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The Road Back to Europe: Andy Burnham and the Unfinished Business of Brexit

1 day ago
15 min read

By Matthew Parish


Saturday 21 November 2026


There is something peculiarly British about the prospect of a country spending ten years extricating itself from a political institution, only to discover that many of the advantages it wishes to recover require a substantial reassembly of the arrangements it has so laboriously dismantled. Brexit was supposed to bring clarity to Britain's constitutional position, restore parliamentary sovereignty and liberate the country from the suffocating embrace of European bureaucracy. Instead it has produced a decade of constitutional uncertainty, political upheaval, economic disappointment and an increasingly uncomfortable recognition that geography cannot be repealed by referendum. Britain remains where she always was, an island on the northwestern perimeter of continental Europe, profoundly dependent upon the economic prosperity, political stability and military security of her neighbours.


The arrival of Andy Burnham in Downing Street on 20 July 2026 has brought this uncomfortable truth back to the centre of British political debate. Unlike his predecessor Sir Keir Starmer, who pursued a cautious policy of improving practical relations with the European Union while refusing to revisit the principal constitutional settlements of Brexit, Burnham appears determined to reopen the fundamental question of Britain's place in Europe. His approach represents more than an adjustment to trade policy. It is an attempt to challenge one of the organising assumptions of British politics since 2016: that the referendum settled the country's European future for an indefinite period. The agreements announced at the British–European Union summit in Brussels on 20 November 2026 demonstrate that this reconsideration has already begun to produce tangible results, although the ultimate destination remains unresolved.


The question is whether Burnham is embarking upon an exercise in pragmatic economic reconstruction or upon something far more ambitious: a gradual reversal of Brexit, pursued through successive agreements until the distinction between Britain being inside and outside the European Union becomes increasingly difficult to discern. The answer matters not merely for the future of the British Labour Party, whose internal divisions on Europe have never been entirely extinguished, but for the Conservative opposition, the insurgent forces of British populism, the constitutional stability of the United Kingdom and the future of European political integration itself.


The immediate diplomatic achievements of the Brussels summit are substantial, although they should not be confused with an agreement to restore Britain's membership of the European institutions. Negotiations have been concluded on measures to remove much of the bureaucracy surrounding agricultural and food trade, link British and European carbon emissions markets and establish a reciprocal scheme permitting up to 100,000 young people from each side to spend as long as three years living, studying or working in the other's territory. The British government estimates that the package could increase the level of national output by as much as 0.5 per cent by 2040, equivalent to approximately £17 billion annually at that point. These are government projections rather than established economic gains, and the agreements still require legal implementation. The agricultural arrangements are intended to apply from March 2028, while opportunities under the youth scheme are expected to become available no later than January 2030.


Nevertheless the significance of the summit extends far beyond the modest collection of practical reforms that have emerged from it. Burnham has altered the political language in which relations with Europe may legitimately be discussed. For almost a decade, British politicians have treated Brexit as an irreversible event, rather like the Norman Conquest or the dissolution of the monasteries, about whose consequences one may argue but whose essential fact cannot be questioned. Burnham has challenged this presumption. His proposition is that constitutional decisions, however momentous, must remain susceptible to democratic reconsideration when the evidence suggests that their consequences have been disappointing. There is nothing inherently undemocratic about this argument. Democracy does not require a nation to remain permanently committed to a decision taken by a different electorate under different circumstances ten years earlier.


Yet the argument contains dangers of its own. Brexit was never exclusively an economic decision. It concerned questions of national identity, democratic legitimacy, immigration, sovereignty and the location of ultimate political authority. These were matters about which reasonable people could disagree, even if the economic case for leaving the European Union was always more contentious than its advocates suggested. To present Brexit merely as an unfortunate commercial error that can be corrected by a sufficiently ingenious series of trade agreements risks misunderstanding the emotional and constitutional forces that brought it about. Millions of British voters supported withdrawal because they believed that important political decisions affecting their lives were being taken by institutions over which they exercised inadequate control. That concern cannot simply be dismissed by calculating the additional percentage points of economic growth that closer European integration might provide.


