Ukraine’s Winter Riposte: Tactical Gains and the Anatomy of a Local Counter-Offensive

Tuesday 17 February 2026

In the fourth winter of full-scale war, when many observers had resigned themselves to a frozen front and grinding attrition, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have demonstrated that even in February’s mud and frost manoeuvre is still possible. Recent gains east of Zaporizhzhia — modest in territorial scale but substantial in operational meaning — reveal a pattern not of sweeping breakthrough but of disciplined tactical opportunism.

These actions were concentrated along the axis running towards Huliaipole and adjacent settlements that had fallen under renewed Russian pressure during the autumn of 2025. Over the course of several days Ukrainian assault groups reclaimed a chain of small villages and defensive belts amounting to roughly two hundred square kilometres. In isolation such figures do not transform the strategic map. Yet in a war defined by trench lines, minefields and artillery duels measured in metres, they represent the most rapid Ukrainian advance in many months.

The gains were neither accidental nor purely opportunistic. They followed careful reconnaissance and preparatory shaping operations. Ukrainian intelligence units — integrating aerial reconnaissance drones, signals interception and forward observation posts — identified sectors where Russian forward battalions were thinly supplied and poorly coordinated. Reports indicate that Russian formations in this sector had suffered degraded battlefield communications following tightened satellite authentication controls and Ukrainian electronic warfare measures. When communications falter in a positional war, cohesion frays — and cohesion is the essence of trench defence.

The tactical sequence appears to have unfolded in three stages.

First, Ukrainian artillery brigades conducted sustained counter-battery fire, targeting Russian gun positions and ammunition depots situated just beyond the immediate front line. Precision-guided munitions — often directed by small reconnaissance drones operating at low altitude — suppressed Russian tube artillery long enough to permit movement. In modern positional warfare, the side that wins the artillery duel briefly wins the ground.

Secondly, assault detachments drawn from mechanised brigades advanced in dispersed formations rather than in massed columns. Lessons learned from earlier counter-offensives have clearly been absorbed. Instead of committing large armoured thrusts against prepared minefields, Ukrainian units employed small infantry groups transported in armoured vehicles to forward staging points before advancing on foot. Engineers followed closely, clearing narrow corridors through defensive belts under covering fire.

These corridors were not designed for dramatic penetration. Rather they enabled Ukrainian infantry to seize specific trench networks and tree lines, thereby unhinging adjacent Russian positions. Once a single defensive node collapses, neighbouring units face enfilading fire — and must either withdraw or risk encirclement. In several instances, Russian forces retreated in good order to secondary lines; in others withdrawal was disorderly, leaving behind equipment and fortifications hastily abandoned.

Thirdly, once villages were secured Ukrainian forces consolidated immediately — digging fresh trenches, laying their own mines and repositioning anti-tank guided missiles to repel counter-attacks. This rapid consolidation is crucial. In previous campaigns both sides have struggled not in taking ground but in holding it against swift counter-strokes. The recent advances appear deliberately limited to what could be defended with available reserves.

Geographically, the reclaimed terrain consists largely of open agricultural land punctuated by shelterbelts and low settlements — ground offering little natural cover. Its value lies less in topography than in geometry. By advancing several kilometres along selected salients, Ukrainian units have shortened parts of their defensive line while complicating Russian supply routes feeding forward battalions. Even a small shift can alter artillery arcs and observation lines — changing who sees and who is seen.

It is important, however, to resist the temptation to declare a turning point. In eastern sectors of Donetsk Oblast Russian formations continue to press attacks of their own, exploiting numerical superiority in manpower and heavy ordnance. She remains a theatre of attrition in which gains in one sector are often balanced by pressure in another. The war has settled into a grim calculus of endurance — shells, trained soldiers and the industrial capacity to replenish both.

Yet morale is not an abstract consideration. For Ukraine, she fights not only for territory but for narrative — the assertion that she retains agency against a larger adversary. Limited advances in winter send a signal domestically and abroad that her forces can still seize the initiative when conditions permit. They reinforce confidence among soldiers who have endured years of trench warfare and reassure international partners that assistance continues to yield operational effect.

The broader strategic environment remains uncertain. Diplomatic manoeuvres proceed in parallel with artillery exchanges. Each kilometre regained may strengthen Kyiv’s hand in negotiation — yet no series of local advances alone can compel a decisive political settlement.

What these recent operations demonstrate above all is adaptation. Ukraine’s military has refined her tactics since the dramatic counter-offensives of 2022. She now favours incremental disruption over theatrical breakthrough — attritional pressure applied with precision rather than spectacle. If Russia’s invasion has become the slowest war of movement in modern European history, it is because both sides have learned the lethality of open advance.

In this frozen season the Ukrainian Armed Forces have shown that even within stalemate there is room for manoeuvre — provided intelligence is accurate, artillery disciplined and consolidation swift. The front line may not have shifted dramatically on the map, but along selected sectors it has moved — and in a war measured in trenches and tree lines that movement matters.

Should the coming spring bring firmer ground and renewed offensives, these winter gains may be remembered not as an isolated episode but as a quiet rehearsal — proof that the capacity for tactical initiative endures.