Can Russians be prosecuted for war crimes?

The question whether it might ever become practical to bring Russians—up to and including the President—to justice for war crimes is a profoundly difficult one, for legal, political, and strategic reasons. To explore it, one must examine (1) the legal possibilities, (2) the political and enforcement challenges, (3) the shifting international environment, and (4) the risks and trade‑offs involved. Our conclusion is cautious: while it is not impossible, the path is extremely narrow and contingent on favourable developments in politics, state collapse or regime change, or international cooperation.

Legal Foundations and Limits

Jurisdiction and legal frameworks

There is today a credible legal basis for prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and (in some cases) genocide by Russian individuals, including high-level officials:

• The International Criminal Court (ICC) has opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine and has already issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin (and others) on charges related to the forced deportation of Ukrainian children, amongst other possible grounds. 

  
  

• More broadly, the Rome Statute and customary international law provide for the prosecution of the gravest crimes even if committed by heads of state or military commanders. 

  
  

• However the ICC’s jurisdiction is constrained (e.g. by Article 15bis of the Rome Statute) so that it cannot prosecute a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute for the crime of aggression if the acts are committed by its nationals on its territory (unless certain conditions are met). Russia is not a party, limiting the scope of the ICC’s aggression jurisdiction over Russian leadership. 

  
  

• To close these gaps, there is momentum toward creating a special tribunal for the crime of aggression in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine — a tribunal established by treaty between Ukraine and the Council of Europe (CoE) in June 2025. 

  
  

• Such an ad hoc tribunal would aim to complement the ICC by addressing crimes (especially aggression) that the ICC cannot fully prosecute in this case. 

Thus from a strictly legal or normative perspective, there is already a more robust basis now than would have been conceivable just a few years ago. The legal architecture is being stretched and adapted to address the institutional gap that Russia’s non‑membership of the ICC leaves.

But legal possibility is only the first hurdle.

Immunity, practical obstacles, and command responsibility

Even where international law permits prosecution, there are thorny issues in bringing individual high-level actors to trial:

• Heads of state and senior officials often enjoy immunity ratione personae under customary international law while in office, meaning they cannot be prosecuted before foreign or international tribunals during their tenure. That immunity can lapse once they leave office, but the timing and interpretation are contested. 

  
  

• Proving the criminal responsibility of top officials (e.g. presidents, prime ministers, ministers) requires connecting them to the chain of command, demonstrating they issued orders, had knowledge, or failed to prevent or punish crimes — doctrines like command responsibility or joint criminal enterprise. These are legally established but often hard to prove in practice, especially in authoritarian systems with opaque decision‑making. 

  
  

• Evidence must be collected under extremely difficult conditions (war zones, destroyed infrastructure, ongoing resistance) and preserved over time. Even when evidence exists, witnesses may be intimidated, killed, moved, or rendered unavailable.

  
  

• The tribunal (whether ICC or ad hoc) must ensure due process, which means defence rights, appeals, and procedural fairness — these are expensive, time-consuming, and require strong institutional capacity.

In sum, high legal thresholds and procedural safeguards mean that many cases against senior figures will be extremely challenging to bring successfully unless the political and security environment is favourable.

Political & Enforcement Challenges

Lack of territorial control and unwillingness to surrender

Even if a tribunal issues an arrest warrant, executing it is a separate matter:

• Russia is unlikely ever to voluntarily extradite its President or senior officials to an international or foreign court.

  
  

• If those individuals remain in Russia or in states allied with or sympathetic to Russia, they can (and almost surely will) evade arrest indefinitely.

  
  

• The ICC and the special tribunal lack police forces of their own. They rely on states to cooperate in arresting and handing over suspects. If no state is willing or able to do so, the warrants remain symbolic. (This has long been a weakness of the ICC in other contexts.) 

  
  

• Indeed even when Putin traveled to Mongolia (an ICC member), Mongolia declined to arrest him despite the ICC warrant. 

  
  

• Some states have passed domestic laws explicitly forbidding cooperation with the ICC or other international bodies in prosecuting Russians. Russia herself has made it a punishable offence to cooperate with institutions like the ICC. 

Thus, unless there is a radical shift in Russia’s internal politics — e.g. regime collapse, a coup, or broad political reform — enforcement is extremely difficult.

International political constraints and geopolitical risks

Even amongst states that formally support international justice, political considerations intervene:

• States may fear backlash (economic, military, diplomatic) from Russia or her allies if they cooperate in arrests.

  
  

• Some states may prioritise geopolitical or security alliances over strict enforcement of international criminal law.

