The Tragedy of Traditional Christianity in Ukraine

By Sam Nason
Sunday 22 November 2026
Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the majority religion in Ukraine. However, the actions of the Russian Orthodox Church, led by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, have increasingly complicated Ukrainians’ relationship with Christian institutions. Kirill, who titles himself as patriarch of Moscow and all Rus’, suggested in 2022 that Russian soldiers who die fighting in Ukraine will have all of their sins cleansed, equivocating the sacrifice to martyrdom. The patriarchate has published documents that label Russia’s war of aggression as a "a Holy War in which Russia and its people, defending the single spiritual space of Holy Russia … protects the world against the onslaught of globalism and the victory of the West, which has fallen into Satanism".
Unabashed and enthusiastic support by the Moscovite church for what is, in many Ukrainians’ minds, a genocidal war of choice, poses an existential question. C.S. Lewis wrote that “war makes death real to us”, and the suggestion is that the confrontation with mortality found in war leads to spiritual contemplation. It is perhaps a unique tragedy that at the very moment the Ukrainian remembers death, they must also remember that the church generations of Ukrainians have depended upon for spiritual guidance wants them to die.
The label “Moscow and all Rus’” reminds us of the historical context that has played out as complex church political theatre in recent years. When Volodymyr the Great of Kyiv converted to Christianity in 988 and christianized Kyivan Rus’, the Metropolis of Kyiv and all Rus’ was established as the seat of the bishop to lead the church in those lands, canonically under the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Kyiv remained the ecclesiastical center until 1240, when the Mongol sack of Kyiv devastated the city and her political institutions. As Kyiv continued to decline, Metropolitan Maximos moved his residence to Vladimir-on-the-Kylazma in 1299. 26 years later his successor, Metropolitan Peter, moved the residence to Moscow. This was an unofficial move; Peter was still titled Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus’, and remained canonically under Constantinople.
At this point in her history, the Church has made a significant geographical departure from her historic origin of Kyiv but remained ecclesiastically and titularly the same. This changed in the fifteenth century. After rejecting a proposed union between the Orthodox and Catholic churches in 1439, Moscow unilaterally declared independence from Constantinople in 1448, a declaration Constantinople did not recognize at the time. In 1458, a separate metropolitan was appointed for Kyiv and the Orthodox lands of Poland-Lithuania, formalizing the division. Moscow subsequently adopted the title “Metropolitan of Moscow and All Rus’,” replacing “Kyiv” with “Moscow.” Both churches claimed the mantle of the baptism of Rus’.
The long, intertwined, and often times sordid history of the Moscovite and Kyivan church is incredibly fraught with political and ecclesiastical nuance. I hope that this short history has provided some context for the reader, and I further pray that the reader will forgive me for skipping ahead roughly 500 years to the dreary world of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union instituted a policy of state atheism with the goal of naturally eliminating Christianity through oppression, propaganda, and taxation. In his 2005 book The Last Shall be First, Rev. Ihor Tsar, a Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest, recalls his grandfather being offered a position in the city council. Mr. Pylypchak worked a grueling menial labor job on a collective farm, and was approached by a Communist Party representative who noticed he worked hard, did not drink or smoke, and was of good character. The issue, however, was that Rev. Ihor’s grandfather attended church each week, which was “incompatible with Soviet morality”. It is a common story in the Soviet context: a cozy office job with the caveat of embracing atheism.
The USSR did not fail to see the necessity of exercising control and influence over the ecclesial organs that persisted. After World War II, the Russian Orthodox Church was placed entirely within the purview of the NKVD, the USSR’s secret police agency, and later under the KGB. The church's leadership was composed almost entirely of agents and collaborators of the state security services. In 2023, Swiss newspapers reported that police have verified that now-Patriarch Kirill worked as a KGB agent in the 1970s whilst representing the Moscow Patriarchate at the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Geneva. Kirill was tasked with influencing the WCC. The Soviet goal was for the WCC to denounce the United States.
The pervasive nature of the state security apparatus in the USSR was part of the policy of state atheism. It was not hidden from the Soviet people that their clergy and hierarchs were likely KGB informants. In order to avoid a fate similar to that of Rev. Ihor’s grandfather, or worse, many Ukrainians simply chose to stay home on a Sunday morning. As trust in the institution of the church was eroded, the Soviets simultaneously worked to consolidate religious devotion within the Orthodox church. While the Orthodox church was allowed to exist as a church in captivity, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) was specifically targeted for liquidation.
