Non-Aligned or Misaligned? The Global South’s Ambiguous Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine
- Matthew Parish
- 5 hours ago
- 6 min read
Since Russia launched her full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the world has witnessed a significant geopolitical divide—not just between Russia and the West, but between the Global North and large parts of the Global South. While Western powers responded with unprecedented unity in condemning Moscow, imposing sweeping sanctions and arming Kyiv, the response of much of the Global South has been more ambiguous. Countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East have displayed a wide range of positions—some neutral, some quietly sympathetic to Russia and others overtly critical of Western involvement. Here we explore the motivations behind these stances, evaluate whether the Global South is truly “non-aligned” or increasingly “misaligned” with liberal democratic values, and we consider the broader implications for international order.
Historical Legacy and Strategic Non-Alignment
Much of the Global South’s posture can be traced to the historical legacy of non-alignment during the Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in 1961, was rooted in the desire of post-colonial states to avoid entanglement in the rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union. For many of these countries, neutrality—or what they now call “strategic autonomy”—remains a core tenet of foreign policy. India, for instance, has abstained from condemning Russia outright in numerous UN votes, maintaining strong defence and energy ties with Moscow. South Africa, another prominent member of the NAM, has occasionally echoed Russian talking points and even hosted joint naval drills with the Russian navy in early 2023.
While these countries argue their position stems from a principled stance against Great Power confrontation, critics suggest that such neutrality often masks strategic or economic interests. Russia, for example, remains a major arms supplier to many countries in Asia and Africa, while offering energy and food exports on favourable terms. In some cases, long-standing relationships with Moscow date back to Soviet support for anti-colonial movements—a history that Russia, unlike the West, still actively cultivates.
Anti-Western Sentiment and Double Standards
Another major factor behind the Global South’s ambiguous stance is resentment toward what many perceive as Western hypocrisy and selective application of international norms. Critics point out that while the West is swift to condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine, it has historically turned a blind eye to its own military interventions, including in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. The West’s failure to address the humanitarian toll of these conflicts has led many in the Global South to view moral condemnation of Russia as inconsistent or self-serving.
This disillusionment has been compounded by the unequal economic impact of the war. Sanctions on Russia have disrupted global supply chains, driving up the cost of food, fuel, and fertiliser—commodities on which many Global South countries are heavily dependent. Western efforts to enlist these countries in a sanctions regime against Russia have often been met with accusations of insensitivity or neocolonialism. As Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo put it in 2022, “Africa does not want to be dragged into another Great Power rivalry when our people are paying the price in rising prices and hunger.”
Case Studies: Brazil, India, and the Gulf States
Brazil, under former President Jair Bolsonaro and now under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has pursued a cautious policy. Bolsonaro visited Moscow just days before the 2022 invasion and resisted condemnation. Lula, while rhetorically more critical of Russia, has also insisted that NATO shares blame for the conflict and has refused to send weapons to Ukraine. Lula’s effort to cast Brazil as a peacemaker—most notably through his proposed “peace club” of neutral nations—has received mixed reactions, with Western diplomats wary of moral equivalence between aggressor and victim. Lula attended Moscow's Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2025, whereas most Western nations' leaders stayed away.
India, as mentioned, has walked a diplomatic tightrope. She has increased imports of discounted Russian oil and refused to criticise Moscow harshly in public forums, even as she deepens security cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia through the so-called "Quad" (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between these four countries). For New Delhi, preserving its strategic autonomy while hedging against China remains paramount, and alienating Russia—its long-time defence supplier—would undermine that balance.
The Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have also charted an independent course. While formally allied with the United States, they have maintained cordial ties with Moscow and taken advantage of energy market volatility to assert their own geopolitical importance. OPEC+, of which Russia is a key member, continues to influence oil production levels in coordination with Riyadh—evidence of mutual interest trumping ideological alignment.
Implications for the Liberal International Order
The war in Ukraine has revealed that the liberal international order—centred on norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity and human rights—is not universally accepted as a guiding principle. For many in the Global South, these norms appear selectively enforced. Consequently efforts by the West to portray the conflict as a battle between democracy and autocracy often fall flat outside Euro-Atlantic circles.
