top of page

Europe’s Right to Refuse

1 day ago
4 min read

By Matthew Parish


Saturday 21 November 2026


Great Power politics is conducted through photographs as well as treaties. The gathering of Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen on 19 November offered an image of a world whose most consequential decisions might be settled amongst three men. Europe was absent. For a continent accustomed to debating its strategic autonomy, the spectacle posed an uncomfortable question: would Europeans help determine the international order, or merely receive explanations of decisions taken elsewhere? The meeting produced no visible breakthrough, but its political symbolism travelled considerably further than its substantive achievements.


The following day, the contest to appoint the next United Nations Secretary-General supplied a useful corrective. In an informal Security Council ballot, the Emirati candidate, Lana Nusseibeh, encountered opposition from three permanent members. Britain and France were reportedly amongst them. Reports identifying Washington and Moscow as her supporters suggest that China also opposed her. The ballot was secret, and these indications should not be mistaken for an officially disclosed division of the Council. Nevertheless, the apparent British and French refusal deserves attention.


Its significance lies in the possibility that Europe is beginning to exercise powers which discussions of her decline too readily overlook.


Britain and France retain permanent seats on the Security Council. These confer a particular kind of authority: neither country can appoint a Secretary-General by herself, but either can prevent an unacceptable appointment. In the preliminary ballots, opposition signals an obstacle which must be overcome before a formal recommendation can succeed. Nusseibeh’s candidature encountered precisely this difficulty. The selection remained unresolved after the ninth straw poll.


Such procedural details may appear remote from the realities of power. Yet institutions acquire renewed importance when governments discover that the rules still constrain them. An understanding reached amongst larger states does not automatically become an international decision. Others retain rights, interests and the capacity to withhold consent.

For Europe, this is a potentially important rediscovery.


The timing invites interpretation, although it does not establish causation. There is no basis for declaring that London and Paris organised their opposition as a reply to Shenzhen. Nor does agreement over one candidate prove the existence of a comprehensive joint strategy. Governments may arrive at the same position for different reasons. But the juxtaposition exposes the limits of imagining that Washington, Moscow and Beijing can constitute a directorate above the institutions through which international authority must still be exercised.


The controversy also concerns the character of the United Nations itself. British parliamentarians opposing Nusseibeh’s candidature have questioned whether her record defending Emirati policy would allow her to command confidence as an impartial Secretary-General. Their objections include her responses to allegations concerning Emirati support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. These are substantive concerns about independence and accountability, rather than simply an argument over which capital should secure its preferred appointment. The UAE denies supporting the forces concerned.


Europe should take those concerns seriously on their own terms. Sudanese suffering must not become a convenient illustration in an essay about European prestige. A credible European foreign policy would apply the standards it invokes even when doing so inconveniences commercially valuable partners.


The British and French relationship is particularly consequential because it crosses the institutional boundary created by Brexit. Britain’s departure from the European Union did not remove her from European geography. France’s membership does not give her authority to speak for the entire continent. Nevertheless, cooperation between them can connect diplomatic resources which European institutions alone do not possess.


There is a practical lesson here. European autonomy need not await a single constitution, a single foreign ministry or agreement upon every strategic question. It can develop through governments identifying particular interests and acting together to defend them. Institutions matter, but political will determines whether the powers within them are used.


For Ukraine, the implications extend well beyond the appointment of an international civil servant.


The central danger in contemporary Great Power diplomacy is that Ukraine’s future might be treated as a negotiable relationship between stronger states. A settlement could be described as balanced because Washington and Moscow found it acceptable, even if the country expected to live with its consequences regarded it as intolerable. Europeans who accept their own exclusion from consequential decisions would be poorly placed to resist Ukraine’s exclusion.


An independent European voice can help prevent that outcome. Its legitimacy, however, depends upon including Ukraine in decisions affecting her future. Britain and France cannot object to a three-power directorate merely because they would prefer a five-power one. European autonomy should enlarge the effective sovereignty of European countries, including those without permanent seats or nuclear arsenals.


There are equally important limits to what this episode demonstrates. Diplomatic obstruction is considerably easier than sustained strategic action. A government can reject a candidate in a ballot without acquiring the industrial capacity, military readiness or financial endurance necessary to uphold a security settlement.


The test will therefore come after the refusal. Can European governments agree upon what they want, assemble sufficient support to obtain it and sustain their position when the costs become uncomfortable? Can London and Paris bring other European states into a durable policy rather than present them with decisions already taken? Can they translate institutional privilege into security which citizens and allies can actually rely upon?


These questions should restrain declarations that Europe has already returned as an autonomous Great Power. What may be emerging is more modest, and for that reason more credible: a willingness to act without assuming that agreement in Washington is a prerequisite for European judgment.


The apparent British and French resistance over the Secretary-Generalship is best understood as an indication of that possibility. Europe still possesses instruments through which she can influence the international system. Her weakness has sometimes consisted in treating their exercise as impolite, impractical or dependent upon permission.


Shenzhen supplied the photograph of a world organised around three powerful leaders. The Security Council supplied a reminder that photographs do not settle appointments.


Whether this becomes a turning point will depend upon what Europe does with her recovered willingness to refuse.

 
 

Note from Matthew Parish, Editor-in-Chief. The Lviv Herald is a unique and independent source of analytical journalism about the war in Ukraine and its aftermath, and all the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the war as well as the tremendous advances in military technology the war has yielded. To achieve this independence, we rely exclusively on donations. Please donate if you can, with the buttons at the top of this page.

Copyright (c) Lviv Herald 2024-26. All rights reserved.  Accredited by the Armed Forces of Ukraine after approval by the State Security Service of Ukraine. To view our policy on the anonymity of authors, please click the "About" page.

bottom of page