Burnham therefore faces a problem that is at once intellectual and electoral. He must persuade the British public that greater cooperation with European institutions is consistent with meaningful democratic self-government. This requires considerably more sophisticated political argument than the language of economic advantage alone. A country can be wealthier while enjoying less autonomy over its laws, just as it can be poorer while exercising greater formal sovereignty. The relevant question is how much sovereignty is genuinely useful when exercised independently, and how much can be exercised more effectively through common institutions. The ability to make one's own agricultural regulations, for example, is of limited practical value if doing so makes agricultural exports prohibitively expensive. Conversely, independent regulation in fields such as financial services, artificial intelligence and emerging technologies may offer genuine competitive opportunities that the British government would be unwise to surrender without careful examination.


Within the Labour Party, these tensions are particularly acute. Burnham's political instincts were formed in the industrial North of England, where economic insecurity, regional inequality and a profound distrust of metropolitan political establishments helped sustain the vote for Brexit. His experience as Mayor of Greater Manchester has given him a practical conception of politics in which the provision of functioning transport systems, employment opportunities and public services carries greater significance than abstract constitutional doctrine. This may make him a particularly effective advocate for closer European relations. He can argue that the interests of former industrial communities are better served by access to continental markets, investment in manufacturing and secure employment than by maintaining elaborate customs barriers in the name of national independence.


But the Labour Party has by no means reached a common position. Many of its parliamentary representatives remain concerned that reopening the European question will alienate voters who supported Brexit and subsequently became willing to vote Labour precisely because the party appeared to have accepted the referendum result. Chancellor John Healey has expressed scepticism about the prospect of Britain rejoining the Union, while other members of the government are concerned that an extended constitutional debate could distract attention from economic management and public services. The difficulty is not simply that Labour contains supporters and opponents of European integration. It is that the constituencies upon which its parliamentary majority depends have different historical experiences of the European Union and different understandings of what Brexit was supposed to accomplish.


This creates an opportunity for Nigel Farage and Reform UK. Farage has already characterised the Brussels agreements as the beginning of a gradual return to European membership, presenting himself once again as the defender of a popular decision threatened by an untrustworthy political establishment. The argument has a certain political effectiveness because Burnham has deliberately declined to exclude the possibility of eventual membership. Nevertheless, Farage must confront a difficulty that did not exist in 2016. He can no longer present departure from the European Union as an untested proposition promising an improved national future. Brexit has now been implemented, and its consequences have become part of the ordinary experience of British businesses and households. The burden of political persuasion is consequently more evenly distributed between those advocating closer relations and those insisting upon continued separation.


The Conservative Party faces a somewhat different predicament. The European question has divided British Conservatives for generations, periodically consuming the careers of their leaders and diverting attention from nearly every other aspect of government. Under Kemi Badenoch, the party must decide whether to defend the entirety of the post-Brexit settlement or distinguish between the constitutional principle of withdrawal and particular arrangements that have proved economically disadvantageous. An intelligent Conservative position might accept that the United Kingdom should reduce unnecessary commercial barriers while resisting any surrender of independent legislative authority. But the distinction is difficult to sustain in practice. The removal of barriers frequently requires the harmonisation of regulatory standards, and harmonisation inevitably raises the question of who writes those standards and who interprets them. The Conservatives may find themselves defending a more economically cumbersome version of Brexit simply because admitting the desirability of regulatory cooperation would be politically embarrassing.


Public opinion presents Burnham with both an opportunity and a warning. Polling published by YouGov on 18 November indicated that 58 per cent of Britons believed that leaving the European Union had been the wrong decision, while 63 per cent considered Brexit a failure. Yet only 37 per cent regarded pursuing rejoining as the right governmental priority, against 45 per cent who did not. Separate polling found that the precise terms of any future accession agreement could dramatically change the outcome of another referendum, particularly where adoption of the euro or the loss of Britain's former budget rebate was involved. There is therefore an important distinction between regret about Brexit and enthusiasm for embarking upon another prolonged constitutional adventure. A voter may believe that Britain would have been better off remaining inside the European Union while simultaneously believing that trying to reverse the decision would consume years of political energy better devoted to housing, health, taxation or industrial regeneration.


