Washington's rapprochement with Belarus

Washington’s recent attempts to thaw relations with Belarus, one of Europe's most autocratic states and a close ally of Russia, seem incongruous against the wider strategic context of Europe’s security and the war in Ukraine. But that is precisely what the second Trump administration has been trying to achieve since assuming office in January 2025.

This year has seen a tentative, transactional opening: prisoner releases and a rare high-level US visit to Minsk have been traded for the possibility—still unrealised—of modest sanctions relief and a quieter Belarusian role on NATO’s eastern flank. Yet the fundamentals remain unchanged. Belarus is tightly bound to Russia militarily and economically; the United States has not reopened its suspended embassy; and the sanctions architecture endures. Any rapprochement is therefore provisional, reversible and circumscribed by Moscow’s leverage. 

What changed in 2025

After years of deep freeze following the 2020 post-election Belarusian crackdown, three developments in 2025 created room for a limited thaw. First, early in the year Minsk released several US citizens from custody—beginning with Anastassia Nuhfer on 26 January—moves Washington publicly welcomed. Further releases followed in February and April, including the prominent US national Youras Ziankovich. These gestures mattered politically in Washington and established a line of communication. 

Second, on 21 June a US delegation led by Special Envoy Keith Kellogg met Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko in Minsk—the highest-level American visit in years. On the same day Belarus freed prominent civil rights activist Siarhei Tsikhanouski and thirteen other political prisoners. The timing was no coincidence and signalled a purposeful if narrow bargain: liberty for named detainees in exchange for engagement and the prospect of relief. 

Third, Lukashenko himself advertised that it was the Americans who had asked to talk, underscoring his effort to leverage dialogue with the West without breaking with Moscow. His message was candid: Belarus would coordinate with Russia and would not make decisions behind her back. That is the ceiling on any thaw. 

What Washington appears to want

Publicly, the United States has sought humanitarian outcomes—freeing specific prisoners—while testing whether Minsk will lower near-term security risks: avoiding direct Belarusian participation in Russia’s campaign against Ukraine; moving large exercises away from borders; and dampening nuclear signalling now that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons are reportedly in Belarus. Analytical reporting suggests the notional deal is simple: more releases and restraint, in exchange for limited sanctions relief. To date Washington has not in fact eased core Belarus sanctions; the official programme remains active. Embassy operations in Minsk, suspended since February 2022, have not resumed. 

On the military-security side, Minsk has conspicuously downplayed this September’s Zapad-2025 drills and shifted major activities deeper inland—messaging that aligns with a desire to avoid new provocations while talks with the United States are nascent. It is signalling, not transformation, but signals matter in a crisis-prone theatre. 

Minsk's position

Belarus wants sanctions relief on sectors that bite—above all potash and air links—and a measure of Western respectability without abandoning her alliance with Russia. Limited prisoner releases and a calibrated public tone toward NATO are the low-cost levers Lukashenko can pull. In parallel, he has courted international relevance as a supposed facilitator for US–Russia dialogue on Ukraine, a role that flatters Minsk and costs little. But Belarus’s economy and security are knitted to Russia, and Moscow’s nuclear and conventional footprint on Belarusian soil sets hard limits on Minsk’s autonomy. 

There is no “reset”

The desire to keep channels of communication open is far from a formal agreement to reinitiate a full state to state relationship. First, coercive instruments remain in place. The US sanctions programme is live; the State Department still warns citizens that the embassy cannot assist them in Belarus; and Congress’s briefings reflect a wary view of Minsk’s trajectory. None of that looks like a reopening. 

Second, the human-rights ledger has hardly moved. Even after June’s releases, well over a thousand political prisoners remain in Belarusian jails. Rights groups and independent media treat June’s gesture as a bargaining chip rather than a change of course. 

Third, the strategic picture is unchanged. Russian forces train and deploy with Belarus; Zapad-2025 will still proceed; and nuclear-related signalling has not vanished. For Washington and Europe, any Belarus policy must be nested within the campaign to support Ukraine and deter Russia, not cut across it. 

The logic of a narrow rapprochement

A limited thaw nonetheless has its uses for both sides. For Washington, extracting citizens, reducing near-border military theatre, and probing whether Minsk can be nudged into a more inert posture in the Ukraine war are worthwhile at modest diplomatic cost. For Minsk, small, reversible steps—prisoner releases, adjusted exercise geography—buy options with the West while preserving Russian backing at home. This is the classic repertoire of a weak ally seeking slack within a dominant patron’s embrace. 

Risks, tests and plausible trajectories

Three near-term tests will show whether this goes beyond symbolic trade-offs.

• Prisoners and access. Do further batches of detainees walk free, and will Minsk allow neutral monitoring of conditions for those who remain? A one-off gesture looks transactional; a pattern might begin to look policy-driven. 

• Sanctions signalling. Does Washington issue narrow general licences or specific delistings tied to verifiable steps, or does the regime’s repression and its entanglement with Russia foreclose even limited relief? So far there has been no formal easing. 

• Military posture. Are Belarusian activities near NATO borders restrained during and after Zapad-2025, with fewer incidents and less nuclear posturing? Minsk has moved drills inward and toned down the fanfare; whether that endures matters. 

If these tests break favourably, the plausible best case is a shallow détente: episodic prisoner releases, a quieter frontier, and tightly scoped economic licences—not a reopening of embassies and trade. The middling case is stasis with continued bargaining over names and dates. The worst case is a snap-back: renewed crackdowns at home or provocations near the border, followed by fresh designations and a frozen channel. This is something Belarus will likely want to avoid, particularly given the current prospect of tighter sanctions on Moscow that Minsk will not want to be ensnared within.

A measured outcome

There is a logic to trying: even limited de-escalation around Belarus helps Ukraine and NATO, and freeing named people is an end in itself. But given Minsk’s structural dependence on Moscow and the persistence of repression, rapprochement can only be cautious, conditional and closely coupled to verifiable behaviour. The United States has edged the door open; Belarus has poked it with a toe. For now, neither has stepped through.