Minsk as mediator?

The release yesterday of more than one hundred Belarusian political prisoners, secured in exchange for the lifting by the United States of sanctions on Belarusian potash exports, is an event of genuine human importance. For those released and their families, it is the end of years of arbitrary detention. For Belarus herself, however, it is also a calculated political signal. Minsk is advertising that she can still trade in things the West values and that she can do so without immediately provoking a Russian veto.

That matters because Belarus is once again hinting that she could play a role, however modest, in efforts to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. The suggestion is not new. The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 were negotiated in the Belarusian capital, embedding the idea that Belarus could serve as a diplomatic platform between Kyiv and Moscow. Yet history has weighed heavily against that claim. In February 2022, Russia used Belarusian territory as a principal staging ground for the invasion of northern Ukraine. Whatever neutrality Minsk once claimed was fatally compromised in Ukrainian eyes.

The question therefore is not whether Minsk can host talks. It is whether Belarus can credibly act as an intermediary, what kind of intermediary she might be, and at what cost to Ukraine and to Western unity.

What yesterday’s deal reveals about Lukashenko’s Belarus is instructive. First, she remains highly sensitive to economic pressure. Potash exports are central to Belarus’s foreign currency earnings and to the domestic political settlement that keeps Alyaksandr Lukashenko in power. Sanctions relief in this sector is therefore a powerful incentive, not a symbolic gesture.

Secondly, the deal exposes the transactional nature of Minsk’s approach to repression. Political prisoners have been released not because the system that produced them has changed, but because they have been converted into bargaining assets. The fact that many hundreds more remain imprisoned is not incidental. It is what gives Belarus continuing leverage over any Western government tempted to repeat the exercise.

Thirdly, Minsk is deliberately presenting herself as useful to Washington on the Ukraine question. By releasing prisoners in a highly publicised exchange, Belarus is signalling that she can deliver concrete outcomes and that she retains personal access to Vladimir Putin. The implication is clear. If the United States wants channels to Moscow that are not publicly confrontational, Minsk is offering her services.

From Ukraine’s perspective, this is where the credibility problem begins. Belarus was not a neutral bystander in 2022. Russian forces crossed into Ukraine from Belarusian territory, threatening Kyiv itself. Any renewed Minsk process therefore risks being seen not as a fresh diplomatic initiative but as a return to a framework already associated with bad faith and military exploitation.

From Moscow’s perspective, the problem is different but equally constraining. Belarus is not an independent broker. She is an ally and a dependent. Lukashenko’s survival depends upon Russian political backing, security guarantees and financial support. If he were to mediate in a way that genuinely constrained Russian freedom of action, he would be undermining the very relationship that sustains his regime. His room for manoeuvre is therefore narrow by design.

This does not mean that Belarus is irrelevant. It means that her relevance is limited to certain narrow functions.

Belarus could plausibly play a role in humanitarian arrangements. Today’s prisoner release demonstrates that she can organise transfers, co-ordinate with third countries and implement deals that require discretion and logistical competence. In principle, this capacity could be extended to prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, humanitarian corridors, or technical arrangements relating to civilians caught behind front lines. These are not trivial matters. They save lives and reduce suffering. But they do not resolve the war.

Minsk could also serve as a venue for discreet back-channel communications. Wars often end because private conversations clarify what each side is actually prepared to concede. Belarus’s geographic position and her proximity to Moscow make such contacts possible. Yet any such channel would have to be one amongst several, not the sole conduit. Ukraine cannot afford to rely on a single back-channel hosted by a state so closely aligned with her adversary.

A further, limited area of potential relevance lies in reducing risks on Ukraine’s northern border. Confidence-building measures, such as advance notification of exercises or constraints on deployments, could in theory be discussed with Belarusian participation. However any such understandings would require verification and external guarantees. Ukrainian security cannot rest on Belarusian assurances alone.

What Minsk cannot credibly deliver is far more significant. She cannot broker a durable territorial settlement. She cannot provide security guarantees to Ukraine. She cannot enforce Russian compliance with any agreement that Moscow later finds inconvenient. These were precisely the weaknesses of the earlier Minsk agreements, which produced documents but not peace. For Ukraine, the memory of that experience is not academic. It is measured in lost territory and renewed war.

There is also a strategic risk for the West. Yesterday’s potash deal illustrates how Belarus can tempt individual Western actors with selective concessions. If Minsk were elevated as a central diplomatic intermediary, Russia could exploit that position to encourage divergent approaches to sanctions amongst the United States and the European Union. For Ukraine, Western unity is not a luxury. It is a strategic necessity.

Seen in this light, Washington’s engagement with Belarus may be less about Minsk mediating the war and more about applying indirect pressure on Moscow. If sanctions relief can be used to encourage Belarus to limit her military co-operation with Russia, or at least to raise the political cost of deeper involvement (sanctions removal can always be reversed), that would marginally improve Ukraine’s security environment. Even a reduced threat from the north has value. But this is a cautious, incremental strategy, not a diplomatic breakthrough.

The danger is that Lukashenko simply monetises repression while remaining strategically loyal to Russia. In that scenario, Belarus becomes not a bridge but a shopfront, trading prisoners and access for economic relief without altering her fundamental alignment.

The realistic prospect, therefore, is a modest one. Minsk may have a role at the margins of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, particularly in humanitarian arrangements and discreet technical contacts. She is highly unlikely to be the forum through which a comprehensive and durable peace is negotiated.

If Belarus is to be engaged at all, certain principles should guide that engagement. Humanitarian concessions should not become a mechanism for the gradual erosion of sanctions without strategic return. Any military-related understandings must be verifiable and supported by partners Ukraine trusts. Above all the continued existence of political prisoners in Belarus should be treated not as a negotiating resource but as an ongoing indictment of the regime.

Yesterday’s releases show that Minsk can do deals. They do not show that she can end wars. Belarus may offer rooms, couriers and conversations. Peace itself will depend, as it always has, on power, enforcement and guarantees far beyond her reach.