Iran and North Korea: Military Technology Transfers and the Russia–Ukraine War

Since Russia launched her full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the war has transformed from a regional conflict into a global test of geopolitical alignments, military resilience and international norms. Among the more concerning developments has been the reported involvement of two pariah states—Iran and North Korea—in supplying military technology and equipment to the Russian Federation. These transfers not only help Moscow circumvent the impact of Western sanctions and arms embargoes but also underscore a shifting global order in which authoritarian regimes support one another through informal networks of mutual utility. The implications of such cooperation are vast: they touch upon international law, strategic stability and the future of arms control.

Iran’s Role: Drones and Beyond

The Emergence of Shahed Drones

Iran has emerged as a key military supplier to Russia, particularly in the provision of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Beginning in mid-2022, Russia began deploying Iranian-made Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones—cheap, loitering munitions (that can wait in an area until they find a viable target) capable of striking civilian infrastructure deep inside Ukraine. These so-called “kamikaze drones” have become an integral part of Russia’s airstrike strategy, often used to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences and cause disruption far from the front line.

The technology transfer involved is not merely transactional. Intelligence reports indicate that Russian and Iranian engineers are now co-producing drones inside Russia, with production facilities reportedly established in Tatarstan. This collaboration reduces Moscow’s reliance on Iranian exports and allows for faster, localised supply.

Missile Technology and the Possibility of Escalation

As the war drags on, attention has turned to the potential supply of ballistic missiles, such as the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar, which could further increase Ukraine’s vulnerability. US and EU officials have warned that Iranian missile deliveries may constitute a “red line” that could dramatically alter the scope of the conflict and provoke wider international repercussions. Though no confirmed deliveries of missiles have yet been verified, Russia and Iran signed a military cooperation pact in 2023 that leaves such an escalation on the table.

North Korea’s Role: Artillery and Ammunition

Ammunition Transfers to Sustain a War of Attrition

North Korea, with her vast stockpiles of Soviet-calibre ammunition and artillery systems, has been another critical enabler of Russia’s prolonged assault. In 2023 and 2024, US and South Korean intelligence agencies reported shipments of millions of artillery shells and short-range missiles from North Korea to Russia, often via intermediaries in the Russian Far East.

Unlike Iran’s drone and missile technology, North Korea’s contribution is less sophisticated but strategically vital. Russia's war effort relies heavily on high-tempo artillery fire, and Moscow’s ability to maintain shelling across a thousand-kilometre front is directly aided by Pyongyang’s industrial-scale supply of munitions. In this sense North Korea acts as an “arsenal of autocracy”, prolonging the war by sheer volume.

Deployment of North Korean Troops in Support of Russian Forces

Perhaps more consequentially, credible reports in early 2025 indicated that North Korea had deployed several hundred or thousands of military personnel, including artillery specialists and logistics support units, to the Kursk region of western Russia, where Ukrainian cross-border raids and drone attacks had intensified. While the presence of these troops is described by Moscow as “volunteers,” their deployment reflects a significant escalation in military cooperation. Although they are not frontline assault troops their assistance in fortifying Russian defensive lines, manning anti-aircraft systems and managing supply depots has allowed Russian regular forces to redeploy elsewhere. This marks the first time since the Korean War that North Korean troops have served in a foreign conflict—albeit under the guise of technical advisors and auxiliary support—blurring the lines between proxy support and direct participation.

Political Symbolism and Diplomacy

In return for these military transfers, Pyongyang has gained political capital and material rewards. In 2023 Kim Jong-un visited Russia for the first time since the pandemic, touring the Vostochny Cosmodrome and reportedly discussing satellite technology and nuclear submarine capabilities. North Korea also seeks food, fuel, and technological support from Russia in exchange for its arms.

This cooperation marks a significant rebuke to UN Security Council resolutions, many of which Russia once supported. Moscow now openly violates restrictions it once helped impose, eroding the legitimacy of global nonproliferation regimes.

