Russia's evolution in her use of the Shahed drone

Monday 19 January 2026

The Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munition, adopted, modified and mass-produced by Russia during her invasion of Ukraine, has undergone a quiet but significant evolution since February 2022. What began as a relatively crude long-range terror weapon has developed into a family of adaptive systems, incorporating changes in propulsion, guidance, survivability and, most consequentially for civilians and defenders alike, ordnance.

From the outset, the Shahed’s military purpose was only partially tactical. Its strategic function was psychological and economic: saturating Ukrainian air defences, exhausting interceptor stocks and imposing a constant atmosphere of insecurity far from the front line. Yet as the war has lengthened, Russia has refined the drone not merely to persist, but to become more lethal, more evasive and more flexible in its destructive effect.

Early payload diversity, 2022

In 2022, Shahed drones arriving in Ukrainian airspace displayed a mixed approach to warheads. Some carried conventional high explosive charges, while others were fitted with thermobaric payloads. This diversity reflected both Iranian design options and Russian experimentation. At that stage production volumes were relatively low, and the drones were often deployed in small numbers against urban infrastructure targets, where Russia sought to maximise terror effects rather than battlefield efficiency.

Thermobaric warheads operate by dispersing an aerosolised fuel cloud which is then ignited, producing a high-temperature blast followed by a pressure drop. In enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces, such as buildings or trenches, the effects are devastating. Heat, overpressure and oxygen depletion combine to cause fatal injuries even where fragmentation is limited. In 2022, Russia appeared willing to employ this class of munition with little concern for the legal or humanitarian implications, particularly in civilian areas.

Mass production and a shift to high explosive

As Russian procurement expanded and domestic assembly lines were established, payload standardisation followed. By late 2022 and into 2023, the overwhelming majority of Shahed drones carried conventional high explosive warheads. This was not an arbitrary choice. High explosive charges are cheaper, easier to manufacture at scale, more predictable in performance and simpler to integrate with mass-produced airframes.

From Russia’s perspective, the drone had become less a precision terror device and more a cost-exchange weapon. The aim was to force Ukraine to spend expensive surface-to-air missiles to intercept cheap incoming drones. In this context, warhead sophistication mattered less than reliability and production volume. High explosive payloads met that requirement.

For those on the ground, the difference was significant. In open terrain, a thermobaric warhead presents a paradoxical survivability profile. The intense heat and vacuum effect dissipate rapidly in large, unconfined spaces. At distances of thirty metres or more, the lethal effects fall off sharply, provided there is no secondary fragmentation or structural collapse. High explosive warheads, by contrast, rely on blast and fragmentation whose lethal radius declines more gradually. In open areas, they maintain a broader zone of critical injury, reducing the odds of survival for anyone caught nearby.

The return of thermobarics, 2024–2025

Over the past twelve months, a discernible shift has occurred. Ukrainian recovery of drone debris and battlefield reporting indicate a steady increase in Shahed drones once again carrying thermobaric warheads. This suggests a reassessment by Russian planners, informed by both tactical experience and Ukrainian adaptation.

As Ukraine has improved early warning, dispersal and open-air defensive practices, the terror effect of high explosive drones has diminished. Thermobaric payloads, especially when used against lightly protected positions, logistics areas or temporary troop concentrations, restore a degree of lethality that fragmentation-based charges cannot always deliver. The choice reflects a grim calculus: selecting warheads that maximise killing potential against personnel rather than merely damaging infrastructure.

The distinction is not academic. In large open areas, a thermobaric detonation, while horrifying, offers a higher chance of survival beyond a relatively short radius because the heat vacuum collapses quickly. A conventional high explosive charge, by contrast, produces a more persistent lethal envelope. This reality has shaped Ukrainian defensive advice and field behaviour, even as Russia adjusts her ordnance choices to negate those adaptations.

Variants, guidance and survivability

Alongside warhead evolution, the Shahed family has diversified structurally. The Geran and Gerbera variants represent incremental but meaningful steps towards greater autonomy and survivability. Recent examples have been recovered carrying satellite communications equipment, including Starlink terminals, enabling real-time guidance updates and resistance to jamming.

More alarming is the mounting of man-portable air defence systems directly onto some drones. While not intended for independent targeting in the traditional sense, these systems complicate interception. A drone that can threaten low-flying helicopters or deter close-range engagement forces Ukrainian defenders to alter engagement envelopes, again increasing the cost of defence.

Propulsion changes and area denial

Propulsion has also evolved. Early Shaheds relied upon noisy propeller engines, whose distinctive sound became an auditory warning across Ukrainian cities. Newer variants have experimented with jet engines, increasing speed and reducing reaction time for defenders. While range may be reduced, the tactical benefit in saturation attacks is clear.

Perhaps most insidious is the introduction of drones carrying anti-personnel mines, released along flight paths. This transforms the Shahed from a point-target weapon into an area-denial system, contaminating terrain long after the drone has passed. Such use further blurs the line between aerial attack and long-term civilian harm, embedding the drone within a broader strategy of attrition and destabilisation.

An evolving instrument of war

The evolution of the Shahed drone illustrates a broader truth about Russia’s conduct of the war. She adapts not in pursuit of decisive victory, but in pursuit of sustained damage. Each modification responds to Ukrainian resilience, Western support and the grinding realities of industrial warfare. The drone’s changing warheads, guidance systems and deployment methods reflect a state willing to recalibrate violence to maintain pressure rather than achieve resolution.

For Ukraine, understanding these evolutions is not merely a technical exercise. It informs civil defence guidance, military doctrine and the ethical case presented to the world. The Shahed is no longer a static symbol of imported aggression. It is a living system, reshaped by a war that has become, in every sense, a laboratory of modern destruction.