What Will Volunteer Groups Do After the War?

Volunteerism has been one of the defining features of Ukraine’s resilience since the earliest days of the Russian invasion. From 2014 onwards, and on a far greater scale after February 2022, voluntary associations have filled the gaps in logistics, medical support, equipment procurement, accommodation, evacuation, information distribution and social welfare. They have become the connective tissue binding civil society to the front line. If and when the war ends, it is inevitable that Ukraine’s volunteer landscape will not simply revert to its pre-war form. The tasks, structures and expectations placed upon volunteer groups will change profoundly, even if the spirit that created them remains indispensable. The transition from wartime mobilisation to post-conflict reconstruction will reshape the work of civil society just as dramatically as the war has reshaped the state.

The most immediate transformation will be demographic and humanitarian. Even if an armistice is achieved, Ukraine will face the consequences of hundreds of thousands of wounded soldiers, displaced civilians, orphaned children and shattered families. Volunteer organisations that grew adept at supplying thermal imagers and drones may find their skills redirected towards supporting rehabilitation centres, prosthetic workshops, trauma counselling, veterans’ integration programmes and residential care facilities. These tasks are no less urgent than delivering tactical equipment to the front line, but they require new expertise, long-term planning and close cooperation with the Ministries of Social Policy and Health. Volunteers will need to shift from an emergency response mentality to a patient, long-horizon model of care.

Secondly, there will be the colossal task of reconstruction. When the war ends, Ukraine will still be a country with ruined energy infrastructure, mined agricultural land, demolished housing and thousands of damaged schools and hospitals. Some of this work will be supported by international donors, but the capacity of Ukraine’s state institutions will remain stretched for years. Volunteers will therefore become a bridge between local communities and national rebuilding strategies. Instead of supplying pickup trucks for battalions, groups may find themselves organising local clean-ups, coordinating demining awareness campaigns, liaising with foreign non-governmental organisations, assisting in the reconstruction of village centres, and monitoring the implementation of donor-funded projects to ensure that funds are not diverted by corruption. This community-level oversight may become one of the most significant contributions volunteer groups can make to post-war Ukraine.

A third change will involve the relationship between volunteers and the Armed Forces. During the war, many volunteer networks served as auxiliary supply chains, bypassing bureaucratic obstacles and meeting urgent needs through private donations. Once hostilities cease, Ukraine’s military will undergo deep institutional reforms. It will demobilise, restructure and professionalise. Procurement systems will be expected to operate more transparently, and reliance upon private volunteer logistics should diminish. Yet volunteer groups will still have important roles: helping veterans transition to civilian employment, supporting training and education facilities for discharged personnel, raising funds for memorial projects, and maintaining a civic culture of respect for military service. The Armed Forces may seek to formalise cooperation with volunteers, but boundaries will need to be carefully drawn to avoid the politicisation or commercialisation of patriotic activism.

A fourth area in which volunteer roles will evolve is governance and anti-corruption oversight. Wartime conditions temporarily reduced public patience for criticism of the state, but a post-war settlement will revive debates about transparency, accountability and reform. Volunteer groups with experience in procurement and fund-raising will be well-placed to demand higher standards from state institutions. They may become part of a broader monitoring ecosystem, supporting investigative journalism, assisting auditors, or participating in local councils’ oversight committees. The challenge will be to maintain independence whilst engaging constructively with public authorities. Volunteerism can remain a counterweight to political inertia, but it must avoid becoming co-opted by competing factions, particularly in the heated environment that may follow a post-war election.

Fifthly, there will be new psychological needs uniquely of concern to volunteers. War has created solidarity but also exhaustion. Many volunteers have lived for years in a permanent state of mobilisation, juggling private employment with nightly fund-raising appeals and perpetual logistical coordination. When the war ends, they may suffer from their own forms of burnout, identity loss or survivor guilt. Volunteer groups may need to develop internal support systems for their own members and reconsider the sustainability of their funding models. The temptation to maintain wartime tempo will clash with the need for rest and recalibration. A successful transition will require recognising that volunteers themselves need care.

Sixthly, the geopolitical context will influence volunteer activity. A post-war Ukraine will remain militarily and politically fragile. Her foreign partners may offer security guarantees, but Moscow is unlikely to abandon its objectives. Volunteer groups may therefore become conduits for international engagement: explaining local conditions to foreign donors, mediating between Ukraine’s communities and international institutions, and acting as informal diplomats in the reconstruction process. Their knowledge of local needs will make them essential interlocutors, particularly in regions close to the former front line.

Finally, the moral authority accumulated by volunteers during the war will influence Ukraine’s civic culture. Volunteers have become some of the most trusted actors in Ukrainian public life, frequently more credible than formal institutions. After the war, this trust will carry responsibilities. Volunteer groups will need to avoid fragmenting into political vehicles or competing oligarchic interests, and instead maintain their focus upon community service. Their accumulated expertise, organisational discipline and reputation may allow them to shape national debates on education, urban planning, environmental protection, public health and cultural renewal. In this wider sense, volunteerism may help define the character of the peace that follows.

The transition from war to peace will not diminish the need for volunteers; it will simply transform the nature of their mission. The skills that volunteers developed during the conflict – improvisation, integrity, speed of response and intimate community knowledge – will remain invaluable as Ukraine rebuilds. But the priorities will shift from supplying the front to mending the country. The challenge will be to preserve the ethos of solidarity while adapting to a post-war environment that demands patience, institutional cooperation and long-term vision. Volunteer groups helped Ukraine survive the war; in a different way, they will be essential in helping her survive the peace.