Shenzhen and the Ghost of Yalta: Three Great Powers Decide the Fate of Ukraine

By Matthew Parish
Tuesday 17 November 2026
On 19 November 2026, three of the most powerful men in the world are expected to gather in the Chinese city of Shenzhen. Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will meet in a diplomatic encounter of extraordinary significance, potentially attempting to redefine the relationships between the United States, Russia and China. For Ukraine, a country approaching the fifth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion, the consequences may be profound. Yet the most remarkable feature of the meeting is that Ukraine herself will not be represented.
There is something distinctly nineteenth-century about the spectacle of three great powers discussing the affairs of the world between themselves. The language may be modern, encompassing nuclear disarmament, artificial intelligence, international trade and geopolitical stability, but the underlying intellectual architecture is familiar. The rulers of powerful states gather together to determine the conditions under which less powerful states may enjoy their independence. The great powers negotiate spheres of influence, security guarantees and economic concessions, while the inhabitants of the territories concerned are left wondering what has been decided about their futures.
The historical comparison most frequently invoked is the Yalta Conference of February 1945, when Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin met in Crimea to discuss the post-war settlement of Europe. The comparison is imperfect, as all historical analogies inevitably are. Nevertheless, the essential concern is intelligible. The people of Central and Eastern Europe remember the consequences of arrangements in which their national aspirations were subordinated to the strategic priorities of larger powers. For Ukrainians, whose country subsequently endured decades of Soviet domination, the symbolism is particularly uncomfortable.
However, the three men gathering in Shenzhen are not united by a common strategic purpose. Their interests overlap in some respects and diverge dramatically in others. Understanding their different objectives is essential to appreciating what the meeting might mean for Ukraine.
For Vladimir Putin, the attraction of the occasion is relatively straightforward. Russia has spent nearly five years fighting an immensely costly war without securing the comprehensive political subordination of Ukraine that Moscow initially sought. Whatever territorial advantages Russia has obtained, Ukraine remains an independent state with a functioning government, substantial military capabilities and enduring international support. Putin therefore has a powerful incentive to explore whether diplomacy can deliver political concessions that Russian military operations have been unable to secure.
The Kremlin has recently revived demands extending considerably beyond the territorial disputes in eastern and southern Ukraine. Moscow has sought restrictions upon NATO's military presence in Eastern Europe, limits upon Ukraine's armed forces and wider changes to the European security architecture. These proposals resemble elements of the Russian demands advanced before the invasion in February 2022. They suggest that the Kremlin continues to regard the war not merely as a conflict over territory but as an opportunity to renegotiate Russia's position within the European international order.
There would be obvious advantages for Moscow in moving these discussions away from negotiations involving Ukraine and its European partners into conversations between the leaders of the three largest geopolitical powers. Even if no agreement emerges, Putin acquires diplomatic recognition as an indispensable participant in the management of international affairs. The spectacle itself matters. Russia, notwithstanding the economic and military strains of the war, would be presented as a state whose approval remains necessary for any comprehensive international settlement.
Donald Trump's objectives are rather different. The American President has repeatedly expressed his desire to bring the war in Ukraine to an end, while also pursuing a broader understanding with Russia and China. His approach to international relations places considerable emphasis upon personal negotiations between national leaders, frequently treating complex diplomatic controversies as problems that might be resolved through sufficiently determined bargaining. This approach can sometimes overcome institutional inertia, although it also creates difficulties when the matters under negotiation concern the fundamental security interests of countries not directly represented.
Trump also wishes to explore nuclear arms control. The expiration of the New START treaty in February 2026 removed the principal remaining bilateral restrictions upon American and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. A new agreement incorporating China would be a substantial diplomatic achievement, although Beijing has traditionally resisted being placed within the same arms-control framework as Washington and Moscow because its nuclear arsenal is considerably smaller. Nevertheless, the possibility of progress on nuclear restraint gives the gathering a purpose extending beyond Ukraine and provides an argument in favour of dialogue even between governments whose interests remain deeply antagonistic.
China presents perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the meeting. Xi Jinping presides over an economic and political power whose relationship with Russia has become increasingly important since the invasion of Ukraine. Chinese purchases of Russian energy, combined with the supply of industrial technologies and commercially available components, have helped sustain the Russian economy and manufacturing sector despite Western sanctions. Beijing nevertheless maintains that it seeks peace and has avoided formally becoming a belligerent in the European conflict.
