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The Day After Declaring Victory: Russia’s Approaching Political Reckoning

7 hours ago
12 min read

By Matthew Parish


Tuesday 17 November 2026


There is a peculiar problem facing dictators who wage long wars. They must eventually find a way to stop fighting without admitting that the enormous sacrifices they have demanded of their populations were unnecessary. Victory, in such circumstances, becomes not so much a military achievement as an administrative exercise. It must be invented, explained, celebrated and finally imposed upon the national consciousness. The government must persuade the people that whatever has happened was precisely what was intended all along.


Russia is approaching this predicament. After almost five years of full-scale war against Ukraine, the Kremlin must contemplate not merely how the conflict might end but how Russian society might survive its conclusion. The political institutions of Vladimir Putin's Russia have become thoroughly adapted to wartime conditions, in which dissent is treason, economic hardship is patriotic sacrifice and the ordinary standards by which governments are judged have been suspended indefinitely. Peace, paradoxically, may prove more difficult for the Russian authorities to manage than war.


At a gathering of senior Kremlin officials and deputies of the ruling United Russia party outside Moscow on 13 and 14 November 2026, preparations for a declaration of victory and the return of combatants formed part of discussions about Russia's political future. Sergei Kiriyenko, the influential first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, was amongst the officials addressing parliamentarians. The political calendar stretching towards presidential elections in 2030 and parliamentary elections in 2031 was also considered.


This does not necessarily mean that peace is imminent. Russian officials have discussed preparing the population for victory on previous occasions, without the war subsequently ending. Nevertheless, the intellectual exercise is revealing. It suggests that the Russian government recognises that the transition from war to peace will present a collection of political, social and geopolitical difficulties for which its existing institutions are singularly ill-equipped.


The first problem is defining what victory actually means. The original Russian objectives in February 2022 included the subordination of Ukraine to Moscow's political will, the destruction or neutralisation of its independent military capabilities and the prevention of its integration into Western security structures. Russia's invasion was intended to overturn the European political settlement that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These were imperial ambitions of an extraordinary scale, based upon the assumption that Ukraine was not a genuinely sovereign nation but an historical aberration that could be corrected by force.


Almost five years later, Ukraine remains an independent state, its national identity has been consolidated by the experience of resistance and much of Europe has reorganised its defence policies around the proposition that Russia constitutes a permanent security threat. Finland and Sweden have joined NATO, developments that would have seemed deeply undesirable to Moscow before its invasion. Even if Russia retains occupied Ukrainian territories under some future settlement, the wider strategic result would be difficult to describe as an unqualified Russian success.


Yet the Kremlin has continued to insist upon a revision of Europe's security arrangements. During diplomatic exchanges in November 2026, Russian representatives reportedly revived demands that NATO effectively withdraw its military presence to positions associated with 1997, before successive rounds of enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe. They also advanced arguments favouring a continental settlement divided into spheres of influence, reminiscent of the Cold War.


This is an extraordinary ambition for a country whose prolonged war against a substantially smaller neighbour has demonstrated the limitations of its conventional military power. It also exposes an essential contradiction in the Russian position. Moscow wishes simultaneously to claim that it has defeated Ukraine and to persuade the Western powers to reconstruct the European security order in Russia's favour. The former might conceivably be accomplished through domestic propaganda. The latter requires the cooperation of foreign governments that have little reason to accept Moscow's interpretation of events.


The distinction between ending a war and achieving a peace settlement is therefore fundamental. A ceasefire, an armistice or even a formally negotiated agreement might bring the immediate fighting to a halt without resolving the underlying geopolitical dispute. Russia might present territorial acquisitions as proof of triumph while Ukraine and its allies insist that those acquisitions remain unlawful and provisional. The resulting arrangement could resemble an extended period of armed confrontation rather than a genuine reconciliation between neighbouring states.


For Ukraine, the danger would be that a cessation of hostilities might merely provide Russia with an opportunity to rebuild its military forces and prepare for another attempt at conquest. For Europe, the question would be whether any agreement could provide credible security guarantees without effectively rewarding the use of aggressive force. Moscow's demands concerning NATO's historical boundaries demonstrate why negotiations about Ukraine cannot be separated from the broader question of European security.


