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The Price of Waiting: China and the Defence of the West

30 minutes ago
6 min read

By Matthew Parish


Tuesday 17 November 2026


The most consequential threats to a country’s security do not always arrive first as military threats. They may appear as inexpensive imports, profitable investment opportunities or commercial arrangements which seem too advantageous to question. By the time their strategic significance becomes apparent, the factories have closed, the technical expertise has dispersed and the government discovers that its freedom of action depends upon the consent of another state.


For Europeans, the experience of dependence upon Russian energy should have settled this question. Commercial interdependence can impose costs upon aggression, but it does not reliably prevent it. An authoritarian government may accept economic damage which its trading partners regard as inconceivable, particularly when it believes that territory, regime security or national prestige is at stake.


China presents a considerably larger and more complicated challenge. Her economic importance makes isolation both impractical and undesirable. Her industrial capabilities, technological ambitions and expanding armed forces nevertheless create opportunities to exert pressure upon other countries which Western governments cannot responsibly ignore. The task is to prepare for the possibility that these capabilities will be used coercively, while preserving the conditions under which peaceful competition remains possible.


The relevant period for preparation is the next five to ten years. This is long enough to build factories, train engineers and replenish military reserves, provided decisions are taken now. It is also short enough for delay to determine the outcome before a crisis begins.


China’s rise should not be confused with an inevitable march towards global supremacy. The International Monetary Fund identifies ageing, debt and weak productivity growth amongst the constraints upon her medium-term prospects. A formidable industrial economy can also suffer from wasteful investment and inadequate domestic demand. Predictions of uninterrupted Chinese ascendancy deserve as much scepticism as repeated predictions of imminent Chinese collapse.


Yet these difficulties offer little basis for strategic complacency. A state need not become richer than all its rivals combined to threaten their interests. It needs sufficient strength at a particular place, control over a resource they cannot readily replace, or the capacity to impose costs which their political systems are unwilling to bear.


The economic danger lies especially in concentrated dependence. Cheap Chinese goods can improve living standards, and Chinese innovation can benefit consumers elsewhere. The security problem arises when essential industries lose access to alternative suppliers, leaving decisions about their continued operation exposed to political intervention in Beijing.

Critical minerals illustrate the distinction. A country may possess mineral deposits without possessing the plants, chemical expertise and manufacturing facilities required to turn them into useful components. The International Energy Agency’s 2026 assessment finds persistent concentration in refining and significant weaknesses in the development of alternative supply chains. Opening mines alone will not resolve a dependence which extends through processing into finished products.


Such vulnerabilities matter in peacetime because they can influence foreign policy. They matter still more during a confrontation, when an interruption to civilian manufacturing may coincide with an urgent requirement to expand military production. A government cannot confidently promise to resist coercion if doing so might deprive its factories of the materials needed to sustain resistance.


The military challenge has a similar structure. Beijing does not require the ability to occupy Europe or defeat every American alliance simultaneously. Her most plausible route to a decisive strategic advantage is to create a regional situation in which intervention becomes prohibitively costly, uncertain or slow.


Taiwan is the clearest potential focus of such a crisis. An invasion is only one possible scenario. A blockade, restrictions presented as customs enforcement, or sustained pressure upon shipping could confront Western governments with difficult decisions before the character of the operation was universally accepted as an act of war. Economic disruption and political hesitation might achieve objectives which a costly amphibious assault could not.


Military modernisation makes these possibilities more serious without making their outcome predetermined. The Pentagon’s 2025 assessment describes expanding Chinese capabilities across nuclear, maritime, missile, cyber and space operations, and projects a nuclear stockpile exceeding 1,000 warheads by 2030. These are American assessments, including forecasts rather than established future facts. They nevertheless indicate the scale of the planning problem.


A capability milestone must never be mistaken for a date upon which war has been decided. Equally, uncertainty about intentions cannot justify postponing preparations which require years to complete.


From Ukraine, the separation sometimes drawn between European and Asian security appears particularly artificial. NATO’s 2024 Washington declaration identified China as a decisive enabler of Russia’s war through support for her defence industrial base, including dual-use inputs. This does not make Moscow and Beijing identical actors, or establish that every future confrontation would be coordinated. It does demonstrate that the material foundations of aggression in Europe extend beyond Europe.