  
  

• There is a risk that overly aggressive prosecution of high-ranking Russians (while failing to prosecute war crimes by others) may be portrayed as victor’s justice or selective justice, undermining legitimacy.

  
  

• Instituting a prosecution of a sitting or recently deposed leader risks major instability, both inside Russia and in international relations.

  
  

• Political will is fickle: change of government or shifting priorities might cause states to withdraw support or funding for tribunals.

Time and attrition

• War crimes prosecutions often take decades; much evidence degrades, witnesses die or relocate, memories fade.

  
  

• As time passes, it becomes harder to marshal political energy for prosecutions.

  
  

• There is risk of achieving too little too late: even if a trial occurs after someone’s death, it may be viewed as a historical exercise rather than meaningful accountability.

Potential Catalysts or Windows of Opportunity

Despite the daunting obstacles, there are paths under which prosecuting senior Russians might become more than a theoretical possibility.

Regime change, defection, or internal fracture

If the Russian political order were to fracture — for example through a coup, internal power struggle, popular uprising, or elite defection — some figures might flee abroad or lose the protective machinery of the state. In such a scenario:

• A deposed leader might be arrested or seek asylum in a state that is willing to extradite.

  
  

• Documents, emails, and internal communications might fall into the hands of other actors (e.g. the new regime or foreign intelligence), making prosecutions more feasible.

  
  

• Other states might feel safer facilitating transfers if they believe the new regime is stable and compliant with international norms.

However this is speculative and deeply uncertain, especially in a strong authoritarian state like Russia with deep security services.

Expanding international cooperation and norms

• If more states enact “universal jurisdiction” laws — allowing their domestic courts to try individuals for war crimes regardless of where the crime occurred — Russian actors might be prosecuted in neutral jurisdictions. Some countries already do this for genocide or crimes against humanity.

  
  

• The special tribunal for aggression, once operational, might generate increased legitimacy, resources and support, thereby shifting the costs and incentives for non-cooperation.

  
  

• Over time, precedent from prior tribunals (for Yugoslavia, Rwanda) may strengthen norms and narrow the space for impunity.

  
  

• Financial and travel restrictions (sanctions, asset freezes, visa bans) can marginalize indicted individuals, constraining their movement and increasing pressure to settle or negotiate.

Transitional or restorative justice mechanisms

In some contexts, accountability may come not just by criminal trial but via truth commissions, reparations or negotiated amnesty (with accountability guarantees). While less satisfying to some victims, these can be more realistic in a post-conflict environment. A partially credible transitional justice process might include criminal prosecutions of mid- and high-level figures when possible, combined with other measures for broader reconciliation.

Risks, Trade‑offs, and Strategic Considerations

Prosecuting high-level Russians is not cost-free and raises difficult risks:

• It could deepen Russian internal resistance, making Russia more intransigent or aggressive.

  
  

• The trials may become theatres for propaganda or politically biased prosecutions, undermining legitimacy.

  
  

• Overemphasis on criminal justice might detract from pragmatic efforts at peace, reconstruction, and diplomacy.

  
  

• If prosecutions are wildly partial (only against low-level actors) while the “masters of war” remain untouched, legitimacy and moral force might suffer.

Thus, any realistic strategy must balance ambition with prudence, and focus on incremental gains, preserving the rule of law, even if full accountability is delayed.

Conclusion: Is It Ever Practical?

Given the legal foundations now in place, the possibility of a special tribunal, and the gathering of evidence, there is at least some hope that before too long it becomes practically feasible to bring to trial senior Russian actors. But “practical” here must be understood in a contingent sense — conditional on favourable political, institutional and security developments.

We estimate that in the near to medium term (say 5–20 years), it is unlikely that a sitting Russian President or similarly high-ranking officials will be physically brought to the dock, unless Russia undergoes dramatic internal transformation. More plausible is a scenario in which, after a regime transition, certain officials are detained or extradited, and criminal trials proceed in absentia or against fugitives. The special tribunal for aggression is a promising development, though whether it will overcome the enforcement gap is entirely dependent on international cooperation and regime dynamics.

Thus we should maintain determined effort — collecting evidence, building alliances, strengthening legal institutions — even if perfect justice remains elusive. Over time, incremental progress—trials of mid- and senior-level commanders, assertions of universal jurisdiction, symbolic indictments—may build momentum and narrow the safe harbour for impunity. In that sense, practical justice for Russian war crimes is an aspiration that may slowly shift from fantasy toward the margins of Realpolitik, though it will likely remain extraordinarily difficult for the foreseeable future.