The Joint Expeditionary Force and the War at Sea: Britain’s Bid to Confront Russia’s Shadow Fleet

Friday 13 March 2026

In recent weeks the United Kingdom’s Defence Secretary John Healey has convened the defence ministers and military representatives of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) to discuss coordinated measures to degrade Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and merchant vessels. These ships, frequently operating under opaque ownership structures and flags of convenience, have become a central instrument by which Russia circumvents Western sanctions imposed following her invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The gathering signals an emerging recognition that the enforcement of sanctions against Russia has shifted from the domain of finance and law into the realm of maritime security. While Western governments have succeeded in restricting many conventional financial channels available to Russia, Moscow has increasingly relied upon clandestine shipping networks to continue exporting oil and petroleum products to global markets. The shadow fleet now represents one of the most important arteries sustaining Russia’s wartime economy.

The decision to convene the JEF for this purpose reflects the unique character of the organisation itself. Unlike the better-known structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the JEF is a comparatively flexible and operationally oriented military partnership designed to respond rapidly to regional crises, particularly in northern Europe and the High North.

Origins and Structure of the Joint Expeditionary Force

The Joint Expeditionary Force was initiated by the United Kingdom in 2014 in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. At that moment European security planners became acutely aware that existing alliance structures were not always well suited to rapid regional responses to emerging crises. NATO remained the cornerstone of European collective defence, yet its decision-making procedures could be slow and its geographic scope vast.

The British proposal therefore envisioned a smaller coalition of militarily capable northern European states able to assemble forces quickly for crisis management, deterrence and regional defence. Over time the initiative developed into a formal multinational framework headquartered in the United Kingdom and led operationally by British command structures.

Today the JEF comprises ten participating states:

• the United Kingdom

• Denmark

• Estonia

• Finland

• Iceland

• Latvia

• Lithuania

• Netherlands

• Norway

• Sweden

These states form a geographic arc stretching from the North Atlantic through the Baltic Sea region. Several share borders with Russia, while others control strategic maritime routes critical to northern European commerce and security. Their militaries are also amongst the most technologically sophisticated in Europe, with strong naval and air capabilities particularly suited to operations in the Baltic and Arctic environments.

Unlike NATO, the JEF is not a treaty alliance with a formal collective defence clause. Instead it is a framework for cooperation and operational coordination. Decisions are made politically by the participating governments, while the United Kingdom provides the core command architecture and much of the logistical backbone for joint deployments.

Authorities and Legal Foundations

Because the Joint Expeditionary Force is not a supranational organisation, it does not possess independent legal authority to conduct operations. All actions undertaken by the JEF must derive from the sovereign decisions of it member states. In practice this means that operations occur through national forces operating under a shared operational plan.

The legal authorities underpinning JEF activity therefore arise from three principal sources.

First, individual states retain their inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. If maritime security threats arise in their territorial waters or exclusive economic zones, those states may act individually or collectively to address them.

Secondly, participating governments may agree to conduct joint operations under international maritime law, particularly within the framework of the International Maritime Organization and conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. These provide the legal foundation for inspections, environmental enforcement, and safety regulations applicable to merchant shipping.

Thirdly, where sanctions regimes apply, enforcement activities may be justified through domestic legislation implementing international sanctions against Russia. European states, including the United Kingdom and members of the European Union, have adopted extensive sanctions frameworks targeting Russian energy exports and associated shipping operations.

Within this legal landscape the JEF serves primarily as a coordination mechanism. It enables governments to pool intelligence, deploy maritime patrol aircraft and naval assets in concert, and conduct surveillance or inspection activities more effectively than any one state acting alone.

Russia’s Shadow Fleet

Russia’s shadow fleet has emerged as one of the most ingenious adaptations to Western economic pressure since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The fleet consists largely of ageing oil tankers purchased through intermediaries, frequently registered in jurisdictions with limited regulatory oversight.

Many of these vessels operate under “flags of convenience” belonging to states with minimal capacity to monitor maritime safety or enforce sanctions compliance. Ownership structures are deliberately obscured through shell companies, nominee directors and complex chains of corporate control stretching across multiple jurisdictions.

The ships themselves often engage in practices designed to evade monitoring. These include switching off automatic identification systems, conducting ship-to-ship transfers of oil on the high seas, falsifying documentation regarding cargo origins, and routing cargoes through intermediary ports before final delivery.

The scale of the phenomenon is considerable. Estimates vary, but analysts frequently place the shadow fleet at several hundred vessels. Together they transport a significant portion of Russia’s seaborne crude exports, particularly to markets in Asia where demand for discounted Russian oil remains strong.

These operations present not only economic but environmental risks. Many of the vessels involved are older tankers operating without adequate insurance or safety oversight. A major accident in the narrow waters of the Baltic Sea or North Sea could produce catastrophic ecological consequences for northern Europe.

The Strategic Role of the JEF

The involvement of the Joint Expeditionary Force in addressing this problem reflects the maritime geography of northern Europe. The Baltic Sea and North Atlantic are amongst the principal transit routes for Russian oil exports from ports such as Primorsk and Ust-Luga. Ships carrying these cargoes must pass close to the territorial waters or exclusive economic zones of several JEF member states.

By coordinating maritime surveillance and enforcement activities, the JEF nations can significantly increase scrutiny of suspicious vessels. Naval patrols, coastguard operations and maritime patrol aircraft can identify ships engaged in sanction-evasion practices and bring them under regulatory inspection regimes where appropriate.

In practical terms this may involve a range of measures.

Authorities may require vessels suspected of sanctions violations to provide documentation regarding cargo origin, ownership and insurance coverage. Environmental safety regulations can be applied rigorously to older tankers whose maintenance standards appear inadequate. Port access may be denied to ships failing to meet regulatory requirements.

Moreover intelligence sharing amongst JEF members allows suspicious shipping patterns to be tracked across national jurisdictions. A tanker that leaves a Russian port with its tracking transponder switched off may reappear hundreds of miles away engaged in ship-to-ship transfer operations. Coordinated monitoring makes such manoeuvres far more difficult to conceal.

Strategic Implications

For the United Kingdom and her northern European partners, confronting Russia’s shadow fleet is about more than sanctions enforcement. It also represents a demonstration of regional solidarity and strategic initiative at a moment when European governments increasingly recognise the necessity of assuming greater responsibility for their own security.

The JEF has become one of the most dynamic security frameworks in Europe precisely because of her flexibility. It operates alongside NATO rather than replacing it, offering a rapid-reaction mechanism capable of addressing regional challenges that may fall short of the threshold of formal alliance operations.

Should the effort to constrain Russia’s shadow fleet prove successful, it may establish a precedent for the JEF’s future role in maritime security. Hybrid economic warfare, sanctions evasion networks and covert logistical operations are likely to remain persistent features of geopolitical competition in the twenty-first century.

The sea has always been the great highway of global commerce. In wartime she becomes something more dangerous still. By bringing together the naval and maritime capabilities of northern Europe’s most capable states, the JEF is seeking to ensure that the Baltic and North Atlantic do not become avenues through which Russia may quietly undermine the economic pressure intended to limit her war against Ukraine.

Whether the effort succeeds will depend upon the willingness of participating governments to sustain coordinated enforcement measures over the long term. But the message delivered by the convening of the JEF is unmistakable: the struggle over sanctions compliance has now reached the oceans, and Europe intends to contest it there.