Will US oil companies invest in Venezuela?

Wednesday 21 January 2026

In the early days of the year 2026, the geopolitical order of the Americas was shaken by an event unprecedented in modern history: United States forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas, dismantling de facto the regime that had ruled the oil-rich nation for over a decade. In the aftermath, President Donald Trump’s administration has set its gaze firmly upon Venezuela’s vast hydrocarbon wealth, urging and at times cajoling the great American energy corporations to return to a country that, in a previous era, was the promise and pride of global petroleum production. We examine whether, and under what conditions, United States oil companies might find investment in Venezuela attractive, or whether the risks and realities of the Venezuelan oil industry render such prospects illusory.

Venezuela’s importance lies in the sheer scale of its oil endowment. The country possesses the world’s largest proven crude reserves, largely in the heavy, extra-heavy fields of the Orinoco Belt. Yet decades of mismanagement, corruption, sanctions and underinvestment have reduced production from more than three million barrels per day to a fraction of that figure. Restoring output to even modest levels, analysts suggest, would require investment on the scale of many tens of billions of dollars—and a political environment far more stable than the one that prevailed until this month. 

The Trump administration’s public pitch to the oil industry has been bold. Officials have spoken of a “$100 billion investment plan” and of opportunities for United States companies to rebuild Venezuela’s decaying infrastructure, harness her huge resource base and export large quantities of crude to American refineries. The White House has even issued executive orders designed to protect Venezuelan oil revenues from legal claims, signalling to investors that the United States government will assert control over sales and revenue flows rather than leaving them subject to the vagaries of foreign courts or creditor claims. 

Yet the initial reception from the oil sector has been cautious, if not outright sceptical. At a high-profile White House meeting, the chief executive officer of ExxonMobil described Venezuela in her current legal and commercial state as “uninvestable,” citing a long history of asset expropriations and a legal framework that offers uncertain protections for foreign capital. His scepticism was so pronounced that the US President suggested Exxon might be excluded from future opportunities if it did not change its tone. 

Other major firms have been less sceptical but still measured in their assessments. Chevron, which never fully withdrew from Venezuela under past administrations and retains ongoing joint ventures there, appears poised to expand its involvement, reflecting a unique position relative to its peers. ConocoPhillips and others have indicated interest in potential returns but emphasise that legal clarity, protections against expropriation and resolution of outstanding debt claims will be prerequisites to large-scale investment. 

The prudence of these firms is not merely caution but calculation. Reviving Venezuela’s oil sector is not akin to reopening fields in Texas or the Gulf of Mexico. It means reconstructing dilapidated facilities, modernising refineries, rehabilitating an ageing workforce and managing relations with creditors from China and Russia who hold significant claims on Venezuelan assets. Even with government backing, the commercial risk is high and the timeline long; many industry analysts warn that substantial increases in production could take years, not months. 

Beyond economics, there are political and legal hurdles. Venezuela’s constitution proclaims that her oil belongs to the nation, not foreign corporations. Past nationalisations under Presidents Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro led to asset seizures and litigation that have lingered in international courts for years. Resolving these disputes to the satisfaction of all parties would require not just political change in Caracas but durable guarantees that future governments, whether under interim authorities now recognised by Washington or through some negotiated settlement, will honour contracts and arbitral awards. 

There is also the broader geopolitical context. Venezuela’s oil has long been intertwined with China, which extended significant loans backed by future oil shipments; Russia, too, remains a key partner. The abrupt reintegration of Venezuelan oil into Western markets may thus generate friction beyond Caracas, complicating efforts to build stable investment frameworks. Moreover, environmental observers note that expanding heavy crude output in Venezuela would have consequences for global carbon budgets and undermine climate commitments—a factor that, however peripheral to near-term commercial calculations, adds to the reputational risk for companies contemplating major investments. 

Yet not all actors see only risk. Global oil trading houses, known for their agility and tolerance for political risk, have been quick to secure licences to export Venezuelan crude, anticipating profitable margins by selling heavy oil at discounts to Asian and other refiners. Their early moves suggest that—even as the majors hesitate—others see an opening to exploit short-term arbitrage opportunities while longer-term investment decisions gestate. 

In conclusion, the attraction of investing in Venezuela’s oil industry for United States companies is real in geological and strategic terms. The potential prize—access to unparalleled reserves and the rebuilding of a once-dominant petroleum sector—could be immense. Yet the obstacles are equally formidable: legal uncertainty, political instability, a decayed energy infrastructure, global market dynamics and geopolitical entanglements loom large. For now the voices within the industry counsel a measured approach, urging clear guarantees and robust protections before committing to the kind of capital outlays that a Venezuelan renaissance would demand. In the balance between opportunity and peril, both sides of that scale remain heavy with unresolved questions, even as Washington touts a new chapter of American energy leadership in the Caribbean.