Between Solidarity and Strain: Understanding the Rise of Anti-Ukrainian Sentiment in Poland

Since the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Poland has stood at the forefront of European support for Ukraine. Her open-armed reception of millions of Ukrainian refugees was hailed as a remarkable act of solidarity. Yet more than three years into the war, strains have begun to surface. While institutional support from the Polish government remains largely consistent, signs of rising anti-Ukrainian sentiment amongst parts of the Polish public have become more visible. Understanding this shift is essential for preserving the long-standing friendship between two historically intertwined nations and for maintaining European unity in the face of Russian aggression.

Historical Complexity and Post-2022 Solidarity

Polish-Ukrainian relations are shaped by a shared and sometimes troubled history, marked by both cooperation and conflict. Memories of the Volhynia massacres by Ukrainian extremists during World War II (1943–44) and competing national narratives have periodically strained relations, even in recent decades. However these historical wounds seemed to recede into the background in 2022 when Poland mobilised rapidly to provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Polish cities became hubs for international aid, and Polish citizens offered shelter, employment and integration support to Ukrainian refugees.

But solidarity under crisis is not the same as long-term coexistence. As the war has stretched into its third year, fatigue has begun to set in, exposing vulnerabilities in the fabric of inter-communal support.

Sources of Growing Tensions

Several factors are contributing to the recent uptick in anti-Ukrainian sentiment in parts of Polish society:

Socio-Economic Competition

One of the most cited causes is economic anxiety. With over a million Ukrainian refugees residing in Poland and many more commuting or working temporarily, some Poles—especially in economically vulnerable regions—feel pressure on public services, housing and the job market. Though most studies suggest that Ukrainians have contributed positively to Poland’s economy, perceptions often lag behind reality. Social media and populist political discourse can amplify grievances, real or imagined, leading to scapegoating and resentment.

Political Exploitation

During the 2023 Polish parliamentary elections, several far-right parties and figures used the refugee issue to inflame nationalist sentiment. Campaigns portrayed Ukrainians as unfairly privileged in access to benefits, sometimes using misleading statistics or conspiratorial rhetoric. While mainstream parties rejected these narratives, the discourse shaped public opinion. According to polls from late 2023, favourable Polish views of Ukrainians declined from their wartime high. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this trend is continuing to a degree.

Agricultural Protests and the Grain Crisis

Perhaps the most visible flashpoint has been the “grain crisis” of 2023–24. As Ukrainian agricultural exports flowed through Poland due to blockades of Black Sea ports, Polish farmers protested against what they perceived as unfair competition. Despite government attempts to regulate the flow and compensate Polish producers, the issue became symbolic of larger frustrations with European policy, bureaucracy and external dependencies. Ukrainian truck drivers and transport companies were also targeted in some instances of civil unrest and protests at border crossings.

Cultural Misunderstandings and Integration Challenges

While many Ukrainian refugees have successfully integrated, differences in language, education and administrative systems have led to occasional tensions. In schools, Polish and Ukrainian children sometimes struggle with mutual adaptation. Misinformation about Ukrainian demands or behaviour, often circulated online, contributes to suspicion and alienation, especially in areas with limited intercultural experience.

Polish and European Responses

Despite these challenges, the Polish state has generally responded with responsibility and moderation. Law enforcement has taken action against hate crimes or xenophobic protests, and major political parties—both in power and opposition—have reaffirmed their support for Ukraine. Civil society remains robust: NGOs, churches and grassroots organisations continue to provide support for both refugees and host communities.

At the European level, the European Commission has played a mediating role in trade disputes, including efforts to balance Ukrainian export needs with the stability of domestic markets in Poland and other Eastern EU member states. Funding from the EU’s Cohesion and Recovery mechanisms has also supported refugee integration and public service expansion, although more targeted communication and anti-disinformation measures are needed.

What More Can Be Done

To counter growing anti-Ukrainian sentiment and bolster social cohesion, several initiatives are essential:

1. Transparent Economic Communication

Governments must communicate clearly about the economic impact of Ukrainian presence, highlighting benefits as well as addressing real grievances with responsive policy (e.g. subsidies for farmers, expanded housing support). Myths and data distortions need to be tackled with transparency.

2. Local Integration and Dialogue Initiatives

More support should be given to local-level integration programmes that bring Poles and Ukrainians together in schools, community centres and workplaces. Municipal partnerships and cultural exchange events can foster understanding and empathy.

3. Regulation of Online Hate Speech

Poland and the EU must expand efforts to monitor and counter online xenophobia and misinformation, including foreign-sponsored campaigns that seek to inflame ethnic tensions. A unified European strategy against digital propaganda should be prioritised.

4. Historical Reconciliation Projects

While not a short-term fix, renewed academic and cultural efforts to confront difficult shared histories—such as the Volhynia massacres—through joint exhibitions, memorials, or school curricula could prevent history from being manipulated into division.

Conclusion

Anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland remains far from dominant, but its emergence in pockets of society is a cautionary sign. At stake is not only the health of bilateral relations but the broader European commitment to unity against Russian aggression. Poland’s early wartime solidarity with Ukraine remains one of the most inspiring stories of international compassion in the 21st century. Preserving that spirit will require political courage, honest communication, and sustained effort—across borders and communities.

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Reading List

Academic Books and Articles

1. Snyder, Timothy. Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (Basic Books, 2010)

   – Offers historical background on Polish-Ukrainian relations, including the Volhynia massacres and legacies of wartime violence.

2. Portnov, Andrii. “Poland and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Asymmetric Memories.”

   East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2011): 817–846.

   – Explores diverging national narratives and their implications for modern relations.

3. Jaroszewicz, Marta. Ukrainians in Poland: Migration Dynamics and Integration Challenges. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 2023.

   – A policy-focused analysis of Ukrainian migration and public attitudes in Poland since 2014, updated with wartime trends.

4. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. “Shared Memories, Divided Histories: Memory Politics in Ukraine and Poland.”

   In: Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

   – Discusses competing national myths and attempts at reconciliation.

Reports and Journalism

5. Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka. “Why Polish Farmers Are Angry Over Ukrainian Grain.”

   Al Jazeera, March 2024.

   – Offers context for the grain dispute and its social consequences.

6. “Anti-Ukrainian Sentiment on the Rise in Poland: What’s Behind the Shift?”

   Politico Europe, November 2023.

   – Investigative journalism on populist rhetoric and refugee fatigue.

7. “Poland’s Support for Ukraine Remains Strong—But Is It Fraying at the Edges?”

   Financial Times, January 2024.

   – A balanced analysis of political and public opinion trends.

8. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Experiences of Ukrainian Refugees in the EU: 2022–2024 Reports.

   – Contains data on discrimination, integration challenges, and social cohesion issues across EU countries, including Poland.

Policy & Civil Society Publications

9. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): “Poland, Ukraine, and the Future of Eastern Europe” (2023)

   – A geopolitical and sociocultural analysis of how Poland can help shape Europe’s eastern policy while managing internal dissent.

10. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): Monitoring Hate Speech and Intolerance Related to the War in Ukraine (2023–2024)

    – Provides cross-border trends of xenophobia and recommended state responses.

11. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Warsaw): Xenophobia in Poland: Trends and Legal Gaps (2023)

    – Civil society watchdog analysis of institutional responses to hate crimes.

12. Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw): Building Bridges: Local Government and Refugee Integration in Poland (2024)

    – A positive look at best practices for sustaining long-term coexistence.