Trump at the United Nations

What he said at UNGA and online

Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 2025, President Trump paired a combative speech with an unmistakable pivot on Ukraine. In public remarks and a subsequent Truth Social (his social media platform) post, he said Ukraine can “win back all” territory lost to Russia—a notable departure from earlier talk of land-for-peace. Multiple outlets recorded the shift, noting that it followed his bilateral meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the UN sidelines. 

Trump’s Truth Social post (quoted in full as reproduced by multiple outlets; typos from the original)

“After getting to know and fully understand the Ukraine/Russia Military and Economic situation and, after seeing the Economic trouble it is causing Russia, I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form. With time, patience, and the financial support of Europe and, in particular, NATO, the original Borders from where this War started, is very much an option. We will continue to supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them. Russia has been fighting ‘aimlessly’ in a war that a ‘real military power’ would have won in less than a week. Putin and Russia are in BIG Economic trouble, and this is the time for Ukraine to act.” 

(Different newsrooms captured the same post verbatim; the sentences above aggregate the full text as reproduced across these reports.)

Trump echoed that message in the UNGA hall and" pool sprays" (media events on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly summit)—calling Russia a “paper tiger,” chiding European buyers of Russian energy, and saying NATO states should shoot down intruding Russian aircraft. 

How Trump’s Ukraine position has evolved (2017-2025)

• 2017–2019 (first term): After early hesitation, his administration approved lethal defensive aid (Javelins) to Ukraine (2018; expanded in 2019). Yet in 2019 the White House froze congressionally approved military aid, a central episode in Trump’s first impeachment. 

  
  

• 2022–2024 (out of office; then campaign): Trump often argued he could end the war “quickly”, at times implying territorial concessions would be necessary—positions widely reported and criticised by Kyiv and many European leaders. 

  
  

• 2025 (current term): For months he has tied new US sanctions or tariffs to conditions on others (e.g, Europe halting Russian energy purchases, 100% tariffs on China/India if they keep buying Russian oil). Since August, he’s oscillated between courting Putin and publicly needling Moscow’s military/economy. At UNGA on 23 September 2025, he pivoted: Ukraine “can win back all territory”, and Europe/NATO should help make it happen. 

Possible explanations for the shift

1. Battlefield/economic reading: Sustained Russian underperformance and economic strain—points he now emphasises—make maximal Ukrainian aims seem more plausible to him. 

   
   

2. Alliance dynamics at UN week: A concentrated dose of European and Ukrainian diplomacy in New York (plus allied outrage at recent NATO airspace violations) likely raised the political cost of ambiguity. 

   
   

3. Conditional leverage politics: Keeping sanctions as a bargaining chip—contingent on Europe’s energy stance—lets him claim toughness on Russia while pressing allies to shoulder more costs. 

Is his sanctions conditionality realistic or negotiable?

Short version: Not straightforward. Trump’s line has been that additional US sanctions (or tariffs) will come if all NATO countries stop buying Russian energy. That collides with legal and political realities:

• NATO doesn’t do trade sanctions. It has no legal authority to mandate embargoes; members coordinate sanctions via the EU (for most Europeans) or nationally (e.g. the U.S., UK, Türkiye). 

  
  

• EU energy still has Russian strands. Most Russian crude to the EU is banned, but Russian LNG continues to land in France, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands, and pipeline flows still reach Hungary and Slovakia via Druzhba/TurkStream. Brussels is only now debating a future LNG ban (proposals to enter into force around 2027), and Budapest/Bratislava remain resistant. Getting every NATO country to zero immediately is improbable. 

Negotiability outlook

• What is feasible soon:

  
  

  • A phased EU timeline to sunset Russian LNG (already under discussion), paired with services/insurance restrictions that make shadow-fleet trades harder. 

    
    

  • Narrower unanimity “workarounds” (e.g. constructive abstention on CFSP (EU common Foreign and Security Policy) decisions; then a regulation under Article 215 TFEU (Treaty on the Framework of the European Union) by qualified majority voting - QMV) can ease holdouts without a treaty rewrite—but still require delicate European Council choreography. 

  
  

• What is not feasible quickly:

  
  

  • All NATO members halting all Russian oil/gas immediately—because NATO lacks the lever, and EU unanimity (or practical consensus) is still needed for big new embargo steps; Hungary has already said no. 

  
  

Conditions under which a deal could take shape

1. Phased conditionality rather than absolutes. If Washington offers a step-up ladder (e.g. US secondary sanctions on specific Russian energy trades after EU passes an LNG phase-out and closes shadow-fleet loopholes), allies can sign on without “all at once” pain. 

   
   

2. Targeted waivers and infrastructure help. For the few holdouts still tied to Druzhba/TurkStream, the EU/US could fund interconnectors (locations where transit of hydrocarbons is changed), storage and swap deals to cover near-term gaps—making national politicians more willing to move. 

   
   

3. Joint messaging on enforcement. A NATO–EU hybrid approach (NATO for maritime surveillance/air policing; EU for legal/financial measures) keeps the NATO alliance out of sanctions law while supporting cost imposition on Russia. 

Bottom line: As stated—“no new US sanctions unless every NATO country stops buying Russian energy”—the condition is unlikely to be met soon. A negotiated, sequenced package—EU LNG phase-out, anti–shadow fleet enforcement, and US snapback tariffs if Moscow stonewalls—is negotiable and could be tabled in EU Councils and US–EU trade/energy dialogues this autumn. 

The politics of the pivot

Trump’s UN week messaging put him closer to the mainstream NATO/EU view that Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders can be restored—while still keeping pressure on allies to move first on energy. Whether this becomes policy depends on whether the White House translates the rhetoric into sanctions design and enforcement—and whether Europe can line up enough votes (or abstentions) to move faster on LNG and pipeline exemptions. For now, the shift is real in words, conditional in deeds.