The practical consequence is that preparing for China cannot sensibly mean abandoning Ukraine. A Europe unable to contain Russian aggression will continue to require American attention and resources precisely when those resources may be urgently needed elsewhere.


European governments should therefore assume a greater, durable share of responsibility for continental defence. This requires air defence, ammunition, logistics, intelligence and repair capacity, supported by procurement commitments which survive electoral cycles. Announcing expenditure targets is easier than creating forces which can fight, replenish themselves and continue fighting. Readiness should be measured in deliverable capabilities.


For the Indo-Pacific, the corresponding priority should be to make coercion difficult to accomplish. Taiwan’s resilience requires dispersed and survivable defensive systems, reliable communications, civil preparedness and reserves of essential supplies. Regional partners need arrangements for maintaining access, repairing damaged infrastructure and sustaining operations under pressure. Large platforms have their place, but they cannot compensate for inadequate stocks, exposed bases or fragile supply systems.


Western governments must also plan for a confrontation which begins below the threshold of open warfare. They should agree in advance how to assess a blockade, support commercial shipping, coordinate economic measures and communicate demands for de-escalation. The first days of a crisis are a poor time to discover that allies have incompatible definitions of what has occurred.


Economic preparation should begin with a disciplined inventory of dependence. Within the next year, governments should identify the relatively small number of materials, components and services whose interruption could disable essential infrastructure or defence production. Companies supplying these sectors should demonstrate that their alternative sources are operational, rather than merely names in a contingency document.


The next stage requires money and patience. Governments should support refining, recycling, industrial equipment and specialist skills through competitive contracts and predictable demand. Public assistance should carry deadlines, performance requirements and provisions for recovering support where commitments are not met. Otherwise the language of security will become an expensive refuge for businesses seeking protection from ordinary competition.


Stockpiles can bridge a disruption, but they cannot replace production indefinitely. Their size should reflect the time needed to bring alternative supplies into use. Likewise, diversification should include several dependable partners rather than reproduce the same concentration in a different jurisdiction.


These measures will carry costs. Redundant capacity and strategic reserves appear inefficient when judged against uninterrupted peacetime trade. Their value becomes visible when that trade fails. Governments should explain this honestly, protect households facing disproportionate burdens and publish enough evidence for voters to judge whether the expenditure purchases meaningful resilience.


Technology policy requires comparable precision. Restrictions on transfers with a substantial military application should be coordinated amongst allies and enforced against evasion. An indiscriminate attempt to sever scientific and commercial contact would sacrifice benefits while encouraging alternative systems beyond Western influence. Research security should address demonstrable risks, without treating Chinese ancestry as evidence of disloyalty.


The same principle applies to diplomacy. Countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America will make decisions according to their own interests. If Western governments want them to choose alternative infrastructure, finance or technology, credible offers must accompany the requests. Demanding alignment while providing neither markets nor investment is unlikely to produce enduring partnerships.


Preparedness must also include sustained communication with Beijing. Military incident procedures, crisis contacts and discussions of nuclear risk are necessary precisely because relations may deteriorate. Governments should make clear which conduct they oppose, what consequences would follow, and what steps would permit those consequences to be reversed. Deterrence becomes less stable when an adversary believes that restraint offers no benefit.


The purpose of this policy should be explicit: to preserve the freedom of countries to make their own political choices, and to prevent disputes from being settled through economic strangulation or military force. It should leave ample room for a prosperous China to trade, innovate and participate in international institutions.


The lesson visible from Lviv is that the time available for preparation is itself a strategic resource. It can be spent building productive capacity, strengthening alliances and making societies harder to intimidate. It can also be exhausted in arguments about whether the danger has yet become sufficiently obvious.


By the time that argument is settled beyond dispute, the opportunity to prepare cheaply and peacefully may already have passed.

 
 

Note from Matthew Parish, Editor-in-Chief. The Lviv Herald is a unique and independent source of analytical journalism about the war in Ukraine and its aftermath, and all the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the war as well as the tremendous advances in military technology the war has yielded. To achieve this independence, we rely exclusively on donations. Please donate if you can, with the buttons at the top of this page.

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