The UGCC is a relatively minor ethnic community of Eastern Catholics highly concentrated in western Ukraine and specifically Lviv. The church interestingly considers itself fully Eastern Orthodox in confession whilst simultaneously within full communion with the Roman Catholic church. An example of how this functions is that when UGCC parishioners recite the Nicene Creed, they omit the Filioque clause. Less than 10% of Ukrainians identify as Greek Catholic, however in Lviv, the number is greater than 50%. The church owes its existence to the 16th century Union of Brest, during which a group of Orthodox Kyivan bishops agreed to recognize the authority of the Pope while retaining Byzantine liturgical rites.
During the Soviet era, the Ukrainian Orthodox faithful attended Orthodox churches that were directly under the Patriarchate of Moscow and all Rus’, a church that was controlled entirely by the Soviet intelligence agencies and had essentially no outside, international influences. In contrast, the UGCC was directly under the Pope in Rome. While Stalin could easily handpick a NKVD agent to run the Moscovite church, choosing the Pope and exercising influence on him was considerably more complicated.
In 1946, Soviet authorities held a typically Soviet show-trial style synod at St. Georges Cathedral in Lviv, the historic seat of the Greek Catholic Metropolitan. The assembly purported to abolish the UGCC and reestablish communion with the Moscow Patriarchate as if the Union of Brest had never occurred. The liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was personally approved by Stalin. In March 1945, Soviet official Georgy Karpov submitted a plan to sever the UGCC's relationship with Rome and absorb it into the Russian Orthodox Church. Stalin's response was brief: “Comrade Karpov: I agree with all the measures.” Within a year, the Soviet authorities had orchestrated the 1946 Lviv Council, formally declaring the UGCC dissolved.
The Soviets wanted to display the dissolution of the UGCC as a decision made by UGCC clerics and bishops. However, many of these clerics and bishops had been arrested and replaced with NKVD agents shortly before the assembly in Lviv. According to the UGCC archival account, approximately 70% of the more than 200 representatives who voted to dissolve the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church were Soviet state security service agents.
Following this robber council, many church properties were seized and handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church. The Greek Catholic Church continued as an underground and illegal persecuted minority, while the Orthodox church in Ukraine acted as an arm of the Soviet intelligence community.
As the Soviet Union approached collapse in 1991, the Moscow Patriarchate granted its Ukrainian Exarchate some autonomy, reorganizing it as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). Although the UOC could now govern many of its internal affairs, it remained canonically subordinate to Moscow. In this respect, its relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate bore some resemblance to the original Metropolitanate of Kyiv's relationship with Constantinople in 988.
This restructured church was headed up by Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko of Kyiv, a longtime Moscow Patriarchate official whom Soviet intelligence documents identified as a KGB collaborator under the codename “Antonov.”
This brings our story ever closer to the present day. In 1990’s Ukraine, we find a majority nominally Orthodox Christian population attending churches still very much ruled politically from Moscow and connected to Russian intelligence services, which have been rebranded as the FSB. The UGCC was restored as an official church in 1989, and throughout the next decade many of the church buildings that had been forcibly transferred to the Orthodox church were restored to the UGCC.
Despite his documented connections to the KGB, Metropolitan Filaret was a vocal advocate for complete autocephaly of the UOC. Under normal circumstances in the Eastern Orthodox church, sovereign nations have a native and politically independent church. Because Ukraine was sovereign, Filaret argued it deserved its own church. Moscow refused, and continued to exercise Soviet-style control over the church as well as using it for intelligence operations. Since 2022, the Security Service of Ukraine has initiated more than 200 criminal proceedings against UOC clerics. 27 of the suspects are high ranking bishops and metropolitans who are believed to be working as intelligence operatives for the Russian government. One example from 2025 was a UOC priest in Donetsk region who was caught telling Russian military operatives where Ukrainian military targets were. He was also charged with spreading Russian propaganda.
The messy state of the church in Ukraine is a disaster for the spiritual wellbeing of the average Ukrainian layman. The last century of the Orthodox church in Ukraine has been marked by Moscovite abuse, oppression, and propaganda. Whereas in Soviet times, the Church was a necessary pariah that could be leveraged for greater control over the populace, now it has a new purpose. The idea of “Holy Rus” has been wrapped into Russian nationalism as the Kremlin frames the war to the Russian people as an existential battle against the West. Average Ukrainian laymen experience Christianity in a way very different from those in the West, often forced to choose between national identity and Christianity.




