Between the Black Sea and the Steppe: The History of Turkish–Ukrainian Political and Commercial Relations

The relationship between Ukraine and Turkey has always been shaped by geography. The Black Sea is not only a natural border but also a bridge, a space of commerce and conflict, diplomacy and piracy, war and trade. From the days of medieval city-states to the contemporary partnership between Kyiv and Ankara, Turkish–Ukrainian relations have oscillated between rivalry and cooperation. Yet throughout, the two nations have remained bound together by shared interests in security, commerce, and cultural exchange.

Medieval Encounters and Ottoman Expansion

The earliest connections were commercial. In the Middle Ages, the port cities of Crimea—Genoese colonies such as Caffa (modern-day Feodosiia)—acted as crossroads where Italian merchants, Crimean Tatars and Ottoman traders exchanged grain, slaves and luxury goods. Ukrainian lands, particularly the fertile steppe regions, provided wheat and other agricultural products that were transported southwards.

From the fifteenth century, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire northwards across the Black Sea made Ukraine a frontier. The Crimean Khanate, a vassal of the Ottomans, conducted frequent raids into Ukrainian lands, seizing captives to be sold in Ottoman slave markets. This brutal trade scarred Ukrainian collective memory. At the same time, Cossack raiders from the Zaporozhian Sich launched daring naval expeditions across the Black Sea, attacking Ottoman ports and clashing with the Sultan’s navy.

Thus the early relationship was marked by antagonism: Ottoman-backed Crimean Tatars treated the Ukrainian steppe as a hunting ground, while Ukrainian Cossacks treated Ottoman shores as fair targets for reprisal. Yet even amidst hostility, channels of commerce remained open. Ukrainian grain was transported through Black Sea ports to feed the Ottoman population, while the cultural influences of the Ottoman world reached into Ukrainian lands.

Early Modern Alliances

By the seventeenth century, political calculation began to temper rivalry. The Hetmanate, the semi-autonomous Cossack polity established after Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s uprising against Poland in 1648, sought allies to preserve her independence. In 1649 Khmelnytsky negotiated with the Crimean Tatars, and later with the Ottomans themselves, for support against both Polish and Muscovite encroachment.

While these alliances were unstable—shifting loyalties often undermined military cooperation—they reveal a pattern: Ukrainians repeatedly looked south to Istanbul when squeezed between the powers of Warsaw and Moscow. For the Ottomans, Ukraine represented both a buffer zone and a fertile source of grain.

By the late seventeenth century, the geopolitical calculus grew sharper. The Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) marked the beginning of Ottoman decline, but Turkey still sought to maintain influence over the northern Black Sea. Ukrainian lands remained contested, caught between the ambitions of the Ottoman Empire and the rising might of Russia.

Russian Ascendancy and Decline of Ottoman Influence

The eighteenth century proved decisive. As the Russian Empire expanded southwards under Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, the Ottomans steadily lost their grip over the Black Sea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 1783 ended centuries of Tatar raids and curtailed Ottoman power. For Ukrainians, this shift did not necessarily bring liberation: Russian rule often proved as repressive as Ottoman predation.

Nevertheless, commerce with Turkey endured. Ukrainian grain continued to be exported through the Black Sea, and Ottoman markets remained important destinations. Yet politically, the Ottomans had little leverage left. Istanbul could no longer compete with St Petersburg for dominance over Ukrainian territory.

Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: Shifting Sands

During the nineteenth century, Turkish–Ukrainian relations were filtered through the prism of Russian–Ottoman rivalry. The Crimean War (1853–1856), fought partly upon Ukrainian soil, exemplified this dynamic: Ottoman forces fought alongside Britain and France against Russia. While Ukrainians had no state of their own, the war underlined that their territory remained central to the geopolitics of the Black Sea.

In the early twentieth century, Ukrainian independence movements looked again towards Turkey. During Ukraine’s brief struggle for independence in 1917–1921, the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic sought recognition and support from the Ottoman Empire’s successor, the Republic of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Ankara, embroiled in her own struggle for sovereignty, extended a cautious welcome but little practical aid. Still, the episode revealed enduring strategic awareness on both sides.

Soviet Era: Mutual Constraints

For most of the twentieth century, direct political relations between Ukraine and Turkey were constrained by Ukraine’s status as a Soviet republic. The USSR controlled Ukrainian foreign trade, and the Black Sea was heavily militarised. Turkey, a NATO member from 1952, stood on the opposite side of the Cold War divide.

Nevertheless limited commercial and cultural ties persisted. Turkish ports remained interested in Ukrainian grain and industrial products, although all exchanges were mediated through Moscow. Ukrainian seafarers encountered Turkish colleagues across the Black Sea, but political relations were dictated by the superpower confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West.

Independence and Strategic Partnership

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 transformed the dynamic. Turkey was among the first states to recognise Ukrainian independence. This was partly a matter of principle—Ankara supported the sovereignty of post-Soviet states—but also of interest: Turkey saw opportunities for trade, influence and security cooperation.

The 1990s saw a boom in commercial links. Turkish companies invested heavily in Ukrainian construction, textiles and retail. Ukrainian ports became gateways for Turkish goods, while Turkey remained a significant market for Ukrainian agricultural exports. Tourism also expanded, with Ukrainians visiting Turkey’s resorts in growing numbers.

Politically, both states shared an interest in balancing Russian influence. Turkey, while cautious not to provoke Moscow directly, welcomed Ukraine as a partner in promoting Black Sea stability. The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), founded in 1992, symbolised these shared aspirations.

The Contemporary Era: From Pragmatism to Alliance

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 deepened Ukrainian–Turkish ties. Turkey, despite her own complex relations with Russia, refused to recognise the annexation and spoke strongly in defence of Crimean Tatars, with whom she shares cultural and religious bonds. Ukrainian–Turkish defence cooperation intensified, culminating in joint ventures to produce Bayraktar drones—an emblem of Ukraine’s resilience in the war against Russia.

