Security guarantees for Ukraine after American and European national security talks

Yesterday’s consultations amongst United States and European national security advisers sharpened a set of concrete options for security guarantees to underpin any ceasefire or peace deal for Ukraine. Military chiefs have delivered packages for “appropriate consideration”, with a clear premise: Europe would furnish the bulk of forces on the ground, while Washington is exploring a supporting role, including air power and command-and-control. 

What has been ruled out

The United States has explicitly ruled out deploying American ground troops to Ukraine. This exclusion now anchors all subsequent planning. 

NATO membership for Ukraine—while reaffirmed as a long-term objective by the Alliance—has been set aside as an immediate instrument of deterrence in the current talks. President Trump has publicly said any near-term settlement “can’t be NATO”, and has described accession as impossible in this phase. 

Moscow, for its part, is seeking a veto over any Western “security guarantees” and has rejected post-settlement European troop deployments in Ukraine as “foreign intervention”. That stance, if sustained, would block the most forward-leaning options. But it appears that the West intends to proceed notwithstanding the Kremlin's objections.

What has been confirmed as possible

NATO’s Secretary-General Mark Rutte has outlined a two-tier structure: first, a strong Ukrainian force; second, guarantees provided by Europe and the United States—sequenced to follow a peace deal or long truce. President Zelensky has confirmed this direction after their Kyiv meeting on 22 August 2025. 

The concept apears to be on of a European lead with a US backstop. Draft options envisage European nations providing the “lion’s share” of any presence under guarantees, with the United States offering enablers—air support, command-and-control, intelligence and logistics. Reuters reports that even a US-run Command and Control arrangement over European land-based contingents is on the table; Washington has left open an air role. 

Then there is the so-called "coalition of the willing", a trans-European military structure prepared to deploy to Ukrainian territory after initial ceasefire deployments. Ukraine and European interlocutors are building such a structure—missions likely focused on monitoring, training, logistics and critical-infrastructure protection. 

Early national contributions have been confirmed. Estonia has publicly signalled readiness to contribute a peacekeeping unit; Romania has stated she will not send troops but will offer bases—potentially for US fighters—as part of the architecture. These early declarations illuminate the emerging division of labour. 

A timetable has been discussed. Ukrainian officials say a framework draft could be ready within days, with political-legal and military sub-groups finalising components. That does not bind parliaments, but it is a marker of momentum. 

The principal options on the table

European ground presence inside Ukraine now seems an intrinsic part of a western deployment to Ukraine. A tripwire-style presence—likely multinational, rules-based and geographically distributed—could deter renewed invasion by raising the risk of immediate Allied involvement. German military representatives caution that any credible mission would require tens of thousands of troops, not token numbers. The political threshold for such a deployment is high; the operational burden would fall largely on Europe. Nevertheless the principal European military powers do have tens of thousands of troops at their disposal.

Another feature of the ceasefire may be a US-enabled air umbrella. The United States has not committed ground troops but is considering an air role ranging from accelerated air-defence deliveries to enforcing a no-fly regime using US aircraft from allied bases. Romania’s offer of facilities fits this concept, although any “no-fly” enforcement against Russia would constitute a profound escalatory step and therefore demands unambiguous legal authority and political will. 

A command-and-control and intelligence backbone is essential. A US-led command-and-control arrangement over a European force would raise responsiveness and cohesion without placing US ground units in harm’s way. That model would likely be paired with fused intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance (ISR), missile-defence integration and long-range strike coordination. 

Article 5-like legal triggers comparable to those in the NATO Treaty are anticipated for Ukraine. Kyiv is pressing for a treaty-grade mechanism—ratified by partner parliaments—with explicit algorithms and timelines for response if Russia resumes aggression. European and US officials are now discussing “Article 5-like” language within a coalition framework rather than NATO proper. This would be a marked advance over the merely political assurances of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. 

Industrial and financial pillars will be part of the planning. Long-term bilateral security agreements already signed under the G7 Joint Declaration (including the 10-year US–Ukraine pact) remain the yardarm: predictable funding, training, joint production and rapid consultations in crisis. They do not, by themselves, create an automatic collective-defence obligation, but they are the supply-side engine that makes any guarantee militarily real. 

Coercive economics as enforcement is a key pillar of the structure being envisaged. The US President has threatened additional sanctions or tariffs if diplomacy stalls; credible, pre-agreed economic penalties for violations could complement a military guarantee but cannot substitute for physical deterrence. 

Likely shape of an initial package

The most plausible near-term outcome is a non-NATO guarantee with four legs: a European-manned presence inside Ukraine after a ceasefire; a US-enabled air and command and control shield from allied territory; a ratified set of Article 5-like triggers amongst a coalition of the willing; and a reinforced pipeline of weapons, training and finance under existing bilateral accords. That sequence matches what negotiators describe and what early national offers (Estonia, Romania) imply. 

Effectiveness: will this really deter renewed Russian aggression in Europe?

The answer is that it may do.

The first leg is deterrence by tripwire. A visible multinational presence inside Ukraine, even if modestly sized, raises the political cost of renewed Russian invasion and reduces Moscow’s confidence in a quick thrust. Yet experts warn that “tens of thousands” may be necessary to police lines and protect critical nodes; anything less risks being symbolic. 

The second leg is airpower as the decisive margin. An allied air umbrella—short of the most escalatory “no-fly” variant—could sharply reduce Russia’s ability to bombard cities and logistics with missiles and drones. The credibility of this leg depends on basing access, ammunition stockpiles, integrated command, and explicit authorisation to intercept and strike. Romania’s posture addresses basing; stockpiles and authorisations remain open questions. 

The third leg is law that bites. Budapest-style political promises notoriously failed; treaty-grade triggers with automaticity and deadlines are essential. Ukraine’s insistence on ratified, time-bound algorithms is therefore the single most important legal innovation—turning “consultations” into obligations. 

The third leg is Europe’s centre of gravity. With US ground forces off the table, the guarantee’s deterrent power will ride on European staying power: numbers, logistics, rules of engagement, and a willingness to accept risks for years. Some governments are signalling readiness; others will need parliamentary majorities and budgetary certainty. If the European pillar is hollow, Moscow will test it. 

The fourth leg is Russian veto claims. Moscow’s demand to approve or forbid Western measures must be rejected on principle: the point of a guarantee is to constrain the aggressor, not empower her. If Western capitals indulge a de facto veto, deterrence collapses at the first crisis. 

The fifth leg is the NATO horizon. Ultimately the only fully automatic, Alliance-wide guarantee is Article 5 itself. NATO continues to say Ukraine’s future lies in the Alliance, but the current plan aims to build something that moves deterrence from abstract to real while politics catch up. The more the interim shield looks, feels and acts like Article 5, the more it will work. 

A Lviv Herald judgement

If the objective is to end the cycle of Russian aggression in Europe, then the minimum effective package is this: European boots on Ukrainian ground after a ceasefire; a US-enabled air and command shield; a ratified, automatic response algorithm; and an industrial-financial pipeline geared to surge munitions and air defence. Anything less is an invitation to the next war. The choices now are blunt: either the guarantee is structured to be triggered without further debate, or it will be debated when it needs to be triggered.