What North Korea’s Role in the War in Ukraine Reveals About Her Armed Forces

The North Korean People’s Army (KPA) has long been described as one of the world’s largest standing armies, with over one million active soldiers and millions more in reserve. Yet its reputation has been ambiguous: formidable in numbers, opaque in capabilities, and often dismissed as antiquated. The intervention of North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine has, for the first time, provided a degree of empirical evidence as to how the KPA performs in combat outside the Korean peninsula. The lessons emerging from this unprecedented episode are instructive both for military analysts and for policymakers considering the risks posed by North Korea.

A Political and Strategic Gesture

It is important first to situate the North Korean deployment in context. Pyongyang’s decision to send troops to support Russia was as much political theatre as it was military contribution. For Kim Jong Un, the deployment reaffirmed his alignment with Moscow in the face of international isolation and economic sanctions. For Russia, the move symbolised that Vladimir Putin could draw upon partners outside the West, however pariah their status.

Nevertheless, the arrival of North Korean forces on Ukrainian soil transformed an abstract geopolitical relationship into a concrete test of North Korea’s military institutions. Unlike parades in Pyongyang or rehearsed exercises near the demilitarised zone, Ukraine has presented a battlefield of attrition, drone surveillance, precision artillery, and combined-arms operations—the most intense conflict on European soil since 1945.

Tactical Observations of the KPA

Reports from the front suggest that North Korean units deployed by Russia were used in supporting roles rather than at the forefront of major offensives. They often found themselves attached to Russian formations as infantry reinforcements, manning defensive trenches or participating in assaults on fortified Ukrainian positions.

Several observations have emerged:

• Discipline and Cohesion: North Korean troops have displayed a high degree of obedience and discipline, characteristic of a military system built upon rigid hierarchy and ideological indoctrination. Their willingness to undertake high-casualty assaults without hesitation is reminiscent of human-wave tactics associated with Russian strategies.

  
  

• Equipment and Logistics: North Korean soldiers have often been poorly equipped compared to their Russian counterparts. Much of their small arms and personal kit reflected 1960s or 1970s Soviet designs. Their limited access to modern body armour, night-vision systems, or digital communications constrained their effectiveness in modern combined-arms combat.

  
  

• Tactical Adaptability: Ukrainian commanders have remarked upon the relative inflexibility of North Korean units. They operate in rigid formations, sometimes advancing in mass despite exposure to precision artillery and drones. This suggests that the KPA has not meaningfully absorbed lessons of manoeuvre warfare or networked battlefield awareness that characterise modern militaries.

  
  

• Morale and Casualties: Accounts indicate heavy losses among North Korean contingents, yet little sign of mutiny or collapse. Their morale appears rooted less in enthusiasm than in indoctrination and fear of retribution upon themselves or their families at home. This resilience under duress makes them useful shock troops, though at extraordinary human cost.

Lessons About North Korean Doctrine

The performance of North Korean troops in Ukraine reveals several important truths about the KPA.

First, North Korea still relies upon mass and discipline rather than technology or flexibility. The same principles underpin her doctrine for conflict on the Korean peninsula: overwhelming numbers, human-wave assaults, and infiltration by light infantry.

Second, the KPA’s performance underscores the limits of self-reliance. North Korea has trumpeted her ability to resist western pressure through Juche ideology, but on the battlefield she remains dependent upon outdated Soviet patterns of organisation. Fighting in Ukraine has demonstrated that this leaves her soldiers vulnerable when facing opponents equipped with drones, precision munitions and integrated NATO-style command structures.

Third, however, North Korea’s endurance in brutal fighting environments should not be underestimated. The KPA is trained for hardship and socialised into unquestioning obedience. This makes her troops potentially effective in grinding attritional warfare, particularly in mountainous or urban terrain where high casualties may be sustained for incremental gains.

Comparisons with Other Foreign Fighters for Russia

The North Koreans are not the only non-Russian forces deployed by Moscow in Ukraine. Their performance can be contrasted with that of other groups, which reveals both the particularities of the KPA and the wider phenomenon of Russia’s reliance upon foreign manpower.

• Wagner Mercenaries: Wagner Group forces, prior to their partial absorption into the Russian Ministry of Defence, provided Russia with highly motivated and battle-hardened units. Wagner’s assault on Bakhmut demonstrated greater tactical adaptability than the KPA, using decentralised command and small-unit initiative to probe Ukrainian defences. Unlike North Korean conscripts, Wagner fighters were often ex-soldiers, incentivised by pay and pardons rather than ideology.