China has no obvious interest in the complete collapse of Russia, which would leave Beijing confronting the United States without a significant Eurasian strategic partner. Equally, a prolonged and unpredictable European war creates economic uncertainty, complicates China's commercial relationships with Europe and risks further confrontation between nuclear powers. Beijing therefore has reasons both to preserve its relationship with Moscow and to encourage some eventual stabilisation of the conflict. These considerations do not necessarily translate into support for Russia's maximalist demands, still less an enthusiasm for assuming responsibility for enforcing them.
There is also the question of Taiwan. Chinese leaders have consistently rejected foreign interference in what Beijing regards as an internal matter, while many Western governments regard the preservation of peace across the Taiwan Strait as an essential international security interest. A diplomatic gathering premised upon the entitlement of great powers to determine the political futures of their neighbours might therefore create an uncomfortable precedent. China can hardly expect other governments to accept the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty in one context while appearing to endorse the rearrangement of another country's borders through great-power bargaining.
This brings us to the fundamental danger for Ukraine. The war could become one element within a much larger diplomatic exchange, encompassing nuclear weapons, economic sanctions, international trade, European security and the geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Under such circumstances, concessions affecting Ukraine might be considered not exclusively upon their merits but according to the advantages they provide in negotiations over unrelated questions.
One can imagine, for example, discussions involving sanctions relief for Russia in exchange for restrictions upon its military operations, or agreements concerning European security arrangements in return for Russian cooperation on nuclear arms control. China might be invited to use its economic influence over Moscow to facilitate such understandings, perhaps receiving concessions in its own commercial relationship with the United States. None of this necessarily requires an explicit agreement to divide the world into spheres of influence. Indeed, the more sophisticated arrangements of international diplomacy rarely describe themselves in such terms. They emerge through bargains in which the interests of smaller states are treated as negotiable components of larger settlements.
Yet there is another interpretation, and it deserves serious consideration. The involvement of the world's three principal nuclear powers could help create conditions for a negotiated reduction in hostilities. If Washington and Beijing were both prepared to support an enforceable settlement, Moscow might find itself facing stronger incentives to compromise than it would in exclusively bilateral negotiations. China possesses forms of economic leverage over Russia that Western governments cannot easily reproduce, while the United States retains considerable influence over Ukraine's security arrangements and the wider architecture of European defence.
The difficulty is that an agreement to stop fighting is not necessarily an agreement capable of producing lasting peace. A ceasefire that merely consolidates existing front lines might reduce the immediate loss of life, which is no small achievement after years of extraordinary suffering. However, unless accompanied by credible security guarantees and mechanisms for enforcement, such an arrangement could also permit Russia to rebuild its military capabilities while leaving Ukraine exposed to renewed aggression. A settlement that appears successful in the diplomatic communiqués of November 2026 might therefore contain the foundations of another war several years later.
This distinction between ending the fighting and establishing a sustainable peace is particularly important because Ukraine's security cannot be separated from the security of Europe as a whole. Poland, the Baltic states, Romania and other countries along NATO's eastern frontier have their own legitimate interests in any arrangements affecting the military balance in Eastern Europe. An agreement restricting NATO deployments or redefining the military status of Ukraine would necessarily have consequences for these countries. Their governments cannot reasonably be expected to regard such matters as the exclusive province of Washington and Moscow.
There have been encouraging indications that European governments understand this problem. France, Germany, Britain, Italy and Poland, together with representatives of the European Union and NATO, have been coordinating their participation in the continuing diplomatic process. Separate negotiations involving Ukraine, the United States and European representatives are therefore proceeding alongside preparations for the Shenzhen meeting. This creates the possibility that proposals emerging from discussions between Trump, Putin and Xi might be examined within a broader diplomatic framework rather than simply presented to Kyiv as accomplished facts.
Nevertheless, institutional participation is only one dimension of the problem. The essential question concerns the leverage available to the respective parties. Ukraine has survived through its own military resilience, the ingenuity of its defence industries and the assistance provided by its international partners. Its negotiating position consequently depends not merely upon declarations of diplomatic solidarity but upon the continued availability of weapons, intelligence, financial assistance and the industrial resources necessary to sustain its defence.
