How Europe, the United States and China Should Prepare for Three Russian Futures

This forecast builds on the three plausible post-rupture scenarios for Russia—(1) a hardliner dictatorship; (2) a reformist government; and (3) fragmentation of the Russian Federation—and turns them into concrete policy playbooks. It sets out strategic aims, early-warning indicators, practical tools for the first 100 days of each scenario, and cross-scenario measures that policymakers should put in place now.

Assumptions and uncertainties

Three structural facts shape every scenario. First, Russia’s state capacity is highly centralised and therefore brittle; if legitimacy falters, change may be rapid. Secondly, the war in Ukraine is the principal stressor on Russian politics, economics and elites. Thirdly, nuclear security and escalation management remain the overriding global interests. Uncertainties include the coherence of Russian security organs, public tolerance of prolonged war, and the behaviour of regional elites if the centre weakens.

Scenario 1: A hardliner dictatorship

What to watch

Accelerated purges and opaque “health” or “disciplinary” removals of senior figures; emergency decrees expanding mobilisation; budgetary shifts towards defence well above already elevated baselines; criminalisation of routine criticism; intensified cyber-operations and sabotage abroad; rapid growth of China-centric trade settlement; doctrinal nuclear signalling and frequent snap military exercises.

Strategic aims

Contain escalation, deny the regime new coercive resources, preserve Ukrainian sovereignty, and keep the door ajar for future stabilisation without legitimising repression.

Europe

Priorities are deterrence, resilience, and legal stamina. Raise readiness on NATO’s eastern flank and accelerate integrated air and missile defence; lock in multi-year munitions and air-defence production contracts; complete energy diversification, including gas storage, power inter-connectors and LNG gas capacity, to blunt coercion. Tighten export-control enforcement on dual-use goods through end-use audits and corporate liability schemes; expand counter-intelligence against Russian sabotage networks. Prepare refugee reception, critical infrastructure protection plans and maritime security in the Baltic and Black Seas. Maintain sanctions unity, but design humanitarian and food security carve-outs to keep third countries onside.

United States

Anchor extended deterrence and escalation control. Sustain military assistance to Ukraine at predictable, multi-year levels; expand air defence, counter-UAS, and deep-precision strike enablers calibrated to escalation thresholds. Stand up a dedicated interagency cell for Russian cyber and malign finance, with aggressive secondary sanctions enforcement against sanction-evaders. Keep deconfliction hotlines with Moscow’s military and space commands warm; refresh nuclear risk-reduction understandings even absent formal treaties. Coordinate with Europe on sanctions design to prevent wedge tactics.

China

Beijing’s interests are stability on its border, reliable energy flows, and insulation from Western secondary sanctions. Prepare to hedge: maintain channels with Moscow while quietly signalling red lines on nuclear rhetoric and cross-border spillovers. Encourage rouble-yuan settlement only within compliance frameworks that minimise sanction exposure; curb Chinese firms’ high-risk dual-use exports. Offer back-channel messages to Russia that nuclear escalation or widening the war would trigger a sharp downgrading of economic cooperation. Support de-escalatory diplomacy that preserves China’s image as a responsible stakeholder without underwriting repression.

First 100 days toolkit

Europe and the United States should publish a joint sanctions enforcement roadmap, surge air defences to front-line allies, and pre-announce a replenishment schedule for Ukrainian interceptor stocks. China should quietly convene technical risk reduction talks on nuclear safety and cross-border incident management. All three should rehearse cyber-incident response playbooks for attacks on financial plumbing and grid operators.

Scenario 2: A reformist government

What to watch

Governor-level dissent framed as “constitutional fidelity”; elite defections from security organs; release of political prisoners; limited media opening; unilateral ceasefire gestures; technocrats floating debt restructuring and anti-corruption packages; initial contacts with Kyiv via intermediaries.

Strategic aims

Stabilise the transition, end the war on terms consistent with international law, embed non-proliferation and nuclear safety, and avoid a whiplash back to authoritarianism.

Europe

Offer a structured pathway for sanctions relief tied to verifiable steps: durable ceasefire, withdrawal from occupied Ukrainian territory defined in an agreed sequencing plan, prisoner exchanges, and cooperation with war-crimes investigations. Stand up a European Stabilisation Facility for Russia’s critical civilian sectors (power grid safety, pharmaceuticals, aviation safety) with strict conditionality, procurement transparency, and anti-corruption monitors. Deploy OSCE support for credible elections and media safeguards. Expand municipal-level partnerships to bypass central bottlenecks and show early dividends outside Moscow.

United States

Lead on security architecture and non-proliferation. Propose a “Cooperative Threat Reduction 2.0” package (an agreement with allies to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) to secure warheads, materials and command-and-control, with rapid technical teams and IAEA integration. Begin exploratory talks on a post-New-START arms-control framework focused on transparency and risk reduction rather than headline captions. Provide stabilisation assistance anchored by IMF and World Bank programmes with social-safety-net flooring to avoid 1990s-style shocks. Offer targeted support to judicial reform, anti-corruption bureaux and financial-crimes enforcement, so reforms have teeth.

China

Position as an economic stabiliser without crowding out multilateral norms. Offer debt reprofiling and disciplined investment in transport, digital, and energy corridors that meet transparency and procurement standards; coordinate with IFIs (international financial institutions) to avoid unsustainable leverage. Lend political cover to a negotiated Ukraine settlement by endorsing core principles (territorial integrity, withdrawal, reparations mechanism) if sequenced to provide Beijing a face-saving role. Use security and intelligence influence to discourage spoilers within Russia’s security apparatus.

