how people participate in the formation of their own subjectivity.


The concept offers an especially useful way of understanding the contemporary enthusiasm for self-improvement. We are encouraged to monitor our sleep, improve our concentration, optimise our nutrition, regulate our emotions and organise our time. These activities may individually be admirable. The difficulty emerges when self-improvement ceases to be an occasional pursuit and becomes a permanent moral obligation.


An individual who does not monitor his productivity may be considered insufficiently ambitious. Someone who spends an afternoon doing nothing may experience guilt at having wasted potentially useful time. Even relaxation becomes a disciplined activity, undertaken because it supposedly improves subsequent professional performance.


The result is a peculiarly modern form of self-government. Nobody needs to order us to maximise our efficiency because we increasingly impose the obligation upon ourselves. Technological systems provide the instruments through which this self-supervision is conducted, while broader cultural expectations supply the reasons why we believe it necessary.


Foucault's concept of governmentality, concerned with the rationalities and techniques through which conduct is directed, illuminates this phenomenon. Modern power operates not merely by telling people what they must do but also by shaping the ways in which they understand their own interests and responsibilities.


The emotionally spontaneous individual presents a difficulty for such systems because spontaneity cannot reliably be predicted. A person who decides to abandon an important professional engagement because he suddenly wishes to watch the sunset is behaving irrationally according to conventional measures of efficiency. Yet he may also be exercising one of the most important freedoms available to a human being: the freedom to determine that something matters without being required to explain why.


A civilisation that progressively eliminates these possibilities may become extraordinarily efficient while losing sight of the purposes that efficiency was originally intended to serve.


Are we really becoming less emotional?


There is, however, a serious objection to the hypothesis that technological progress is making human beings less emotional. Contemporary society scarcely appears characterised by an absence of feeling. Social media platforms are saturated with anger, indignation, enthusiasm, envy and resentment. Political identities are frequently organised around intensely emotional attachments, while public controversies can provoke extraordinary displays of collective passion.


Digital technology has not simply suppressed emotional expression. In some respects, it has amplified it beyond anything previously possible. A momentary irritation can become a public denunciation attracting millions of spectators, while an individual tragedy can provoke an international wave of sympathy. Technological systems designed to maximise engagement may reward emotionally provocative material precisely because anger and excitement command human attention.


This suggests that the relationship between technological development and emotion is more complicated than a simple process of repression. We may be becoming less capable of spontaneous private emotion while simultaneously engaging in ever more elaborate public performances of feeling.


Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis is again instructive. We should be suspicious of the claim that modern society simply prohibits emotional expression. It may instead be producing particular kinds of emotion while discouraging others.


Anger expressed through social media can be measured, circulated and converted into advertising revenue. Romantic attraction expressed through a dating application becomes information about consumer preferences. Anxiety about personal health creates demand for monitoring devices and therapeutic services. Even dissatisfaction with modern life can be transformed into a market for products promising authenticity, tranquillity and emotional fulfilment.


The emotionally expressive individual is therefore not necessarily a threat to technological rationality. Under the appropriate conditions, he may become one of its most valuable economic resources.


What threatens such systems is not emotion itself but emotion that remains unpredictable, unrecorded and unavailable for classification. A person who experiences private joy without photographing it, expresses affection without documenting it or develops eccentric interests without seeking public validation remains partly outside the economy of technological attention.


The question is therefore not whether humanity is losing its emotions altogether. It is whether we are losing the capacity to experience emotions without simultaneously organising them into socially intelligible performances.


The wartime exception


There is an interesting contrast between the increasingly rationalised emotional life of technologically advanced societies and the experiences of people living under conditions of war. War imposes terrible suffering, yet it also exposes the limitations of the assumption that human existence can be understood or organised through rational calculation.


In wartime Ukraine, people live within a technological environment of extraordinary sophistication. Mobile applications provide warnings of incoming missiles, digital maps identify threats and communications platforms coordinate activities that would once have required extensive bureaucratic organisation. Technology saves lives every day, and there is nothing romantic about the alternative of being deprived of its protections.


Yet war also produces experiences that resist rational classification. People form friendships with extraordinary speed, express affection with unusual directness and make decisions motivated by impulses that cannot be reduced to considerations of personal advantage. Individuals place themselves in danger to help strangers, remain in cities that others consider irrational to inhabit and develop attachments to places whose material circumstances are profoundly unattractive.


The emotional intensity of these experiences is not necessarily evidence that suffering makes people more authentic. War can also cause psychological withdrawal, emotional exhaustion and profound difficulties with intimacy. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the inadequacy of any theory that understands human beings primarily as rational agents concerned with maximising their own welfare.


A person who refuses to abandon his home because it contains the memories of a lifetime may be acting contrary to his immediate material interests. Yet his attachment to that place expresses something that cannot be captured by an economic calculation. To describe his decision as irrational is not necessarily to criticise it. It may instead be to acknowledge that the most important dimensions of human identity frequently exceed the categories through which rational institutions attempt to understand them.