The European perspective is no less complicated. Brussels has welcomed Burnham's change of tone, and the warmth displayed towards the British Prime Minister by Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa is undoubtedly genuine. The European Union is considerably more comfortable dealing with a British government that treats its institutions as potential partners rather than adversaries. Nevertheless, European political generosity has definite limits. The Union cannot afford to establish the principle that a country may withdraw from its institutions while retaining whichever privileges of membership it happens to find commercially convenient. Such an arrangement would undermine the coherence of the single market and encourage other member states to demand similar exceptions to their obligations.


The difficulty is most apparent in the distinction between regulatory cooperation and political representation. Under the new arrangements, Britain will accept common standards in certain sectors in return for reduced barriers to trade. The immediate commercial benefits may be considerable, particularly for food producers and manufacturers exposed to European carbon border charges. Yet the more extensively Britain aligns its legislation with European rules, the more it risks becoming subject to decisions made in institutions in which it has no formal voting rights. The central paradox of Brexit may therefore be that a country seeking to recover democratic control over its legislation finds itself progressively compelled to follow foreign regulatory decisions without enjoying the influence it previously exercised over their formulation.


This paradox is not necessarily fatal to Burnham's strategy, but it demands a degree of candour that British European policy has often lacked. There are circumstances in which alignment with another jurisdiction's regulatory framework is entirely sensible. International trade is full of such arrangements, and commercial sovereignty has never meant that a country can dictate the conditions under which other states admit its products. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental political difference between agreeing voluntarily to equivalent standards and accepting the future development of an elaborate legal system over which one exercises little influence. This distinction will become progressively more important if Burnham contemplates returning Britain to the European single market. He would then need to explain not only the economic advantages of integration but also the constitutional consequences of accepting its underlying rules.


The European Union itself has changed substantially since the British referendum. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has strengthened arguments for collective European security, while growing tensions with China and uncertainty surrounding the United States have encouraged European governments to reconsider their industrial and strategic dependencies. The Brussels summit exposed some of these tensions. Britain wants its manufacturers, particularly its automotive industry, to benefit from European industrial preference arrangements. Yet Brussels is seeking greater consistency between British and European approaches to Chinese electric vehicles and strategic supply chains. Britain cannot automatically expect to receive the advantages of European industrial protection while retaining complete freedom to pursue a different commercial relationship with China.


This is where the European question becomes inseparable from wider British foreign policy. Since the Second World War, British strategic thinking has rested upon the assumption that the country can maintain a special relationship with the United States while playing an influential role in European security. Brexit altered the institutional foundations of that strategy without changing the underlying geography of British interests. An increasingly unpredictable American political environment, coupled with the continuing Russian threat to European security, makes closer cooperation with European governments a matter of strategic necessity rather than merely diplomatic preference. But it would be a mistake to assume that this necessarily requires full membership of the European Union. NATO remains the principal institution of collective military defence for Britain and most European states, while substantial security cooperation can be organised through bilateral and multilateral arrangements outside the Union's formal constitutional structures.


For Ukraine, these developments are particularly consequential. Britain has been among the most consistent European supporters of Ukrainian sovereignty, and its willingness to provide military assistance has not depended upon European Union membership. The new British–European political rapprochement nevertheless offers opportunities to coordinate sanctions enforcement, military industrial production, maritime security and the reconstruction of Ukraine more effectively. The Brussels declaration expressly reaffirmed support for Ukrainian independence and security guarantees, while establishing ambitions for closer cooperation against Russian sanctions evasion, including the activities of the shadow fleet. A Europe in which Britain and the European Union coordinate their substantial military, economic and diplomatic resources is better positioned to resist Russian aggression than one in which they remain preoccupied with the institutional grievances of Brexit.


The Irish dimension illustrates the distinctive constitutional complexity of Britain's European relationship. Northern Ireland remains governed by arrangements intended to preserve an open border with the Republic of Ireland while accommodating its membership of the United Kingdom. The resulting legal and commercial compromises have been among the most difficult consequences of Brexit. Closer British alignment with European agricultural and product standards may reduce the practical significance of regulatory barriers between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, strengthening the internal commercial coherence of the United Kingdom. At the same time, it would diminish some of the political tensions created by the unique European arrangements applying to Northern Ireland. What is presented in London as an economic compromise may therefore carry important implications for the stability of Northern Ireland's constitutional settlement.