However the ambivalence of the Global South is not the same as support for Russia. Most countries have not recognised the annexation of Ukrainian territory or endorsed Russian war aims. Rather their position is more transactional than ideological, shaped by economic pragmatism, historical grievances, and a desire to avoid being co-opted by Great Power agendas.
Looking Ahead: A Multipolar World
As the war grinds on, the challenge for Western diplomacy is to rebuild trust with the Global South. This means more than urging alignment against Russia; it requires addressing long-standing issues like vaccine equity, climate finance and global trade reform. Without such efforts, Western appeals to international law will continue to ring hollow in much of the world.
At the same time, the war in Ukraine has accelerated the shift toward a multipolar global order, where middle powers like Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico seek to shape outcomes on their own terms. Whether this leads to a more just and balanced international system—or one dominated by ad hoc alliances and regional spheres of influence—remains to be seen.
Conclusion
The Global South’s response to the war in Ukraine defies easy categorisation. It is neither uniformly neutral nor explicitly aligned with Russia. Instead it reflects a mix of historical non-alignment, strategic self-interest and deep-seated frustration with the global status quo. As the West grapples with the long-term consequences of the war, understanding and engaging with this perspective will be crucial—not only for Ukraine’s future, but for the credibility of a global order built on the rule of law.
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Reading List
Academic Sources
Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order. Polity Press, 2014.
– A foundational work on the multipolar world order and the evolving role of the Global South.
Barker, Simon. “India’s Strategic Autonomy in the Russia-Ukraine War.” International Affairs Journal, Vol. 99, No. 1 (2023): 98–115.
– Examines India’s balancing act and historical non-alignment roots.
Falk, Richard. Power Shift: On the New Global Order. Zed Books, 2016.
– Discusses the role of emerging powers and criticises the liberal international order from a Global South perspective.
Kornegay, Francis A. “Africa and the Ukraine Crisis: What Room for Strategic Autonomy?” South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2023): 181–197.
– Analysis of African responses to the war in Ukraine.
Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2014.
– Controversial but widely cited realist argument that has found some resonance in parts of the Global South.
Policy Papers and Think Tank Reports
Chatham House. “The Global South and the War in Ukraine: Fragmentation and Frustration.”
– Explores differing regional reactions to the war and implications for global governance.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Darrell West. “Why the Global South Isn’t Buying the West’s Ukraine Narrative.” (2023)
Brookings Institution. “How African Countries View the War in Ukraine.” Policy Brief (2023).
– Emphasises the effects of food and fuel insecurity.
ECFR (European Council on Foreign Relations). “Shadows of the Cold War: The Global South’s Ukraine Dilemma.”
International Crisis Group. “The Global South and the Ukraine War: Beyond the Binary.” Crisis Briefing, 2024.
– Insightful for understanding complex geopolitical positions beyond alignment.
Key Journalism and Media Sources
The Economist. “Why the Global South Shrugs at the War in Ukraine.” April 2023.
– Accessible overview of the varying reactions across continents.
Al Jazeera. “Russia and the Global South: Why Many Countries Remain Neutral on Ukraine.” March 2023.
– Good journalistic synthesis of South Asian and African voices.
Foreign Policy. “The West’s Ukraine Messaging Isn’t Working in the Global South.” By Howard French, 2023.
The Guardian. “Africa’s Dilemma over Ukraine: Between History, Trade and New Alliances.” June 2023.
Le Monde Diplomatique. “Ukraine et le Sud global : une autre lecture du conflit.” October 2023.
– Provides a Francophone perspective on non-Western responses.
Regional Reports or Perspectives
Latin America
– Americas Quarterly: “Why Latin America Stays on the Sidelines of the Ukraine War” (2023)
South Asia
– Observer Research Foundation (India): “India’s Energy Security and the Ukraine War” (2023)
Africa
– African Union Briefings on Food Security Impacts of the Ukraine War, 2022–2024
Middle East & Gulf
– Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW): “The Gulf Balancing Act: Navigating Between Russia and the West” (2023)