The experience of war reminds us that human beings remain capable of profound emotional commitments even in an age of unprecedented technological sophistication. The problem is whether peacetime civilisation increasingly denies these commitments sufficient room to flourish.


The right to remain incomprehensible


What might resistance to the comprehensive rationalisation of human life look like? Foucault did not propose a simple return to some supposedly authentic condition of human existence preceding modern institutions. His later work on ethical self-formation instead explored ways in which individuals might develop practices of freedom within the historical circumstances that shape them.


The relevance of this perspective is that resistance need not involve rejecting technology. Such a position would be both intellectually simplistic and practically absurd. Medical science, communications technology and artificial intelligence have immense capacities to improve human existence. The appropriate objective is not to abandon these developments but to resist the assumption that every human activity ought to be organised according to their principles.


We might begin by defending the legitimacy of experiences that possess no measurable benefit. An afternoon spent wandering through a city without a destination should not require justification as a form of mindfulness. Reading a difficult novel need not be defended as an exercise in cognitive improvement. Falling in love with an unsuitable person should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of defective decision-making.


There should remain room in human life for eccentricity, emotional extravagance, intellectual contradiction and purposeless pleasure. These qualities are not necessarily obstacles to personal development. They may be constitutive elements of the individuality that makes human existence worthwhile.


There is also a political dimension to this argument. A society that demands complete transparency from its citizens risks confusing intelligibility with virtue. Not every personal motivation needs to be explained, and not every private experience needs to be communicated. The right to privacy is more than a legal protection against unauthorised observation. It is also a moral recognition that individuals require spaces in which their personalities may develop without constant external judgement.


In this respect, the preservation of emotional spontaneity may become an increasingly important form of freedom in technological civilisation. The capacity to behave irrationally, to remain silent about one's motivations or simply to experience something without converting it into information may represent a modest but meaningful resistance to the growing administration of the self.


The future of human emotion


We return, finally, to the original question. Are people becoming less emotional as technology advances and the space for irrational self-expression progressively contracts?

There is no sufficient evidence to conclude that the biological intensity of human emotion is diminishing. Human beings remain capable of love, grief, rage, ecstasy and despair, and the fundamental neurological structures underlying these experiences have not disappeared because we have invented smartphones and artificial intelligence. Indeed, technological development has created new opportunities for emotional stimulation and expression that earlier generations could scarcely have imagined.


Yet there are reasons to suspect that the social conditions under which emotions are experienced are undergoing a profound transformation. We increasingly inhabit environments that encourage the observation, classification, explanation and regulation of human behaviour. The spontaneous is becoming measurable, the private increasingly public and the irrational progressively subject to demands for justification.


Foucault helps us to understand why this transformation might be more significant than it initially appears. Power does not merely prohibit behaviour. It shapes the categories through which individuals understand themselves and the forms of conduct that they consider desirable. If technological society increasingly rewards emotional restraint, psychological transparency and rational self-management, human beings may gradually internalise these expectations until they seem natural rather than historically contingent.


The ultimate danger is not that machines will deprive us of our emotions. It is that we will voluntarily reconstruct our emotional lives according to the standards of intelligibility that machines make possible. We may come to regard our own spontaneous impulses as defects requiring correction, our contradictions as failures of reasoning and our inexplicable attachments as problems awaiting technological resolution.


This would represent an extraordinary reversal of the relationship between humanity and its inventions. Technology originally developed as a means of extending our capabilities so that we might pursue the purposes we considered valuable. We now face the possibility that the technical means will increasingly determine the purposes themselves.


Foucault would remind us that there is nothing inevitable about this outcome. The arrangements through which human beings govern themselves are historical products, capable of being examined, criticised and transformed. The existence of powerful technologies does not require us to surrender every part of our lives to the demands of measurement and rational organisation.


Perhaps the most important freedom remaining to human beings in an age of artificial intelligence will not be the freedom to think more efficiently. Machines may soon perform many forms of intellectual labour far more efficiently than we can ourselves. The distinctive challenge will be to preserve those experiences whose value lies precisely in their refusal to be reduced to calculation.


To love without justification, to grieve without embarrassment, to laugh without purpose, to pursue an absurd enthusiasm and to remain occasionally incomprehensible even to ourselves: these are not imperfections that an advanced civilisation ought to eliminate. They are among the qualities that make civilisation worth having in the first place.


We should therefore be careful what we mean when we congratulate ourselves upon becoming more rational. A world in which every action can be explained, every emotion classified and every individual rendered predictable might be a triumph of technological organisation. It might also be a world in which the most interesting parts of human existence have quietly disappeared.


The greatest achievement of technological civilisation may eventually be to create machines that can reason better than human beings. Its greatest failure would be to persuade human beings that they must consequently become more like machines.

 
 

Note from Matthew Parish, Editor-in-Chief. The Lviv Herald is a unique and independent source of analytical journalism about the war in Ukraine and its aftermath, and all the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the war as well as the tremendous advances in military technology the war has yielded. To achieve this independence, we rely exclusively on donations. Please donate if you can, with the buttons at the top of this page.

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