First 100 days toolkit

Form a Contact Group (EU, US, UK, Canada, Japan, with China as an invited participant) to synchronise conditionality of support and assistance. Establish an escrow for phased unfreezing of sovereign assets tied to benchmarks, including contributions to a Ukraine reconstruction and compensation facility. Deploy election support and media safety missions; fund rapid-impact projects—insulin supply, grid safety upgrades, aviation maintenance standards—that signal immediate gains from reform. Launch trilateral Ukraine-Russia-international security talks focused on ceasefire verification, border monitoring and POW exchanges.

Scenario 3: A fragmented Russia

What to watch

Regional refusals to remit taxes; contradictory decrees from federal and regional authorities; breakdown of rail and logistics command; defections by military districts; competing monetary instruments; regional appeals for external recognition or security guarantees; interruptions at nuclear facilities or closed cities.

Strategic aims

Prevent nuclear and radiological risk, avoid interstate war, manage humanitarian fallout, and discourage opportunistic external interventions that widen conflict.

Europe

Adopt a defensive, legal-minded posture: reinforce NATO’s forward presence and air policing; prepare humanitarian corridors and reception for displaced persons from the North Caucasus and along the Finnish and Baltic borders; establish deconfliction lines with any regional authorities controlling infrastructure that affects European states (Kaliningrad transit, energy pipelines). Maintain a presumption of non-recognition of secessionist claims while allowing case-by-case functional engagement for humanitarian, nuclear safety, and public-health needs. Create rapid-reaction teams for nuclear-material interdiction and radiological incident response with Europol/IAEA participation. Secure the Baltic and Black Sea maritime commons against piracy, smuggling, and drifting mines.

United States

Lead a global nuclear-security coalition. Deploy technical teams for site security, inventory assurance, and transport safeguards; pre-position specialised assets for emergency disablement in coordination with allies. Establish multiple deconfliction channels—to residual federal authorities, emergent regional leaders, and other major powers—focused on nuclear safety and avoidance of clashes. Prepare narrowly tailored sanctions frameworks targeting warlords, proliferators and criminal networks, while leaving space for humanitarian and safety cooperation. Intensify cyber defence of nuclear and grid command networks to prevent spoofing or unauthorised commands.

China

Stabilise the Far East while avoiding faits accomplis that trigger great-power confrontation. Tighten border control and customs to deter arms and material flows; secure pipelines, rail links, and ports critical to northeastern China. Coordinate discreetly with the United States and Europe on nuclear safety contingencies and radiological monitoring, including data-sharing and joint exercises along the Amur and in the Sea of Japan. Use influence with local actors to discourage adventurism and cross-border raids; prioritise humanitarian relief over political endorsement of new entities.

First 100 days toolkit

Stand up a Russia Crisis Nuclear Safety Taskforce (technical, not political) drawing on the IAEA, G7 and willing partners, with China invited for specific workstreams. Issue unified guidance on non-recognition and sanctions to remove ambiguity that regional actors might exploit. Open humanitarian corridors through Kazakhstan, Finland, Georgia and Mongolia with UN coordination. Map and secure legacy nuclear and chemical sites; surge satellite and airborne ISR to monitor movements of strategic materials. Establish maritime safety zones in the Arctic approaches and the Baltic.

Cross-scenario measures to prepare now

1. Nuclear risk reduction: Update hotlines, incident notification templates, and shared vocabulary for ambiguous events; pre-negotiate technical access protocols for CTR-style missions; conduct joint table-top exercises with IAEA participation.

   
   

2. Sanctions architecture with conditionality: Publish a transparent “ladder” linking relief to verifiable steps (ceasefire, withdrawal, accountability, reparation mechanisms). Build automatic snap-back clauses to deter backsliding and a humanitarian licensing system to shield food, medicine, and civil aviation safety.

   
   

3. Export control enforcement: Create a G7-plus clearinghouse for end-use checks, customs risk scoring, and common lists of front companies; tighten extraterritorial liability for knowingly facilitating evasion.

   
   

4. Energy and commodity resilience: Finish decoupling sensitive supply chains; expand LNG, hydrocarbon storage, and infrastructure interconnectors; develop insurance and reinsurance backstops for maritime risk in the Black Sea and Arctic.

   
   

5. Cyber and infrastructure defence: Harden financial messaging systems and grid operators; run red-team exercises for wiper malware and OT compromises; share forensics rapidly across allied CERTs.

   
   

6. Information strategy: Communicate clearly to Russian audiences that sanctions respond to aggression and can be lifted under verifiable peace; deny propaganda that frames Western policy as permanent hostility. Support independent media and digital safety tools.

   
   

7. Humanitarian readiness: Pre-position supplies and funding lines for UNHCR, ICRC and NGOs; plan for POW exchanges and family-tracing services; prepare medical evacuation corridors and trauma-care networks in neighbouring states.

   
   

8. Deconfliction with China: Maintain a discreet channel dedicated to nuclear safety, border incidents, and sanctions spillovers. Where interests align—non-proliferation, refugee management, anti-piracy—coordinate quietly to avoid miscalculation.

Policy guardrails and red lines

Across scenarios, articulate and rehearse red lines: no use or threatened use of nuclear weapons; no kinetic action against NATO territory; no attacks on allied satellites or critical infrastructure that risk mass civilian harm. Couple these with credible, pre-planned response packages that emphasise collective, lawful and proportional action.

The next Russian revolution

Russia’s next rupture—whether towards harsher authoritarianism, reform or fragmentation—will arrive, if it comes, quickly and with little warning. Preparedness therefore hinges on building complementary policy tools that can be deployed within days, not months; maintaining allied unity and clear conditionality; and keeping focused backchannels on nuclear safety and escalation control. Europe, the United States and China do not need to agree on everything to prevent the worst outcomes. They do need to act early, coordinate where their interests overlap, and avoid letting tactical gains today foreclose strategic stability tomorrow.