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Can the United Nations Survive the Ukraine War? The Crisis of Security Council Legitimacy

  • Writer: Matthew Parish
    Matthew Parish
  • 3 minutes ago
  • 6 min read


The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered the gravest challenge to the international order since the end of the Cold War, testing not only Western unity but the institutional resilience of the global rules-based system. At the centre of that system lies the United Nations and within it, the Security Council — the body responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Yet as Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, launched a war of aggression against a sovereign UN member state, the Council stood paralysed, unable to act. Here we explore whether the United Nations — and particularly its Security Council — can survive this crisis of legitimacy, and what reforms or evolutions might be required if it is to retain global credibility in the future.


The Security Council in Theory and Paralysis in Practice


The UN Charter assigns the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It can impose sanctions, authorise military action and mandate peacekeeping operations. However, its ability to act decisively is constrained by the veto power held by its five permanent members (P5): the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia — a structure born out of the post-World War II balance of power.


From the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Council was blocked from taking any substantive action as Moscow exercised its veto against all condemnatory resolutions. A particularly bitter irony emerged in Russia presiding over the Council in April 2023 during the second year of the war. The result has been not just ineffectiveness, but a hemorrhaging of the Council’s credibility, particularly in the eyes of smaller states and those who had placed faith in international law as a restraint on Great Power aggression.


Legal and Institutional Incoherence


The contradiction at the heart of the current crisis lies in the fact that Russia, as a P5 member, simultaneously acts as aggressor and arbiter. Ukraine and numerous legal scholars have argued that Russia’s continued presence on the Security Council as the “successor state” to the USSR is legally questionable, citing the lack of a formal vote when the Russian Federation assumed the Soviet seat in 1991. Yet despite legal ambiguity, Russia’s position has been uncontested in practice.


The General Assembly has stepped in symbolically to fill the gap, with a March 2022 resolution condemning Russia’s invasion passing with 141 votes in favour. But such resolutions are non-binding. The UN Human Rights Council and the International Court of Justice have taken stronger stances, but without enforcement capacity they cannot compel compliance. This institutional fragmentation has exposed the limitations of international law when faced with hard power.


Crisis of Norms and Reform Fatigue


This impasse is not merely procedural, but normative. If a permanent member can violate the UN Charter without consequence, the legitimacy of the entire UN system comes into question. The credibility of the Council rests not only on what it does, but on the perception that its actions are consistent with the Charter’s principles — chiefly sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful dispute resolution.


Calls for Security Council reform are not new. For decades, member states from the Global South and beyond have demanded changes to the P5 structure to reflect the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Proposals have included expanding permanent membership to include India, Brazil, Germany and African nations, or abolishing the veto altogether. But no consensus has emerged. The Ukraine war has reignited these debates with new urgency, but also revealed their political inertia.


The Role of the General Assembly and Alternative Forums


With the Security Council paralysed, the UN General Assembly has taken on a more prominent role, passing resolutions on humanitarian aid and condemning Russia’s actions. While these have no binding authority, they do shape international narrative and signal diplomatic isolation.


Parallel to this, new or reinvigorated forums have emerged. The G7, NATO and the European Union have coordinated sanctions and military aid to Ukraine. Global South states have convened in BRICS and the Non-Aligned Movement to articulate alternative positions, often avoiding outright condemnation of Russia. These alignments reflect a multipolar world in which the UN is no longer the sole forum for crisis response — a shift that further threatens the organisation’s centrality.


Prospects for Survival and Reinvention


Despite its failings, the United Nations continues to provide essential humanitarian, development and peacebuilding work. UN agencies remain active with varying degrees of effectiveness across Ukraine and in global refugee response. Moreover the war has not destroyed the UN’s capacity for dialogue — indeed, the UN helped facilitate the Black Sea Grain Initiative, enabling Ukrainian agricultural exports for a time (until Russia withdrew from the arrangement), and continues to support negotiations on prisoner exchanges and humanitarian corridors.


