Israel and Hezbollah: another round of combat

Wednesday 4 March 2026

In the past three days the long-dormant conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has erupted once again, widening the Middle Eastern conflagration. Hostilities that began when Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in a combined United States–Israeli strike on Saturday 28 February 2026 have drawn Hezbollah into another active confrontation with Israel, prompting the latter to expand her air campaign against Lebanese territory and to move ground forces into southern Lebanon. These developments come as Israel is already prosecuting an extensive military campaign against Iran, raising urgent questions about the capacity of Hezbollah to sustain pressure on the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) when they are committed on two fronts. 

The immediate spark of the current escalation was a salvo of rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles launched by Hezbollah from southern Lebanon into northern Israel early in the week, which the movement said was a response to the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader. This marked the first major direct action by Hezbollah against Israel since the ceasefire that followed the 2024 Lebanon war. In retaliation Israel has mounted a broad air campaign across Lebanon, striking Hezbollah’s southern Beirut strongholds and other facilities, killing dozens and causing mass displacement of civilians from border regions. The Lebanese government has taken the extraordinary step of outlawing Hezbollah’s military activities, reflecting deep internal strain over the group’s decision to engage. 

Israeli political and military leadership has signalled a calculated willingness to widen Israel's operations. Reinforcements have been sent to southern Lebanon, and although not formally labelled a full-scale invasion these ground movements represent an escalation of Israeli military presence beyond purely defensive postures. An Israeli ground invasion is reported as being underway at the time of writing but its current extent is unclear. In response Hezbollah has reported a swarm of drone attacks on Israeli defence infrastructure this morning. At the same time the IDF continues its intensive operations against Iran’s military and strategic infrastructure, deploying air power and missile strikes in concert with United States forces. 

The principal question now confronting analysts is whether Hezbollah can sustain effective pressure on the IDF while Israel is simultaneously engaged with Iran. Hezbollah’s raison d’être as an Iranian-aligned militia driven by Shia ideology has consistently drawn it into the orbit of Tehran’s regional strategic objectives. Historically the group demonstrated considerable resilience and capacity when it engaged Israel in the 2006 Lebanon war, employing a mix of long-range rockets and guerrilla tactics designed to impose costs on Israeli forces and erode domestic confidence in the war effort. More recent engagements prior to the current flare-up showed that Hezbollah had replenished much of its arsenal following periods of relative calm, benefitting from continuous support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

However the strategic context now is markedly different. First the IDF has learned from past conflicts: its Northern Command has invested heavily in surveillance, missile defences, tunnel detection and rapid-reaction forces specifically adapted to confront Hezbollah’s traditional rocket arsenals. Second the Lebanese political environment has shifted. With Beirut’s government publicly revoking Hezbollah’s licence to fight and seeking to assert state monopoly over force, the group is potentially more isolated domestically than in prior escalations. 

Third, and perhaps most consequential, is the broader theatre in which these events are unfolding. Unlike the 2023–24 Gaza conflict — which absorbed the bulk of Israeli operational priorities for an extended period — the renewed hostilities with Iran and now Lebanon place significant demands on Israel’s finite military resources. The IDF’s command structure must allocate air, land and intelligence assets not only to degrade Iranian capabilities deep within Iranian territory, but also to maintain air superiority and ground manoeuvre options along the multi-layered Lebanese frontier.

This two-front scenario complicates Hezbollah’s strategic calculus, too. If it commits heavily on the Lebanese front in the near term, it risks provoking a deeper Israeli ground offensive than that already begun, that could devastate its infrastructure and erode local support, especially if civilian harm mounts. If it restrains its activities it may preserve its remaining capabilities but at the cost of appearing to abandon its stated commitment to defend Iran and Lebanon against perceived aggression. This dilemma is heightened by indications that Hezbollah’s leadership had previously signalled limits to its involvement absent direct threats to Iran’s core leadership — suggesting that its current offensive posture may be as much symbolic as it is militarily decisive. 

In this environment the extent to which Hezbollah can continue to apply sustained pressure on the IDF appears constrained. It retains a significant arsenal and the operational experience to harass Israeli positions, inflicting periodic costs and obliging the IDF to divert forces from other tasks. Nevertheless Hezbollah could bog down Israel in an unwanted ground war with no obvious way out: a mistake Israel has made in the past. The simultaneity of Israel’s campaigns complicates Hezbollah’s strategic aims. The IDF’s enhanced defensive systems and rapid-mobilisation capabilities diminish the immediate impact of rocket barrages that in earlier eras exacted greater psychological and material tolls. Moreover with Israel intensifying air strikes and moving ground units into Lebanese terrain, Hezbollah’s room for manoeuvre may shrink as terrain that once offered relative sanctuary becomes contested. 

The coming weeks or months will likely determine whether this renewed confrontation settles into limited exchange — with Hezbollah seeking to avoid outright destruction while signalling resolve — or deepens into a broader Israeli ground campaign intended to dismantle the group’s military capacity and potentially leading to extended ground war in Lebanese territory. Either outcome will be shaped by the interplay between Israeli strategic priorities, Lebanon’s fractured politics, and the geopolitical currents tied to Iran’s broader confrontation with the United States and her allies. Sadly the conflict with Hezbollah seems likely to be as protracted as the conflict with Iran. In the brittle architecture of Middle Eastern conflict, the simultaneous pressures of a war against Iran and an expanded confrontation with Hezbollah may ultimately stretch both adversaries towards recalibration, but only at significant humanitarian and geopolitical cost.