Zelenskyy in the Gulf

Monday 30 March 2026

The diplomatic tour undertaken by Volodymyr Zelenskyy across the Gulf States in March 2026 marks one of the most consequential reorientations of Ukrainian foreign policy since the outset of the full-scale Russian invasion. It is not merely a search for matériel or funding — although both are urgently required — but a deliberate attempt to reposition Ukraine as a security provider in a rapidly fragmenting international order.

At the centre of these agreements lies a paradox: a country at war, dependent upon external support for her survival, has begun exporting military expertise to some of the wealthiest and most heavily armed states in the world.

Ukraine as a security exporter

The agreements signed with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are structured as long-term — often ten-year — frameworks for defence cooperation. Their immediate focus is the development of joint capabilities against missiles and unmanned aerial systems, the defining weapons of both the war in Ukraine and the contemporaneous conflict involving Iran in the Gulf. 

Ukraine’s offer is unusually specific. She brings battlefield-tested knowledge of how to defeat mass drone attacks — a problem the Gulf States have struggled to solve efficiently despite vast expenditure on Western air defence systems. Ukrainian interceptor drones and electronic warfare techniques, refined under constant Russian bombardment, offer a far cheaper and more scalable solution than traditional missile-based defence. 

In return Kyiv seeks access to precisely those high-end systems she lacks: advanced air defence missiles, financing and industrial capacity. This is not a conventional arms transaction. It is an exchange of asymmetrical strengths — Ukrainian experience for Gulf capital and hardware.

The Gulf States’ strategic calculus

For the Gulf monarchies, the attraction of Ukraine lies in her immediacy. Western defence systems — such as those supplied by the United States — have proven both expensive and, in the face of mass drone saturation, inefficient. Reports of multi-million-dollar missiles being used against low-cost drones have alarmed regional planners. 

Ukraine, by contrast, represents a laboratory of modern warfare. Her soldiers and engineers have spent years adapting to precisely the kind of Iranian-origin drone threats now facing the Gulf. As a result Kyiv has become an unlikely but highly credible partner in regional security.

At the same time the Gulf States are hedging. Their relationships with Washington remain foundational, but the diversion of American attention and resources towards the Iran conflict has exposed vulnerabilities. By engaging Ukraine they diversify their security partnerships while acquiring knowledge that Western allies have been slow to integrate.

Energy, finance and industrial interdependence

The agreements extend beyond defence. They encompass energy supply, industrial co-production and investment.

Ukraine’s acute shortage of diesel — critical for both agriculture and the military — has driven negotiations for fuel supply agreements with Gulf producers. This is not a marginal issue. Fuel scarcity constrains both the Ukrainian war effort and her economic resilience during wartime.

More strategically, the proposed co-production arrangements — including the construction of defence manufacturing facilities in both Ukraine and the Gulf — signal a shift towards integrated industrial partnerships. These arrangements embed Ukraine within global supply chains, reducing her vulnerability to fluctuations in Western political support.

They also serve the Gulf States’ ambitions to localise defence production and reduce reliance on imports — a long-standing objective, particularly in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

The shadow of Iran

These developments cannot be understood outside the context of the escalating confrontation between the Gulf States and Iran.

Iranian missile and drone attacks across the region have created a demand for precisely the capabilities Ukraine has developed in her war against Russia. In effect the technological lessons of the Ukrainian battlefield are being exported into a parallel theatre of conflict.

This creates a subtle but profound geopolitical linkage. Ukraine, while not a direct participant in the Middle Eastern conflict, becomes structurally embedded within its security architecture. Her personnel, training programmes and technologies are now part of the Gulf’s defensive posture.

At the same time Kyiv has been careful to draw a clear boundary: Ukrainian troops will not participate in foreign conflicts. This distinction preserves Ukraine’s strategic autonomy while allowing her to benefit from the partnership.

A response to Western uncertainty

Perhaps the most important driver of these agreements is uncertainty regarding continued Western support.

As the United States diverts attention towards Iran and domestic political considerations complicate long-term commitments, Kyiv has been forced to diversify her alliances. The Gulf States, with their substantial financial resources and growing geopolitical ambition, offer an alternative source of support.

This does not signify a rupture with the West. Rather it reflects a pragmatic recognition that Ukraine’s survival cannot depend upon a single axis of support. By cultivating relationships in the Gulf, Kyiv reduces her exposure to political fluctuations in Washington and Brussels.

Ukraine as a node in a multipolar order

The broader significance of these agreements lies in what they reveal about the emerging international system.

Ukraine is no longer merely a recipient of aid. She is becoming a provider of security, technology and expertise — a role traditionally reserved for great powers. This transformation is driven not by choice but by necessity. Years of high-intensity warfare have forced Ukraine to innovate at a pace unmatched by most militaries.

The Gulf States, for their part, are asserting greater autonomy. By engaging directly with Ukraine they demonstrate a willingness to bypass traditional hierarchies of alliance and to construct a more flexible, transactional network of partnerships.

Together these trends point towards a more decentralised geopolitical landscape — one in which middle powers exchange capabilities in ways that blur the distinction between donor and recipient.

Towards a long-term partnership

Zelenskyy’s Gulf diplomacy represents a strategic inversion. Ukraine, under existential threat, has leveraged her vulnerability into a form of geopolitical capital.

By exporting the hard-earned lessons of her war she secures not only matériel and energy, but also a place within a new constellation of alliances stretching from Eastern Europe to the Arabian Peninsula. These arrangements are pragmatic, transactional and rooted in shared threats rather than shared values.

They may not determine the outcome of the war with Russia. But they alter the terms on which that war is fought — and, perhaps more importantly, the terms on which Ukraine will exist in the world that follows.