US military action against Cuba?

Tuesday 6 January 2026

The question is not whether Washington has the military capacity to strike Cuba. She sits ninety miles from Florida, within dense American surveillance, and within reach of an overwhelming set of naval, air and special operations forces. The harder question is political: whether the United States would judge the benefits of a surgical operation to outweigh the diplomatic damage, the legal controversy and the serious risk of escalation with external actors, above all Russia.

That calculation has changed abruptly in the past few days because of what the United States has just done in Venezuela. According to multiple reports, a United States special operations raid, supported by wider strikes, resulted in the seizure of President Nicolás Maduro and his transfer to New York to face criminal proceedings.  The operation has immediately triggered an argument at the United Nations about legality, with the UN Secretary-General warning about a “dangerous precedent” and legal experts questioning any self-defence justification. Russia and China have condemned the action as a violation of sovereignty and international law. 

Against that background, it is understandable that observers ask whether Cuba might be next, particularly because Cuba appears to have been entangled in Venezuela’s security apparatus. Cuba has stated that 32 Cuban personnel were killed during the Venezuela raid and declared days of mourning. In parallel, American officials have publicly highlighted Cuban involvement in Maduro’s internal security. That combination can create a political narrative in Washington that Cuba is not merely an ideologically hostile neighbour but an operational facilitator of adversaries and transnational criminality, and therefore a candidate for coercion.

Still, soon is not a straightforward term. A Venezuela-style operation against Cuba is possible in a narrow technical sense, but it is distinctly less likely in the near term unless one of three triggers appears.

First, an immediate casus belli in the American domestic frame. The Venezuela operation has been presented as a law enforcement and national security action, centred on drug-related charges. For Cuba, Washington would need an equivalent, highly legible justification that plays well domestically: for example, a dramatic hostage situation, a spectacular attack attributed to Cuban state organs, or an incident that can be framed as imminent threat. Without that, the political costs rise sharply because Cuba is not a distant theatre. She is a neighbour with which the United States has a long, emotionally charged history, a large diaspora constituency and a deep reservoir of international sympathy in parts of the Global South.

Secondly, a belief in controllability. If the Venezuela operation has been framed as surgical, Cuba is a harder environment in which to keep violence contained and outcomes predictable. She is smaller, more densely policed and more unitary as a state. Regime change dynamics are also different. In Venezuela, Washington may calculate that removing one apex figure fractures an already stressed system. In Cuba the ruling apparatus has survived decades of isolation, sanctions and covert pressure, and it is structured to treat existential threats as a mobilisation tool. Even a limited raid could consolidate elite cohesion and create exactly the nationalist rallying effect Washington would wish to avoid.

Thirdly, an escalation pathway involving Russia that Washington is prepared to accept. This is the most strategically important difference between Havana and Caracas. Russia has longstanding political and security ties with both, but Cuba’s symbolic and operational value to Moscow is distinctive by reason of geographical proximity to the United States.

Russia has repeatedly used Cuba for signalling. In June 2024, Russian naval vessels, including a nuclear-powered submarine, visited Havana in a deployment that was widely interpreted as a show of force amid tensions over Ukraine. Russia has also continued to deepen economic links, pledging substantial investment and expanding financial presence in Havana, partly to demonstrate that she retains partners despite Western pressure. In 2025 Russia ratified a military cooperation agreement with Cuba which, whatever its operational substance, reinforces the political message that Moscow intends to keep a foothold in the Caribbean. 

Those facts do not mean Russia could defend Cuba in any conventional sense against American force. Russia’s capacity to project sustained military power into the Caribbean is limited, especially while she remains consumed by her war against Ukraine. But Russia does not need to match the United States ship for ship to impose costs. She needs only to create uncertainty, raise the perceived risk of miscalculation and open retaliatory options in other theatres.

What might a Venezuela-style operation against Cuba look like?

If Washington went down this path, the most plausible template would be a short-duration special operations raid, justified as apprehending specific individuals (for narcotics, sanctions evasion, cybercrime, or alleged support for terrorism), possibly accompanied by strikes against air defence nodes, coastal radars and command infrastructure to enable extraction. That model has two political attractions. It can be sold as finite, not an occupation, and it can be rhetorically folded into a law enforcement framework, as appears to have happened in the Venezuela case. 

