Russian and Chinese Intelligence: Divergent Traditions, Converging Ambitions

The clandestine arms of Russia and China serve as instruments of great power projection, yet they embody strikingly different traditions. Each is moulded by history, geography and ideology. Russia’s foreign intelligence services are heirs to a culture of subversion and confrontation; China’s to one of patience, accumulation and statecraft. To compare them is to observe two rival approaches to the same end: the quiet reshaping of the global balance of power in their favour.

Russian Intelligence: The Culture of Subversion

Moscow’s foreign intelligence institutions – the SVR, the GRU and the FSB’s external directorates – remain steeped in the habits of the Soviet KGB. Their intent is disruptive: to weaken adversaries, destabilise alliances, and cultivate confusion in political systems. Russian operations are characterised by aggression, speed and risk tolerance. They excel in active measures: disinformation, covert financing of extremist parties, cyber sabotage, assassinations abroad, and clandestine military operations.

Historical examples underscore this ethos. During the Cold War, Soviet services ran “active measures” campaigns such as Operation INFEKTION, which spread the rumour that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as a biological weapon. More recently, Russian intelligence has orchestrated influence operations during Western elections: the 2016 US presidential election interference involved GRU hacking of political party servers and political disruption caused by stolen emails through WikiLeaks. In 2018, GRU officers attempted to hack the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague while it was investigating the Skripal poisoning, itself a brazen assassination attempt on British soil using a military-grade nerve agent.

The purpose of these endeavours is not primarily to acquire economic gain or commercial advantage. Rather it is to prevent adversaries from uniting and to weaken the political cohesion of NATO and the European Union. A cyber-attack that cuts electricity in Ukraine, a manipulated referendum in Europe, or a targeted assassination abroad – each reflects a mindset in which victory lies in an adversary’s disarray. Russian intelligence services take pride in sowing mistrust, amplifying divisions, and sustaining the aura of menace that keeps adversaries perpetually off balance.

Chinese Intelligence: The Culture of Accumulation

Beijing’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) and affiliated organs operate with a different ethos. Theirs is a project of patience and permanence. The primary goal is to acquire knowledge – scientific, technological, industrial and political – that strengthens China’s long-term rise. Rather than disruptive operations, Chinese intelligence favours collection: systematic cyber-espionage against universities and corporations, cultivation of overseas Chinese communities for information access, and strategic penetration of Western research institutions.

Concrete cases illustrate this orientation. In 2014, a Chinese national was convicted in the United States for attempting to steal the blueprints of advanced jet engines; similar cases have occurred repeatedly, targeting firms like General Electric and Rolls-Royce. In 2015, Chinese hackers breached the US Office of Personnel Management, exfiltrating security clearance data on more than 20 million individuals – a treasure trove for long-term recruitment and blackmail. Another prominent example is the theft of designs for the F-35 stealth fighter, which Western officials allege contributed to the rapid development of China’s J-20 aircraft.

Chinese operations are rarely spectacular. Instead, they are vast in scale and bureaucratic in method. The intent is cumulative advantage: to shorten China’s technological lag, to understand foreign policymaking from within, and to shape international institutions from the inside. A stolen jet engine design, an infiltrated think tank, or the gradual capture of a United Nations agency vote – each contributes incrementally to Beijing’s grand strategy of national rejuvenation.

Points of Convergence

Despite their contrasting cultures, Russian and Chinese intelligence converge in several respects. Both employ cyber tools as central instruments, exploiting the borderless reach of the internet. Both rely upon diaspora or expatriate networks, whether émigré Russians vulnerable to coercion or Chinese nationals encouraged to serve the motherland. Both benefit from ambiguous boundaries between state and non-state actors, masking official sponsorship behind cut-outs, criminal syndicates or front companies.

Moreover, both increasingly operate with a geopolitical synergy. Russian disinformation campaigns can soften the ground for Chinese economic influence, while Chinese technology theft may be quietly shared with Moscow. Yet the partnership remains uneasy: Moscow fears becoming junior to Beijing, while Beijing views Russian rashness as potentially destabilising to its more patient designs.

Divergent Purposes, Common Challenge

Ultimately, the difference lies in intent. Russia seeks disorder abroad as a substitute for strength at home; China seeks order tilted to her advantage. Russia’s intelligence services wield the dagger; China’s wield the ledger.

For democracies, the implications are sobering. Russian operations may deliver immediate shocks – poisoned individuals, hacked elections, crippled infrastructure. Chinese operations may not be felt for years, until an entire industry is hollowed out by intellectual property theft or a generation of officials is compromised by long-cultivated agents. Both represent systemic challenges, but of different time horizons.

Both traditions draw upon deep cultural wells – Russia’s history of secret police and revolutionary subversion, China’s Confucian patience allied with Communist party discipline. Both will endure. Understanding their divergence is essential if democracies are to devise countermeasures that match the scale of the threat: resilience against Russian sabotage, and vigilance against Chinese penetration.