The political consequences within Russia may be even more remarkable.


The modern Russian state has been transformed by the war into a system of organised militarism. The armed forces, the security services and the defence industries have acquired an influence over the economy and political administration that would have seemed extraordinary during the comparatively prosperous years of Putin's early presidency. Military expenditure has become a principal instrument of economic activity, while patriotic rhetoric has displaced almost every other source of political legitimacy.


Russia's draft plans for 2027 envisage defence expenditure of approximately 17.1 trillion roubles, a substantial increase over the previously budgeted level. The government's fiscal position is becoming increasingly strained, with higher taxation, borrowing and pressure on civilian resources necessary to sustain the military establishment.


There is no simple mechanism by which a war economy can be transformed into a peacetime economy. Factories manufacturing ammunition cannot necessarily be converted overnight into profitable producers of refrigerators. Workers accustomed to comparatively generous wages in military industries may discover that the civilian economy cannot sustain their expectations. Regional administrations dependent upon defence contracts may resist the withdrawal of government spending. The enormous apparatus of military procurement will generate vested interests determined to preserve its privileges.


Indeed, peace might expose economic weaknesses that war has temporarily concealed. Military expenditure creates employment and stimulates industrial production, but the destruction of weapons and military equipment is not equivalent to the creation of enduring national wealth. The Russian economy has been consuming vast quantities of capital, labour and productive capacity in pursuit of objectives that have yielded remarkably little improvement in the lives of ordinary Russian citizens.


A government that can explain inflation and shortages as necessary wartime sacrifices may find those explanations less convincing once the fighting has stopped. Citizens who endured years of economic hardship in anticipation of a glorious victory might reasonably expect the promised benefits to materialise. If they discover instead that their country remains relatively isolated, heavily militarised and burdened by mounting financial obligations, disappointment may become politically consequential.


Then there is the problem of the soldiers.


Hundreds of thousands of Russian men have already returned from service in Ukraine, while substantial numbers remain under arms. Independent investigations suggest that the number who have returned to civilian life is considerably greater than figures prominently acknowledged by the Russian authorities. Their reintegration represents an enormous administrative responsibility involving employment, accommodation, medical treatment, disability support and the psychological consequences of prolonged exposure to violence.


It would be profoundly unjust to assume that every returning soldier constitutes a danger to society. Many will be exhausted men who desire nothing more than to rejoin their families and resume ordinary lives. Others will have suffered grievous physical or psychological injuries and will require considerable assistance. Yet there is already evidence that some veterans have become involved in serious criminal violence, and the scale of the problem may increase as larger numbers return home.


The experience of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Russian wars in Chechnya provides an uncomfortable historical parallel. Veterans returned to societies incapable of adequately accommodating them, and some became involved in criminal networks, private security enterprises and violent political movements. The disintegration of Soviet authority in the late 1980s and early 1990s aggravated these difficulties, although it would be simplistic to attribute the subsequent criminalisation of Russian society solely to military veterans.


The contemporary Russian government faces a particularly delicate version of this problem because it has deliberately elevated the participants in the Ukrainian war into a privileged patriotic category. Men who have fought are presented as national heroes whose sacrifices entitle them to special respect. The Kremlin has encouraged their incorporation into public administration, political organisations and the social hierarchy. A returning soldier may therefore possess a form of moral authority that an ordinary bureaucrat lacks, even when the bureaucrat retains superior institutional power.


This creates the potential for friction between Russia's established political elite and a new generation of militarised citizens. The former consists largely of career administrators, businessmen, security officials and political functionaries whose positions depend upon loyalty to the Kremlin. The latter may include men who believe they have earned their place in the national hierarchy through personal suffering and participation in combat. They may not appreciate being instructed in patriotism by wealthy officials who spent the war in comfortable offices.


