Iraq’s latest instability — why she keeps returning to crisis politics

Tuesday 17 February 2026

Iraq’s current political instability is not a sudden relapse so much as the familiar rhythm of a political system designed to postpone decisive outcomes. Since 2003 Iraq has been governed through a mixture of electoral competition and elite bargaining, in which the decisive contests happen less at the ballot box than afterwards — in the bargaining rooms where blocs assemble majorities, distribute ministries and decide who may govern and who must wait.

The present episode has been sharpened by three converging pressures:

• An election that reshuffled the balance of forces without producing a clear governing mandate

• A constitutional process that turns government formation into a sequence of veto points

• A wider environment — economic irritation, militia power and regional rivalry — that makes compromise costlier and paralysis more tempting

What follows is a map of origins, the live political mechanics and the plausible outcomes.

Origins — the system that produces deadlock

1. The post-2003 settlement: power-sharing as habit, not transition

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq built a constitutional order that aims to avoid dictatorship by dispersing power. In practice this dispersion became an enduring allocation system: blocs negotiate not only policies but also posts and revenue streams. The state is thereby treated as the prize and the referee at once.

This arrangement has two lasting consequences.

First it makes “winning” elections less meaningful. A bloc may come first yet still be forced into concessions that hollow out its programme.

Second, it turns government formation into a test of elite cohesion, not public consent. When cohesion fails, the system stalls.

2. Protest as the periodic audit of elite rule

Iraq has experienced repeated waves of social anger over corruption, poor services and unemployment. Even when protest ebbs its memory remains a constraint: parties and militia-linked actors fear losing control of streets and patronage networks, which encourages the politics of pre-emption and containment. Human rights monitoring and conflict-data reporting have repeatedly noted the use of coercion, intimidation and restrictions on civic space around electoral periods. 

3. Militias and “state-within-a-state” influence

Armed groups — some aligned with Iran and embedded within or alongside state structures — operate as political actors with coercive leverage. This does not mean Iraq is simply a puppet of any external power, but it does mean negotiations happen under the shadow of force and implicit red lines. Analysts increasingly describe Iraqi politics as a managed order: less open civil war than controlled competition. 

4. Baghdad–Erbil: oil, law and sovereignty

A second structural fault line is the relationship between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region — especially over who controls oil exports, contracts and revenues. A 2022 Federal Supreme Court ruling found the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas law unconstitutional and asserted federal authority over exports and contracts, worsening an already hard dispute. 

Parliamentary moves in 2025 aimed at resolving aspects of the payment and budget dispute were meant to restart exports and ease Kurdistan Region salary delays, yet the underlying contest over sovereignty and revenue has remained politically combustible. 

These are the deep causes. The current instability is how they have reassembled in the aftermath of the most recent election.

The present crisis — what is unstable now?

1. The 2025 election produced a winner who could not govern alone

Iraq held parliamentary elections on 11 November 2025. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s bloc won the largest number of seats but far short of a majority, ensuring coalition bargaining would be decisive. 

The Sadrist Movement — previously the largest single force in 2021 — boycotted, changing the social meaning of the vote and lowering its legitimacy in the eyes of many Iraqis who already doubt elections can rotate power. 

So Iraq arrived at the familiar problem: a fragmented parliament, a prime minister with a claim to lead yet not the numbers to impose terms, and rival blocs who can veto but struggle to unite behind an alternative.

2. Constitutional veto points: choosing a president before a prime minister

Government formation in Iraq is not merely political theatre; it is procedurally intricate. The system requires parliamentary steps — including selecting a president — that can themselves be blocked by boycotts, quorum failures and inter-bloc rivalry. In late January 2026 Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council publicly urged adherence to constitutional timelines and rejected “foreign interference”, a pointed signal that delay was becoming politically dangerous. 

Reporting during this period has described agreement on parliamentary leadership as easier than agreement on the presidency and premiership — the posts that decide the distribution of power across ministries and security institutions. 

In other words Iraq is not unstable only because factions disagree — she is unstable because her constitutional machinery gives factions many places to block one another.

3. External pressure is real, but it works through Iraqi actors

Iraq sits in the overlap of Iranian and American strategic interests. That overlap is not abstract: it shapes which coalitions are tolerated and which candidates are opposed. Commentators and regional reporting in early February 2026 framed the post-election bargaining as constrained by outside pressures and by the divisive figure of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose return remains controversial. 

At the same time serious European analysis has stressed Iraqi agency: factions are not simply instructed from abroad, but foreign alignments do alter their leverage at home. 

The result is a paradox: everyone insists that Iraq must be sovereign, but sovereignty is negotiated in a political market where foreign relationships are part of each bloc’s portfolio.