  
  

• Syrian Volunteers: Russia attempted to recruit Syrian veterans of the civil war, but their deployment was limited. Syrian fighters were accustomed to irregular warfare and urban combat, but less so to the intense artillery duels and drone-dominated battlefields of Ukraine. Reports suggest their morale and endurance were lower than those of the North Koreans, who accepted mass casualties with fewer signs of desertion or refusal.

  
  

• Chechen Units: Forces loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov have played a prominent propaganda role, often publicising their participation on social media. In practice, Chechen units have been used more for policing occupied areas and intimidation than for front-line assaults. They possess modern equipment and enjoy privileged status, but their combat reputation has been mixed. Compared to the KPA, Chechens are better armed but less willing to absorb heavy losses.

Against this backdrop, the North Koreans stand out for their extreme discipline and resilience under fire, albeit with minimal tactical sophistication. They more closely resemble cannon fodder than precision instruments, but their very willingness to sustain losses differentiates them from other foreign contingents.

Foreign Fighters for Ukraine

The Ukrainian side has also attracted international volunteers and foreign-trained formations. The contrast between these and North Korean troops fighting for Russia highlights the differences between authoritarian and democratic models of foreign mobilisation.

• The Georgian Legion: Composed largely of veterans with experience from conflicts against Russia in the Caucasus, the Georgian Legion has become one of the most respected foreign formations in Ukraine. Unlike the KPA, the Legion relies on small-unit initiative, battlefield adaptability, and strong esprit de corps. Their performance has underscored how prior combat experience and ideological motivation—fighting a common enemy—translate into effectiveness.

  
  

• Western Volunteers and the International Legion: From North America, Europe, and now with a substantial Latin American majority, volunteers with and without prior service in armies worldwide have joined Ukraine’s ranks. These fighters often bring knowledge of combined-arms tactics, use of modern weapons systems and familiarity with western doctrine; but sometimes they bring little more than familiarity with firing a gun. When used at their best they are not cannon fodder but force multipliers, training and integrating with Ukrainian brigades. Their smaller numbers are offset by higher average skill levels.

  
  

• Polish and Baltic Special Detachments (Unofficial): While not formally acknowledged by governments, there have been reports of Polish or Baltic special forces operating discreetly in Ukraine, often in training or advisory roles. Such units epitomise the contrast with the KPA: technologically advanced, tactically flexible and politically restrained, their value lies not in manpower but in precision and knowledge transfer.

The foreign fighters on Ukraine’s side embody a model of quality over quantity, for the most part combining motivation, modern training and tactical agility. This is the inverse of North Korea’s contribution to Russia: massed manpower, poorly equipped and committed to endurance rather than innovation.

Strategic Implications

The participation of North Korean forces in Ukraine confirms that Pyongyang is prepared to export manpower as a commodity, supplementing Russia’s exhausted pool of infantry. This deepens military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, potentially extending beyond troops to include arms transfers, missile technology and diplomatic alignment in multilateral forums.

For South Korea and the United States, the lesson is sobering. A conflict on the Korean peninsula would not pit North Korea against a static opponent but against technologically advanced forces with strong air and naval superiority. The experience in Ukraine shows that while the KPA can fight doggedly, she would suffer catastrophic losses against modern systems. Yet her sheer size and indifference to casualties would still pose grave risks, particularly in the opening stages of a war.

For Ukraine and Europe, the lesson is different. The North Korean presence underscores the globalisation of the conflict. It reveals how isolated regimes can serve as manpower reservoirs for Russia, prolonging the war of attrition. By contrast, Ukraine’s foreign fighters underscore the solidarity of democratic states and the effectiveness of voluntary, motivated formations.

Conclusions about the North Korean Army

North Korea’s contribution to Russia’s war in Ukraine has illuminated long-shrouded aspects of the Korean People’s Army. The KPA remains large, disciplined and resilient, but technologically backward and tactically rigid. Her soldiers endure extreme hardship, fight cohesively, and sustain appalling losses without collapse—a quality that makes them both formidable and tragically expendable.

When compared to Wagner mercenaries, Syrian volunteers and Chechen formations, the KPA appears simultaneously more primitive and more resilient. When compared to Ukraine’s Georgian Legion, western volunteers and unofficial NATO-trained detachments, the differences are even starker. The KPA exemplifies manpower without modernity; Ukraine’s partners exemplify modernity without mass.

The lessons of Ukraine confirm that totalitarian regimes can still field troops who fight with grim tenacity, even if they are ill-prepared for modern battlefields. But they also confirm that quality, adaptability and the free will of volunteers are decisive factors in twenty-first-century warfare. Numbers, indoctrination and ruthlessness can prolong a conflict; they cannot guarantee victory against opponents who combine skill, technology and freedom of initiative.