Commercially, trade volumes have grown steadily, with both countries aiming for ambitious targets. Turkey has sought Ukrainian grain to secure her food supplies, while Ukrainian companies benefit from Turkish markets and investment. The grain corridor agreement of 2022, brokered by Turkey between Russia and Ukraine under UN auspices, highlighted Ankara’s role as a key intermediary.

Politically, the partnership is pragmatic but significant. Turkey has not fully aligned with Western sanctions against Russia, seeking to preserve her role as mediator, yet she has provided Ukraine with crucial military assistance. For Kyiv, Turkey represents a partner who combines cultural proximity, economic opportunity, and strategic weight in the Black Sea.

Cultural Exchanges and Shared Communities

Beyond politics and trade, relations between Ukraine and Turkey are enriched by cultural and social exchanges.

• The Crimean Tatars: Perhaps the most important bridge between the two nations has been the Crimean Tatar people. Sharing Islamic faith and Turkic language with Turkey, Tatars maintained close cultural ties with Istanbul for centuries. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 and subsequent waves of repression, many Tatars emigrated to Ottoman lands, where their descendants live today. Following the Soviet deportation of Tatars in 1944, Turkey became an advocate for their rights. Since 2014, Ankara has been vocal in defending the Crimean Tatar community against Russian persecution, framing their cause as a humanitarian and cultural link with Ukraine.

  
  

• Religion: The religious encounter between Orthodox Ukraine and Islamic Turkey has historically been one of both division and dialogue. The Ottoman millet system allowed Orthodox Christians to maintain their own structures under Ottoman rule, and this legacy of coexistence has shaped mutual perceptions. In modern times, interfaith initiatives and educational exchanges have fostered dialogue between Muslim communities in Turkey and Christian communities in Ukraine, particularly in the multicultural environment of Crimea before 2014.

  
  

• Migration and Tourism: Since independence, Ukrainians have migrated to Turkey in search of work, particularly in seasonal labour and service industries. Conversely, Turkish entrepreneurs and workers have established businesses in Ukraine. Tourism has created everyday cultural familiarity: Ukrainians flock to Antalya and Bodrum, while Turkish visitors increasingly explore Kyiv, Odesa, and Lviv. These exchanges soften political divides and create networks of personal contact.

  
  

• Cultural Diplomacy: The flourishing of joint cultural festivals, student exchanges and language learning has further cemented ties. Ukrainian universities host Turkish students, while Turkish schools offer Ukrainian language classes. Shared cuisine, music and folklore have also found resonance, with Crimean Tatar traditions acting as a cultural meeting point.

In these ways the Turkish–Ukrainian relationship extends far beyond statecraft. It rests upon communities, migrations, and shared cultural heritage, which lend depth and resilience to the political and commercial partnership.

Turkey’s Balancing Act: NATO, Russia, and Ukraine

The twenty-first century has thrust Turkey into the role of mediator, a position born of geography and necessity. As a NATO member, Turkey is formally aligned with the Western alliance that supports Ukraine militarily and economically. Yet Turkey also depends heavily on Russian energy, agricultural imports and tourism. Ankara’s foreign policy, particularly under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been defined by this balancing act.

On the one hand, Turkey has supplied Ukraine with critical military technologies, most famously the Bayraktar TB2 drone, which became a symbol of resistance in the early months of the 2022 full-scale invasion. Ankara has also hosted negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations, seeking to position herself as the indispensable intermediary. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations, was perhaps the clearest demonstration of her capacity to manage dialogue between two bitter enemies.

However Turkey has resisted joining Western sanctions against Russia. Turkish banks and businesses have become channels for Russian capital seeking to evade restrictions, and Turkish leaders maintain direct dialogue with Moscow. This dual posture has frustrated some Western allies but also enhanced Ankara’s leverage. By refusing to commit fully to one side, Turkey has ensured that both Moscow and Kyiv treat her as essential.

For Ukraine this ambiguity is not without risk, but it also offers unique opportunities. Unlike Poland or the Baltic states, which are unequivocally in the Western camp, Turkey’s intermediary role enables her to influence Russia in ways that NATO’s more hardline members cannot. For Turkey meanwhile, the partnership with Ukraine strengthens her own position in the Black Sea, offering counterbalance to Russian dominance and opening commercial avenues that bind her more closely to Europe.

This balancing act reflects centuries of history. Just as the Ottomans once manoeuvred between European rivals to maintain their influence in the Black Sea, modern Turkey navigates between NATO commitments and Russian dependency. In this geopolitical dance, Ukraine is no longer the passive frontier of empires but an active partner, shaping Ankara’s calculations and benefiting from Turkey’s strategic pragmatism.

Conclusion

The history of Turkish–Ukrainian relations is one of oscillation between conflict and cooperation, predation and partnership. The Ottoman period was marked by raids, slavery and occasional alliances; the Russian imperial age reduced Turkish influence but kept commerce alive; the Soviet era muted direct relations; and independence opened the door to genuine partnership.

Today, Ukraine and Turkey are bound together by necessity. Both face the challenge of managing Russia’s ambitions in the Black Sea, both rely upon mutual trade for prosperity, and both understand that geography has forever tied their destinies. What began as rivalry across the Black Sea has matured into a cautious alliance, one that is reinforced not only by commerce and politics but also by cultural exchange and shared communities.

In Ankara’s balancing act between NATO and Moscow, Ukraine has found both a partner and an advocate. The relationship may be marked by pragmatism, but it is anchored in centuries of shared history, and it is likely to remain one of the most consequential partnerships on the shores of the Black Sea.