Germany at a Crossroads: What a Political Shift in Berlin Could Mean for Ukraine

By a German NAFO Fellow for the Lviv Herald

July 2025 – Berlin / Kyiv

For decades, Germany has stood as one of Europe’s most stable democracies, a pillar of the post-war European order and a key economic and political power in the European Union. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Berlin has also become one of Kyiv’s most crucial supporters—delivering billions in aid, advanced weaponry, humanitarian support, and political solidarity. But as Germany enters a period of political volatility, a new question arises: what happens to Ukraine if Berlin’s political direction changes?

Three populist forces—the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the secessionist Freie Sachsen (Free Saxons), and the left-wing Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW)—are gaining ground across the country, particularly in economically disadvantaged and historically disaffected regions in the east. While these parties differ ideologically, they share common scepticism—if not outright hostility—toward continued German support for Ukraine.

This article examines their rise, their platforms, and the very real implications their growing influence could have for Ukraine.

Why Ukraine Should Pay Attention

Germany is a linchpin of European support for Ukraine. In addition to being one of Kyiv’s largest bilateral donors—having delivered critical systems such as IRIS-T air defences and Leopard tanks—it has provided medical treatment for wounded Ukrainian soldiers, hosted over 1.5 million refugees, and coordinated EU-level sanctions and military procurement.

A political shift in Berlin could have immediate and far-reaching consequences for Ukraine’s war effort, its reconstruction, and its international standing.

AfD: Germany’s Far Right and Russian Sympathies

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has emerged as a dominant force in parts of eastern Germany, topping polls in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg. Its leaders—including Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel—have openly opposed arms shipments to Ukraine and called for rapprochement with Moscow.

Key AfD Positions:

• Immediate halt to all military aid to Ukraine

• Negotiated “peace” settlement aligned with Russian interests

• Rapprochement with the Kremlin

• Either withdrawal from the European Union or systematic weakening of its institutions

Implications for Ukraine:

If the AfD were to take power, even in coalition, Germany’s position would likely pivot drastically:

• Military support to Ukraine would cease

• Germany’s role as an EU financial contributor could be undermined

• Russian narratives about “security interests” and “NATO provocation” would receive new legitimacy

While AfD officials often couch these views in terms of “pragmatism” or “peace,” their practical effect would amount to a withdrawal of German solidarity at a critical moment.

Freie Sachsen: Marginal but Growing

The Free Saxons, while still a fringe group, represent a more radical expression of nationalist and separatist politics. Though lacking federal-level representation, they have shown influence at local levels in eastern Germany and operate as ideological allies of AfD factions.

Who Are the Free Saxons?

• A secessionist movement advocating Saxon autonomy

• Closely tied to extreme right-wing and conspiracy theory movements such as Pegida (a far-right anti-Islamic movement) and Querdenker (vaccine sceptics)

• Openly supportive of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

While unlikely to achieve national office, these groups could act as spoilers at the local or state level, undermining aid programmes, obstructing refugee support, or spreading disinformation.

BSW: The Left-Wing Challenge with a Pro-Russian Slant

The Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), founded by former Die Linke icon Sahra Wagenknecht, has gained surprising momentum. Its critique of NATO, globalisation and sanctions echoes parts of the Russian propaganda narrative, even if expressed in more tempered, pacifist terms.

BSW Talking Points:

• “Weapons prolong the suffering”

• “The war cannot be won”

• “The West shares responsibility for escalation”

BSW’s rhetoric avoids the overt nationalism of the AfD, but the implications for Ukraine are similar:

• Likely suspension of arms deliveries

• Withdrawal from sanctions programmes

• Pressure for Ukrainian concessions in the name of a negotiated peace

This alignment of left-wing pacifism with geopolitical realignment mirrors what analysts call “horseshoe politics”: extremes from both ends of the spectrum converging in their distrust of the West, and accommodation of authoritarian powers.

How Close Are These Parties to Power?

Currently none of these parties are in federal government. But their regional strength is significant:

• In Saxony, the AfD polls as the largest party

• BSW is surging in former industrial regions of western Germany

• Dissatisfaction with the “traffic light” coalition (SPD–FDP–Greens) has fuelled protest voting

• Economic grievances, rising living costs and migration anxieties have become potent drivers

While an AfD–BSW coalition at the federal level remains unlikely in the immediate term, combinations of either with smaller protest parties could disrupt policymaking. At the regional level, coalition governments involving AfD in particular are now a real possibility.

A Worst-Case Scenario for Ukraine

If Germany’s political orientation shifts away from Ukraine, the following outcomes become plausible:

• A significant reduction or end to military assistance

• Suspension or rollback of EU sanctions on Russia, led by Berlin

• A breakdown of European unity, with Germany as a swing state

• Greater visibility for Russian disinformation narratives in European media and politics

In this scenario, Russia would gain breathing room to regroup, rearm, and push her diplomatic agenda across Europe.

What Can Ukraine Do?

Even amid these worrying trends, Ukraine has tools at her disposal:

1. Engage with democratic actors across Germany – Deepening ties with mainstream parties, civil society and regional governments can build resilience.

   
   

2. Support diaspora mobilisation – Ukrainian voices in Germany must remain active in media, arts, and local politics.

   
   

3. Expose disinformation – Monitoring and countering Russian influence operations, particularly in eastern German social media, is essential.

   
   

4. Build decentralised partnerships – Sister-city relationships and regional cooperation can insulate Ukraine-Germany relations from federal-level volatility.

Germany Is Still a Key Ally—But No Longer a Guaranteed One

Germany remains central to Europe’s security architecture and to Ukraine’s survival. But the political consensus that once underpinned unwavering support for Kyiv is no longer assured. The rise of anti-establishment parties from both the far right and left reflects deeper structural anxieties within German society—and it is those fissures that Russia will continue to exploit.

For Ukraine, vigilance is essential. So too is strategic engagement with Germany’s democratic centre. The battle for Ukraine’s future may still be fought on the steppes of the Donbas, but one of its fronts now lies in the corridors of Berlin.