Scotland presents a different problem. Scottish nationalism has frequently portrayed Brexit as an example of Scotland being compelled to accept a constitutional decision rejected by a majority of its own electorate. A British government committed to progressively closer European relations could weaken this argument by restoring some of the practical benefits that Scottish voters associated with European membership. Yet it might equally embolden demands for full participation in European institutions, particularly if Westminster stopped short of eventual accession. The Scottish constitutional question will not be settled merely by improving trade relations with Brussels, but the future direction of those relations will influence the competing political narratives about independence and the continued existence of the United Kingdom.


There is also the question of what the European Union would require if Britain eventually sought readmission. Membership cannot simply be restored by reversing the legislation through which Britain departed. A new accession process under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union would require negotiation and ratification, including agreement by the existing member states. Britain could not presume that the distinctive arrangements it previously enjoyed, including its budget rebate and exemptions concerning the euro and the Schengen area, would automatically be restored. These matters would have to be negotiated, and their resolution might determine whether British voters regarded the eventual terms of accession as acceptable.


Indeed the European Union may have reasons to be cautious about readmitting Britain even if the British electorate develops a consistent majority in favour of doing so. The experience of Brexit was disruptive and politically exhausting for European institutions. European governments would reasonably wish to be satisfied that any return represented a durable national commitment rather than another temporary settlement liable to collapse following a change of British government. The Union would also have to decide how Britain's considerable economic and diplomatic weight should be accommodated within institutions whose internal balance has evolved during its absence. Germany, France, Poland and the other member states might all welcome a renewed British contribution to European policy while entertaining different reservations about the implications of full membership.


These considerations make Burnham's apparent preference for gradualism understandable. At the Brussels summit he indicated that the present package probably represented the limit of what could be accomplished before the next general election, constitutionally due by 2029, while envisaging further informal discussions about Britain's long-term position. This is markedly less ambitious than an immediate campaign for readmission. It suggests that Burnham understands the political risks of reopening the European question too abruptly, even as he seeks to establish a framework within which more extensive integration can eventually be contemplated. His immediate objective may be to demonstrate that cooperation produces measurable advantages and thereby weaken the assumption that all forms of European integration are necessarily disadvantageous.


Yet gradualism contains its own danger. A succession of technical agreements can create the impression that a government is pursuing a constitutional transformation without obtaining a clear democratic mandate for the ultimate destination. Farage will undoubtedly exploit precisely this concern. If Burnham wishes to persuade sceptical voters that closer relations with Europe are not a concealed attempt to reverse Brexit through administrative manoeuvres, he will eventually have to articulate the distinction between the arrangements he considers desirable and those he believes would require explicit electoral authorisation. A customs union, single-market membership and full membership of the European Union are different propositions, with different legal and constitutional implications. They cannot responsibly be treated as interchangeable stages in a process whose outcome has already been determined.


The unresolved dispute over university tuition fees at the November summit provides a useful illustration of the difficulties awaiting him. European governments wish to ensure that their students enjoy more favourable financial conditions when attending British universities, while the British government is reluctant to accept the full implications for university funding. The parties have committed themselves to reaching a further agreement within six months, and the issue remains politically important to implementation of the wider package. What might appear a relatively minor disagreement about student fees is in fact a dispute about the allocation of economic advantages and financial burdens within an increasingly integrated educational market. Every additional step towards closer cooperation will raise similar questions about who pays, who benefits and which institution has the final authority to decide.


Burnham's principal political advantage may nevertheless be his capacity to present European relations as part of a broader programme of national economic renewal rather than as an expression of cultural or ideological attachment to the European project. Britain has spent much of the last decade arguing about its constitutional identity while struggling with low productivity, inadequate investment, regional inequality and deteriorating public infrastructure. A Prime Minister who can demonstrate that European cooperation contributes materially to alleviating these difficulties may find a more receptive audience than one who speaks primarily of the moral virtues of internationalism. The essential test will not be how warmly Burnham is welcomed in Brussels, but whether British households and businesses experience improvements sufficiently tangible to justify the political controversy surrounding his policy.