The Kremlin's concern with the future political relationship between returning combatants and United Russia is therefore understandable. It will want veterans incorporated into existing institutions before they establish independent organisations capable of expressing grievances beyond official control. The preferred arrangement is likely to involve carefully selected veterans receiving parliamentary seats, regional appointments, government employment and conspicuous public honours. Their symbolic presence will help legitimise the ruling establishment while limiting the possibility that veterans might become an autonomous political constituency.


The memory of Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner rebellion in June 2023 must remain particularly uncomfortable for Putin's advisers. Prigozhin demonstrated that a military organisation enjoying patriotic credibility and possessing its own weapons could challenge the authority of the Russian state, at least temporarily. Although the rebellion collapsed and Prigozhin subsequently died, the episode exposed the vulnerability of a political system that encourages private or semi-autonomous military power while depending upon the personal authority of a single individual.


A post-war Russia containing large numbers of disillusioned veterans would not necessarily experience another mutiny. The state retains formidable coercive resources, and most former soldiers will have neither the intention nor the capacity to organise politically. Nevertheless, the potential emergence of nationalist movements claiming that Russia was betrayed by its civilian leadership represents a risk the authorities cannot entirely dismiss.

There is also the question of political succession.


Vladimir Putin will be seventy-eight years old at the time of the scheduled presidential election in 2030. Age alone does not disqualify a political leader from continuing in office, and the constitutional arrangements manufactured in Russia permit Putin to seek another term. Nevertheless, an authoritarian political system organised around a single personality must eventually confront the problem of what happens when that personality disappears.


The end of the war might either simplify or complicate this process. Putin could seek to portray himself as the statesman who restored Russian greatness, secured the country's borders and concluded a favourable diplomatic settlement. Such a narrative could provide the ideological foundation for another presidential term, or conceivably for the managed transfer of power to a chosen successor.


Alternatively, the conclusion of hostilities might expose tensions within the Russian elite that the common enterprise of war has suppressed. The military leadership, intelligence services, economic technocrats, regional governors and nationalist ideologues have different interests. So long as the war continues, Putin's personal authority provides the mechanism through which these factions are reconciled. Once the emergency has passed, their disagreements over resources, responsibility and the direction of the state may become more pronounced.


Sergei Kiriyenko's importance in managing Russia's domestic political machinery illustrates the centrality of such questions. The Kremlin is not merely contemplating the military consequences of the conflict ending. It is preparing the organisational structures through which the post-war population will be governed, elections will be managed and approved political narratives will be disseminated.


There is an additional ideological dimension. Russian officials have been developing proposals concerning patriotic education, traditional values and a supposedly distinctive Russian civilisational identity. The intention appears to be the preservation of the political mobilisation produced by the war, even when the immediate justification of active hostilities no longer exists.


This may be the most enduring domestic consequence of the conflict. The Russian state has invested enormous resources in teaching its citizens that their country is engaged in a historical struggle against hostile foreign powers. Children have been educated in this atmosphere, universities have experienced increased ideological supervision and the boundaries of acceptable public debate have contracted. Even if the guns fall silent, there is no reason to suppose that the authorities will willingly dismantle the political structures built around perpetual confrontation.


Indeed, a victorious national mythology might become the organising principle of Russian politics for decades. The Soviet Union derived much of its political legitimacy from the victory of 1945, an achievement of immense historical significance that was subsequently transformed into a central element of state ideology. Putin's government has already appropriated much of this symbolism, presenting the war against Ukraine through the language and imagery of the struggle against Nazi Germany.


A newly proclaimed victory could be absorbed into the same historical mythology, notwithstanding the profound differences between the Soviet Union's defensive struggle against Hitler and Russia's invasion of an independent neighbouring country. The government would not require logical consistency. It would require only the capacity to control public discourse and repeat its preferred interpretation often enough that alternatives become socially dangerous.


The consequences for Russia's international position would be substantial.


A Russia that retains her imperial ambitions after a negotiated settlement will remain a central problem of European security. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and other countries along NATO's eastern frontier will have little reason to reduce their military preparations. Western governments will be compelled to consider whether Russian rearmament represents preparation for renewed aggression, even if Moscow publicly celebrates the restoration of peace.