Yet Cuba is exactly the sort of case where finite can become sticky. Once the United States crosses the threshold of using force on the island, she may face pressure to go further if the initial result is ambiguous, if hostages are taken, if American personnel are detained, or if Cuban authorities retaliate through asymmetric means. This is why the central risk is not the initial raid but the second week.

Geopolitical consequences, especially regarding Russia

1. A new ruleset in the Western hemisphere

The United States action in Venezuela is already being criticised as a precedent that weakens the norm of sovereignty and the UN Charter framework. If Washington were to strike Cuba as well, the cumulative effect would be to normalise the idea that major powers can treat their near abroad as a law enforcement space, rather than a region governed by strict non-intervention. That would not only alarm Latin American governments but also hand Russia a propaganda gift: Moscow would argue that Washington has discarded the very legal principles she invokes in Europe.

Russia is already framing the Venezuela operation as unlawful and destabilising, with senior figures warning that similar actions against stronger states could amount to war.  A Cuba strike would sharpen this messaging and make it easier for Moscow to portray herself as a defender of international order, notwithstanding her own violations in Ukraine. In diplomatic terms, it is a classic judo move: use the opponent’s momentum.

2. Russian retaliation: not symmetrical, but painful

Russia’s most likely responses would be indirect.

• Military signalling in the Caribbean would intensify: more naval visits, bomber flights where feasible, joint exercises and visible logistics cooperation, calibrated to fall short of permanent basing but sufficient to force Washington to devote attention and assets. The 2024 port call already demonstrated the value of this signalling for Moscow. 

  
  

• Intelligence cooperation could deepen. Cuba’s historical role as an intelligence partner for Russia (and previously the Soviet Union) gives Moscow options that are deniable and comparatively inexpensive. Even if the public evidence is often opaque, the mere plausibility of intelligence activity close to the United States increases political friction.

  
  

• Cyber operations and influence activity could rise in frequency. Russia has repeatedly shown that she prefers tools that are hard to attribute cleanly and can be dialled up or down.

  
  

• Pressure in other theatres. Russia could respond by escalating in places where she believes Washington is sensitive: for example, by hardening positions in UN forums, increasing military-technical cooperation with other anti-American partners, or intensifying disruption efforts in Europe.

The point is not that Russia can save Havana. It is that a Cuba operation would broaden the menu of retaliatory options and, crucially, might encourage Moscow to take bolder risks because she could argue that Washington has already legitimised unilateral force for political ends.

3. A tighter Russia–Cuba embrace

Cuba’s economic vulnerability makes her susceptible to patronage, and Russia has already positioned herself as a financial and political supporter, including pledges of investment through 2030.  If Cuba were attacked, Havana would almost certainly seek deeper Russian backing, even if it comes with strings. That could mean expanded Russian access for port calls, communications infrastructure, training missions, or financial arrangements that help Cuba survive sanctions pressure. The 2025 military cooperation agreement provides a ready-made legal and diplomatic wrapper for such steps. 

4. Effects on Ukraine and Europe

This is where a focus upon Russia becomes strategically sharp. If Washington became embroiled in a Caribbean confrontation, even a limited one, it could distract attention and resources from Ukraine. Russia would welcome that, particularly if it fosters divisions amongst European allies over how far to follow Washington’s lead in legally contested interventions. The Venezuela operation has already drawn cautious responses from some US partners, emphasising respect for international law. A Cuba operation would widen that gap: some governments would see it as the return of nineteenth-century gunboat politics, others would fear alienating Washington, and Moscow would exploit the split.

Might the United States soon execute such an operation?

In the immediate aftermath of Venezuela, the probability is higher than it was a month ago, largely because the psychological barrier has been lowered and because Cuba has been rhetorically linked to Venezuela’s internal security. But it remains more likely that Washington will first tighten coercive measures short of invasion: intensified sanctions enforcement, interdictions, targeted cyber actions, diplomatic isolation and overt support for Cuban dissidents.

A direct operation becomes significantly more plausible if Washington concludes that Havana is operationally complicit in activities that can be sold as immediate threats, or if she believes that Russia is too stretched to respond in ways that matter. The counterargument is that Russia does not need to respond symmetrically to make the costs unpleasant, and Cuba is precisely the place where Moscow can create strategic embarrassment at comparatively low cost. 

If the Venezuela raid is the opening of a new American doctrine, Cuba will be watching closely. So will Russia, and she will be planning not for the first strike but for how to make any second strike feel like the beginning of a wider, messier and more dangerous contest.