There remains, however, a deeper philosophical question concerning the nature of sovereignty in the contemporary world. The traditional conception of the sovereign nation state presupposes that political independence consists principally in the capacity to make decisions without external interference. Yet in an age of deeply integrated supply chains, international financial markets, transnational technologies and military threats that recognise no national frontier, effective political power increasingly depends upon the capacity to influence decisions taken collectively. Britain may have acquired greater formal freedom to regulate its economy after Brexit, but that freedom is of questionable value where the commercial consequences of exercising it are to exclude British businesses from their most important neighbouring markets. Conversely, the willingness to cooperate within institutions does not necessarily diminish national power when it gives a country a meaningful role in shaping rules that would otherwise be imposed upon it by economic necessity.


The difficulty is that neither the advocates of Brexit nor its most enthusiastic opponents have consistently acknowledged this distinction. The former have sometimes confused sovereignty with isolation, while the latter have occasionally treated institutional integration as an unquestionable political virtue. Both positions are inadequate. The proper purpose of constitutional arrangements is not to satisfy an ideological preference for either independence or integration, but to provide the greatest attainable combination of democratic accountability, economic prosperity, individual liberty and national security. The appropriate balance will vary between different fields of policy, and it may change as the international environment evolves.


Andy Burnham has therefore opened a debate that Britain ought perhaps never to have considered permanently closed. His willingness to question the consequences of Brexit is intellectually defensible and potentially politically productive, particularly when accompanied by practical agreements that address demonstrable commercial disadvantages. But the success of his European policy will depend upon his capacity to distinguish economic cooperation from constitutional integration, and upon his willingness to confront the legitimate concerns of those voters who supported Brexit without treating them as obstacles to be circumvented. A renewed relationship with Europe must be built upon persuasion rather than embarrassment, and upon a clear account of what Britain is being asked to surrender as well as what it stands to gain.


There is a final irony in Britain's predicament. For centuries, British foreign policy was shaped by the conviction that the country could preserve its independence only by remaining deeply engaged in the affairs of continental Europe. Britain resisted successive attempts by continental powers to establish overwhelming political dominance precisely because the balance of power in Europe was inseparable from British security and prosperity. The institutional circumstances have changed profoundly, but the strategic lesson has not. Britain cannot insulate itself from European events by declaring itself politically separate from them, any more than Europe can sensibly disregard the military, diplomatic and economic contribution of one of its most important neighbours.


Whether Burnham ultimately leads Britain back into the European Union is therefore less important, at least for the present, than whether he succeeds in restoring a mature understanding of Britain's European interests. The country need not immediately reverse Brexit to recognise that the antagonisms surrounding it have become politically exhausting and economically unproductive. Equally, European governments need not abandon the integrity of their institutions to acknowledge that Britain remains a natural and indispensable partner in their common security and prosperity.


The most encouraging feature of the present rapprochement is not the possibility of another referendum, nor even the prospect of renewed membership. It is the gradual recognition on both sides of the English Channel that political disagreements need not become permanent national estrangements. Britain and Europe have spent too long arguing about the constitutional meaning of their separation while the world around them has become more dangerous, less predictable and increasingly indifferent to the historical distinctions that once seemed so important.


Andy Burnham may yet discover that the greatest challenge in bringing Britain closer to Europe is not persuading the Europeans to welcome Britain back, but persuading the British that their own national interests have never been entirely separate from those of their continental neighbours. If he can achieve that without reigniting the destructive passions of the preceding decade, he may accomplish something considerably more valuable than the reversal of Brexit. He may finally bring Britain's long and unhappy argument with Europe towards a settlement in which political realism replaces constitutional nostalgia, and in which sovereignty is understood not merely as the right to stand apart, but as the capacity to act effectively in a world that no nation can govern alone.

 
 

Note from Matthew Parish, Editor-in-Chief. The Lviv Herald is a unique and independent source of analytical journalism about the war in Ukraine and its aftermath, and all the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the war as well as the tremendous advances in military technology the war has yielded. To achieve this independence, we rely exclusively on donations. Please donate if you can, with the buttons at the top of this page.

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