Russia's negotiating position likewise depends upon its military capabilities, economic endurance and access to foreign technology. China exercises influence through trade and industrial supply chains, while Western governments retain sanctions and export restrictions that may be strengthened, relaxed or modified. These are the practical instruments through which diplomatic agreements acquire meaning. Without them, even the most impressive summit declaration risks becoming another contribution to the already extensive literature of unsuccessful peace initiatives.
For Ukrainians, the immediate question is therefore not whether the three leaders will produce an attractive communiqué or pose for a photograph intended to demonstrate their statesmanship. It is whether their conversations will generate concrete changes in the conditions under which Ukraine must defend itself. An understanding that reduces attacks upon civilian infrastructure, enables further prisoner exchanges or creates enforceable limitations upon military operations would have measurable humanitarian significance. Conversely, an arrangement that weakens Ukraine's ability to resist future aggression without securing its safety could produce consequences extending far beyond the temporary satisfaction of a diplomatic breakthrough.
It would be mistaken, however, to assume that a comprehensive agreement is inevitable. The three leaders possess different priorities, their governments have conflicting strategic interests and the institutional complexity of the matters under discussion makes rapid diplomatic resolution difficult. The gathering might produce little beyond photographs, carefully formulated statements and promises of further negotiations. Indeed, such an outcome would be entirely consistent with the history of spectacular international summits that achieve considerably less than their advance publicity suggests.
There is an additional paradox in the present diplomatic moment. Ukraine, although absent from the Shenzhen meeting, remains indispensable to the implementation of any settlement concerning her future. No foreign leader can compel an entire society to regard an externally negotiated arrangement as legitimate merely by affixing his signature to a document. An agreement that disregards Ukrainian political opinion, constitutional arrangements and national aspirations would encounter formidable obstacles in practice. The ability of great powers to exert pressure is substantial, but their ability to manufacture durable political consent is considerably more limited.
The same principle applies to European governments. The United States remains the central military power within NATO, but the alliance is not simply an instrument through which American presidential decisions are transmitted to obedient European capitals. Its members possess their own governments, electorates, armed forces and national security interests. Any comprehensive reorganisation of the European security order would require political acceptance extending far beyond the three men assembled in China.
The philosophical problem underlying the Shenzhen meeting is therefore an ancient one. International politics has always oscillated between the principles of power and legitimacy. Powerful states possess the capacity to impose conditions upon weaker neighbours, while the modern international legal order rests upon the proposition that sovereign nations enjoy rights not reducible to the preferences of more powerful governments. The war in Ukraine has become one of the defining contemporary tests of whether these principles can coexist.
It would be excessively pessimistic to conclude that negotiations between Trump, Putin and Xi can bring nothing beneficial. Diplomacy remains indispensable, including diplomacy between adversaries, and any serious opportunity to reduce the destruction inflicted upon Ukraine deserves careful examination. Equally, it would be dangerously optimistic to imagine that a meeting between three powerful individuals can resolve a conflict whose causes, consequences and moral significance extend far beyond their personal relationships.
The people of Ukraine have endured almost five years of full-scale warfare, with its extraordinary human costs, shattered families, ruined infrastructure, interrupted education and the constant uncertainty of life beneath the threat of missiles and drones. They have also demonstrated that national independence is not an abstraction bestowed by treaties or guaranteed indefinitely by foreign assurances. It is a political reality sustained by institutions, collective determination and, in the most difficult circumstances, the willingness of citizens to defend their communities.
The diplomatic theatre of Shenzhen may influence the next stage of the war. It may accelerate negotiations, introduce new strategic pressures or simply reveal the limitations of great-power diplomacy. Its ultimate significance will depend upon what follows: the decisions taken in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Kyiv and Europe's capitals, and whether those decisions produce enforceable conditions for lasting security.
The ghost of Yalta will inevitably haunt the proceedings. But the world of 2026 is not the world of 1945, and Ukraine is not merely a territory upon a map awaiting allocation between victorious empires. It is an independent nation whose people have already demonstrated a remarkable capacity to resist decisions made about them without their consent.
The most important question emerging from Shenzhen will therefore be not what the three great powers believe they have agreed, but whether their diplomacy recognises a fundamental lesson of the war: that a durable European peace cannot be constructed without the participation, security and political consent of Ukraine itself.