Whether the UN can survive the Ukraine war, however, depends on what survival means. If it implies retaining its foundational legitimacy and centrality in global conflict resolution, major reform is required. Yet if it means continuing to exist as a space for diplomatic engagement and practical aid, the UN will likely persist — but as a diminished actor.


Reform proposals have recently re-entered political discourse. In 2022, UN Secretary-General António Guterres reiterated his call for Security Council reform to “reflect today’s geopolitical realities,” while Ukraine and Eastern European states have proposed mechanisms to suspend the veto in cases of mass atrocity. The Veto Initiative, passed in April 2022 by the General Assembly, requires permanent members to explain their vetoes — an admittedly modest step toward accountability.


Conclusion: A Fork in the Road


The war in Ukraine has exposed the contradiction at the heart of the Security Council: that it can be rendered impotent by the very states it was designed to restrain. In an age of renewed great power rivalry, the legitimacy of international institutions depends not just on ideals but on performance. The United Nations can survive the Ukraine war — but only if it evolves.


Its future will be shaped by the choices of its member states. They must decide whether the UN is to be a forum for real accountability or a diplomatic theatre for power politics. If the former, it must reform its structures and procedures, particularly around the veto. If the latter, its decline may be slow and quiet, but inevitable.


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Reading List


Academic and Analytical Sources


  1. Edward C. LuckUN Security Council: Practice and Promise (Routledge, 2006)

    A foundational work examining the origins, evolution, and limitations of the Security Council.

  2. Ian HurdHow is Power Legitimized in the United Nations?

    In International Organization Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002), this article explores the relationship between law, power, and legitimacy in UN institutions.

  3. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds.)The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2018)

    A comprehensive reference on the UN system, including chapters on the Security Council, peacekeeping and reform debates.

  4. Martin Binder and Monika HeupelThe Legitimacy of the UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect

    In International Politics Vol. 52 (2015), offers insights into normative legitimacy during crises involving mass atrocity and UN inaction.

  5. Jean E. Krasno (ed.)The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society (Lynne Rienner, 2004)

    Covers structural and political challenges to UN reform and functioning.


Policy Papers and Think Tank Reports


  1. Crisis Group (International Crisis Group)

    Rebooting Multilateralism at the UN: The Case for Security Council Reform (2022)

    https://www.crisisgroup.org – An incisive look at the challenges and options for meaningful reform.

  2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

    “Why the United Nations Cannot Fix the Ukraine Crisis” by Richard Gowan (March 2022)

    https://carnegieendowment.org

  3. Chatham House

    Reforming the UN Security Council: The Illusion of Change? (Chatham House Research Paper, 2021)

    Explores structural reform, regional representation, and veto restrictions.

  4. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

    Europe, the UN, and the Ukraine War: Multilateralism under Pressure (2023)

    Discusses how EU member states are approaching UN diplomacy during the war.

  5. United Nations University – Centre for Policy Research

    Security Council Reform and the Ukraine War (2023)

    Evaluates reform opportunities in the wake of the Council’s paralysis on Ukraine.


Primary Sources and Official Documents


  1. United Nations Charter

    Especially Chapter V (Security Council) and Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace).

  2. General Assembly Resolutions on Ukraine

    • A/RES/ES-11/1 (March 2, 2022): “Aggression against Ukraine”

    • A/RES/ES-11/4 (February 23, 2023): “Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”

  3. Security Council Veto Tracker

    https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick

    Lists all vetoes, including Russia’s repeated use during the Ukraine war.

  4. The Veto Initiative (Resolution A/RES/76/262)

    Adopted in April 2022, requires explanations of vetoes in the General Assembly.

  5. Statements by UN Secretary-General António Guterres

    Available at https://www.un.org/sg/en

    Regular statements on the war in Ukraine and calls for Security Council reform.


 
 

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