Why These Alliances Matter

Undermining the Sanctions Regime

The ability of Russia to circumvent Western sanctions through strategic cooperation with states like Iran and North Korea weakens the overall effectiveness of economic pressure as a policy tool. These relationships provide Russia with a shadow supply chain of weapons and dual-use technologies, complicating sanctions enforcement mechanisms and creating new grey zones in global trade.

Emergence of an Alternative Security Architecture

The cooperation also signals a broader alignment of authoritarian states willing to challenge the post-Cold War liberal order. While not a formal alliance, the Moscow–Tehran–Pyongyang axis is bound by shared strategic goals: weakening Western influence, resisting isolation, and asserting sovereignty through force.

This informal grouping could pose a long-term threat to global security, especially if these nations begin co-developing technologies such as missile propulsion systems, AI-driven targeting or space-based reconnaissance tools. These forms of collaboration are not yet fully realised but loom large in Western defence assessments.

Legal and Strategic Consequences

The arms transfers violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions, especially in North Korea’s case. Yet enforcement remains weak. Russia’s permanent veto power and Iran’s growing economic ties with non-Western states (including China and India) make multilateral action difficult.

In addition this trend complicates arms control diplomacy. With Russia undermining the very norms she once upheld after the end of the Cold War, and the US increasingly focused on Great Power competition, global arms control regimes are fragmenting.

Conclusion

The deepening military cooperation between Iran, North Korea, and Russia is a symptom of a fracturing global order. It sustains Russia’s war effort in Ukraine while emboldening two regimes long marginalised by the West. The use of Iranian drones and North Korean artillery is not merely tactical—it is geopolitical, with far-reaching implications for international law, deterrence theory, and conflict resolution.

Western policymakers must respond with greater intelligence-sharing, targeted secondary sanctions and reinforced export controls, while also addressing the underlying geopolitical rifts that drive these alignments. Otherwise the shadow alliance now sustaining Russia’s war machine could evolve into a more formal and dangerous bloc—one defined not just by what it resists, but by the new rules it seeks to impose.

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Reading List

1. Iran’s Military Support to Russia

• Katz, Mark N. Iran and Russia: Strategic Partners or Competitors? (Oxford University Press, 2022).

• Institute for Science and International Security. “Iran’s Drone Transfers to Russia.” (2023). [ISIS Reports]

• International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Strategic Dossier: Iran’s Power Projection in Eurasia. (2024).

• UN Panel of Experts on Iran. Violation Reports of Arms Embargo Provisions under UNSCR 2231. (2023).

2. North Korea’s Involvement in the Ukraine War

• Bermudez, Joseph S. Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun. North Korea’s Artillery and Ammunition Transfers to Russia – CSIS Beyond Parallel, 2023–2024.

• Ministry of Defense (Republic of Korea). Special Report on North Korean Ammunition Transfers. (Seoul, 2024).

• Human Rights Watch. “North Korea’s Foreign Military Deployments: Evidence and Implications.” (2025).

• Michael Kimmage & Liana Fix. North Korea and the Shadow Conflict in Europe. – Foreign Affairs, March 2025.

• RAND Corporation. Proxy Warfare and Authoritarian Alliances: The Russia–North Korea Convergence. (2024).

3. Sanctions Evasion and Global Arms Trade

• Charon, Thierry. The Sanctions Challenge: Iran, North Korea, and Russia’s Evasion Networks. (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2023).

• Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Dark Commerce: Illicit Military Transfers in the Russia–Ukraine War. (2024).

• UN Security Council Sanctions Monitoring Reports on North Korea and Iran (2022–2025).

4. Strategic Alignments and the Erosion of Global Norms

• Niall Ferguson & Gideon Rachman (eds.). Axes of Authoritarianism: Iran, North Korea and Russia in the Global Order. (Penguin, 2025).

• Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Axis of Need: The Military-Industrial Bargains Binding Iran, North Korea, and Russia. (2024).

• Council on Foreign Relations. Russia’s Pivot East: Dependency, Desperation and Deals. (2023).

• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Fragmenting the Norms: The UN and the Iran–North Korea–Russia Triangle. (2024).