4. Economic irritants: corruption narratives find new triggers

A political deadlock is easier to endure when the economy is calm. It becomes harder when the public feels squeezed. In February 2026 protests and anger from traders over new customs tariffs and fees became a visible example of how quickly economic policy can light up the anti-corruption mood. 

Even where such protests are limited in scale, they matter politically because they restore the language of popular grievance to the centre of debate — a language that factions fear, and that encourages both populist gestures and repressive reflexes.

5. Security pressure: Islamic State detainees and the question of US withdrawal

Security concerns are also part of the political instability — not because Iraq is on the verge of collapse, but because security debates reshape coalition bargaining.

In mid-February 202, the United States and Iraq confirmed the transfer of thousands of Islamic State detainees from Syria into Iraqi custody, framed as a measure to prevent prison breaks and to bring detainees into Iraqi legal processes. 

Reuters also reported that American troops are still expected to withdraw by the end of 2026, even as Baghdad manages the detainee influx and worries about renewed Islamic State activity across the border. 

That combination — more detainees, an approaching change in US posture and persistent militia influence — makes the security ministries even more politically valuable, and therefore harder to allocate in a coalition agreement.

What outcomes are realistically possible?

Iraq’s likely trajectories are not infinite. They are variations on a few recognisable patterns.

Outcome 1: A second-term Sudani government — continuity with negotiated constraints

The most straightforward outcome is that Sudani remains prime minister at the head of a coalition stitched together from Shi‘a blocs, pragmatic Sunnis and Kurdish parties, with extensive bargaining over ministries.

This is plausible because he has the strongest claim from the election results and because many factions prefer a known administrator to a destabilising contest. Reuters’ reporting on seat distribution captured the basic arithmetic that forces such coalition-building. 

What it would mean:

• Continued attempt to balance Iran and the United States rather than choosing a camp

• Incremental economic management, punctuated by corruption scandals and periodic protest

• Ongoing bargaining with the Kurdistan Region over oil exports and revenue sharing, with legal disputes never fully settled 

Outcome 2: A “consensus” government around a different candidate — higher risk of street anger

If Sudani is blocked, the system could produce an alternative compromise prime minister acceptable to the largest blocs and to key external stakeholders. This can stabilise parliament in the short term yet inflame legitimacy problems — because the public sees another elite arrangement.

In early 2026 reporting, the idea of Maliki as a contender has been presented as divisive, precisely because his return would be read by many as the restoration of an older, harder style of rule. 

What it would mean:

• More polarised politics inside Shi‘a ranks

• Greater possibility of protest amongst young Iraqis who already doubt elections can change anything 

• Potential tightening of state controls on activism and media 

Outcome 3: Prolonged paralysis and caretaker government — the slow crisis

Iraq may simply continue to drift: a caretaker government, delayed constitutional milestones and parliamentary bargaining that never quite finishes. The judiciary’s public admonitions about respecting timelines suggest concern that delay is becoming corrosive. 

What it would mean:

• Budget decisions and reforms become hostage to factional trading

• Local services deteriorate further in areas already vulnerable to anger over jobs and corruption

• Armed groups gain relative leverage because formal institutions appear weak

Outcome 4: Early elections or constitutional re-engineering — reform, but also gamble

When elite bargaining fails the temptation is to “return to the people”. In Iraq, early elections are sometimes proposed as a reset, yet they rarely change the fundamentals unless accompanied by electoral-law and party-finance changes. Analysts of Iraq’s elections have argued that voting can recur regularly while power distribution remains tightly managed. 

What it would mean:

• Short-term instability (campaign tensions, claims of fraud, militia intimidation fears)

• Possible longer-term benefit only if the rules of competition, not merely the date of the vote, change

Outcome 5: A more coercive stabilisation — order without legitimacy

There is another, darker form of “stability”: repression, selective arrests, intimidation of protest and a narrowing of political space, all justified as preventing chaos. Human rights reporting on Iraq has documented patterns of arrests and restrictions around protests. 

If the political class becomes convinced that society is too angry to risk open contest, this outcome grows more likely.

What it would mean:

• Fewer street protests, but more simmering resentment

• Less accountability and more corruption, as coercion replaces consent

• Higher long-term risk of a sharper rupture later

The key variable: whether Iraq’s factions fear the street more than they fear each other

In the near term, Iraq’s instability is likely to end the way it often does: with a bargain. The open question is the quality of that bargain.

If the agreement is narrowly about posts, Iraq gets a government but not governance — and she returns to crisis within months.

If the agreement includes a serious programme — on electricity, public-sector payroll discipline, customs and revenue transparency, militia control and a workable Baghdad–Erbil oil settlement — she may buy a few years of calmer politics, even without profound reform.