At the same time, Russia's prolonged estrangement from Europe has accelerated its dependence upon China. Beijing has benefited from Russia's need for alternative markets, industrial supplies, financial channels and diplomatic support. Although the two countries share an interest in challenging aspects of Western predominance, their relationship is profoundly unequal in economic terms. Russia possesses substantial natural resources and military capabilities, but China enjoys vastly greater industrial capacity and international commercial influence.


A negotiated conclusion to the war might allow Moscow to attempt a partial restoration of relations with European countries and the United States. Sanctions relief, the reopening of commercial relationships and the recovery of technological cooperation would all be attractive objectives. However, the success of such efforts would depend upon the terms of a settlement, Russia's subsequent behaviour and the willingness of Western governments to accept renewed economic engagement.


The immediate diplomatic environment does not suggest that these matters will be straightforward. As recently as 16 November, Russian officials were disputing whether European representatives should participate in the next round of negotiations, even while European governments insisted upon their legitimate role in determining the continent's security.


There is thus a fundamental choice before the Russian leadership. It can attempt to restore its position as a conventional great power operating within an international system of sovereign states, or it can continue to insist upon an imperial entitlement to control the political destiny of its neighbours. The former might gradually provide opportunities for economic recovery and diplomatic rehabilitation. The latter promises a prolonged confrontation with Europe, continued militarisation and an increasingly dependent relationship with China.


The difficulty is that Putin's domestic political legitimacy has become closely attached to the second proposition. The Russian government has spent years arguing that its national security requires the subordination of Ukraine and the revision of Europe's political boundaries. To abandon these demands would be to acknowledge that the central assumptions underlying the war were mistaken. Authoritarian governments rarely find such admissions congenial.


For Ukraine, therefore, the emergence of Russian discussions about post-war political arrangements should be treated with cautious interest rather than premature optimism. There is a meaningful distinction between a government preparing administratively for the possibility of peace and a government having decided to accept the political compromises necessary to achieve it. The former may reflect prudence, propaganda planning or domestic anxiety. Only the latter could provide a credible foundation for negotiations.


Nor should Ukrainians underestimate the importance of Russia's internal political difficulties. A government struggling to accommodate returning soldiers, sustain military expenditure, preserve elite unity and manufacture a persuasive narrative of national success may eventually find that its domestic obligations constrain its external ambitions. Economic exhaustion does not automatically produce political moderation, but it can alter the calculations of those responsible for maintaining an authoritarian regime.


The crucial uncertainty is whether peace would encourage Russia to reconsider the assumptions that led it into the war, or merely provide the opportunity to rebuild its strength before pursuing them again. The answer will depend not only upon Putin and his immediate circle but upon the structure of Russian institutions, the attitudes of the population and the ability of the international community to maintain a credible security settlement.


There is one final irony. For nearly five years, the Kremlin has presented the war as a means of protecting Russia from external threats. Yet the greatest political dangers confronting the Russian state after the conflict may prove to be entirely domestic: the disappointment of returning soldiers, the exhaustion of the economy, the rivalry of powerful institutions, the resentment of ordinary citizens and the unresolved question of succession to an ageing president.


Russia began its invasion of Ukraine under the assumption that the principal challenge was how to defeat another country. It may eventually discover that the more difficult challenge is how to govern its own.


And when the Kremlin finally announces victory, the celebrations may conceal a rather different historical reality. The conclusion of the war will not necessarily represent the culmination of Putin's political achievement. It may instead mark the beginning of the most uncertain period in the history of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


For the Russian state, the day after victory may prove considerably more dangerous than the day before it.

 
 

Note from Matthew Parish, Editor-in-Chief. The Lviv Herald is a unique and independent source of analytical journalism about the war in Ukraine and its aftermath, and all the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the war as well as the tremendous advances in military technology the war has yielded. To achieve this independence, we rely exclusively on donations. Please donate if you can, with the buttons at the top of this page.

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