Yet the deeper origin remains: Iraq’s post-2003 system was built to prevent domination, and it succeeded — but it also made decision-making a perpetual negotiation. The current instability is the price of that success.

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The principal blocs in the Council of Representatives

The parliamentary elections of 11 November 2025 returned a fragmented legislature in which no single bloc commands a majority. The largest formation was the coalition aligned with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, reported to have secured 46 seats — a plurality, but far from the numbers required to govern alone.

The broad configuration of blocs can be summarised as follows:

1. The Sudani-aligned coalition

   
   

   Centred upon the incumbent prime minister, this bloc benefits from incumbency, administrative experience and relationships across the security and economic ministries. Its strength lies in continuity and the perception of relative technocratic steadiness. Its weakness is dependence upon coalition partners whose support is transactional.

   
   

2. The State of Law and associated factions

   
   

   Linked to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, this current retains influence amongst elements of the Shi‘a political establishment and within networks shaped during his earlier premiership. For some Iraqis, Maliki represents experience and firm leadership; for others, his name evokes polarisation and the sectarian tensions of the past.

   
   

3. Kurdish parties

   
   

   The Kurdistan Region’s two principal parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan — remain pivotal. Their parliamentary weight is decisive in close votes, particularly in the election of the President of the Republic, a post traditionally allocated to a Kurdish candidate. Their bargaining priorities consistently include oil revenue, budget transfers, salary payments and the constitutional status of disputed territories.

   
   

4. Sunni Arab coalitions

   
   

   Sunni blocs, often associated with figures such as Mohammed al-Halbousi, play a balancing role. Their influence is magnified when Shi‘a blocs are divided, as they can tip coalition arithmetic in exchange for control of ministries or provincial commitments.

   
   

5. The absent Sadrists

   
   

   The Sadrist Movement’s boycott altered the social legitimacy of the election, even if it simplified parliamentary arithmetic. The absence of Sadrist deputies reduces open confrontation inside parliament but does not remove their capacity to mobilise in the street.

The net effect is that the “largest bloc” is rarely the “governing bloc” until protracted bargaining has produced a working majority. Iraq’s instability therefore begins not with violence, but with arithmetic.

The constitutional sequence — where paralysis most often occurs

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution establishes a formal sequence for government formation. Each stage creates an opportunity for veto or delay.

1. Certification of results

   
   

   The Independent High Electoral Commission certifies results. Challenges may be referred to the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, which has become an increasingly assertive arbiter of political disputes. Even technical complaints can delay the convening of parliament.

   
   

2. Convening the Council of Representatives

   
   

   The newly elected Council of Representatives of Iraq must meet and elect a Speaker and deputies. While usually achievable through cross-sectarian bargaining, this stage can stall if rival Sunni factions contest the speakership.

   
   

3. Election of the President of the Republic

   
   

   Parliament must elect a president — traditionally a Kurdish nominee — by a two-thirds majority in the first round, or an absolute majority in a subsequent round between the top candidates. Achieving quorum for this vote is often the first major veto point. Kurdish party rivalry, or broader coalition disputes, can prevent the necessary attendance.

   
   

4. Nomination of the Prime Minister

   
   

   The President then invites the candidate of the “largest bloc” to form a government. The ambiguity of what constitutes the “largest bloc” — the pre-election list or a post-election alliance — has historically generated litigation and manoeuvre before the Federal Supreme Court.

   
   

5. Formation of the Council of Ministers

   
   

   The prime minister-designate has 30 days to present a cabinet and government programme for parliamentary approval. This is the most politically delicate phase. Ministries are allocated amongst blocs; security portfolios are especially contentious; and failure to agree can result in repeated partial votes or an expired mandate.

At each juncture absence from the chamber can be as powerful as opposition within it. Iraq’s constitutional architecture therefore institutionalises bargaining but also institutionalises obstruction.

Why these veto points matter now

In the present instability, three dynamics intensify these procedural choke points:

• Fragmentation within the Shi‘a political spectrum, making it harder to present a unified “largest bloc”

• Kurdish leverage over the presidency amidst unresolved oil and budget disputes between Baghdad and Erbil

• The strategic importance of the security ministries in the context of Islamic State detainee transfers and the anticipated recalibration of the United States’ military presence

Thus the crisis is not a constitutional breakdown but a constitutional congestion. The rules are functioning — yet precisely because they function through supermajorities, timed mandates and multi-stage approvals, they reward cohesive blocs and punish fragmented ones.

If Iraq’s leaders can align interests at each of these stages, a government will emerge. If not she will enter once again the familiar condition of caretaker rule — legally intact, politically suspended, and waiting for arithmetic to yield agreement.