The Washington peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan: what’s in it

Reporting from multiple outlets indicates that Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a United States-brokered agreement at the White House, with President Donald Trump presiding. The text publicly described so far has three headline components: formal cessation of the state of conflict; arrangements on borders, transit and connectivity; and the retirement of earlier mediation formats.

A signature feature is a US-backed transit route across southern Armenia—variously described as the Zangezur corridor or, in the American branding, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity—intended to connect Azerbaijan proper with its exclave of Nakhchivan and, by extension, Turkey. The deal also envisages dissolving the long-moribund OSCE Minsk Group framework. 

At the time of writing, the treaty text does not appear to be available; nevertheless we provide below as much information as has been released into the public domain.

Several accounts suggest Washington will enjoy privileged development rights, and potentially a presence, along the transit corridor, reinforcing US leverage over a route that has strategic implications for trade between the Caspian and the Mediterranean. This is presented in Washington as a diplomatic win that sidelines Moscow and Tehran in the South Caucasus. 

The agreement follows months of signals that the parties were converging on a text, after Yerevan publicly accepted Baku’s proposals on unresolved points in March 2025 and both sides indicated readiness to sign once venue and modalities were settled. 

Why now: the enabling context

Three structural shifts made a breakthrough more plausible.

First, the facts on the ground changed decisively after Azerbaijan re-established control over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, which led to the exodus of almost the entire Armenian population from the enclave. With the core territorial dispute removed de facto, a treaty could be reframed around borders, connectivity and mutual recognition rather than status questions that had deadlocked talks for decades. 

Second, Russia’s bandwidth and authority in the region have eroded amidst her war in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s inability to guarantee security outcomes for either side weakened its role as arbiter; Western and regional diplomacy filled the vacuum. The White House ceremony is widely read as an explicit upstaging of Moscow’s former primacy. 

Third, both Baku and Yerevan faced incentives to lock in gains and mitigate risks. Azerbaijan sought a legally enforceable transit regime to consolidate strategic depth towards Turkey; Armenia, increasingly sceptical of Russian guarantees, needed economic openings and security diversification, even at the cost of difficult compromises. 

How the deal is supposed to work

The corridor: Public descriptions suggest a demarcated, internationally guaranteed transit route through Syunik (southern Armenia), with customs, policing and sovereignty arrangements still to be detailed. Some reports speak of US development rights and a peacekeeping or monitoring role to secure traffic and deter interference. The branding of the route may be politically theatrical, but the operational question is whether it is extraterritorial, supervised, or simply expedited under Armenian sovereignty. Those distinctions will matter for Armenian domestic consent and Iranian reactions which are likely to be negative as the corridor will give Armenian exports functional autonomy from Iran. 

Borders and normalisation: The agreement reportedly includes provisions for border delimitation and the normalisation of diplomatic and economic ties, building on principles the sides had circled since 2022–2024 but could not previously finalise. The dissolution of the Minsk Group formalises the shift from a multilateral OSCE track to bilateral arrangements with ad hoc external guarantors. 

Security assurance and monitoring: Some coverage references a US role in underwriting the corridor and wider peace framework. Whether this is civilian monitoring, economic stewardship or a military presence will shape regional responses. A light footprint with robust political backing is likelier than a heavy peacekeeping deployment. 

Winners, worriers and wildcards

Armenia: The upside is a potential economic lifeline and a diversified security posture less dependent upon Russia; the downside is domestic backlash over perceived capitulation after the Karabakh exodus and fears that any corridor arrangement might erode sovereignty in Syunik, the region of southern Armenia through which the corridor will pass. Managing public opinion will be as critical as managing border beacons. 

Azerbaijan: Baku secures legal cover and international buy-in for a long-sought land bridge to Nakhchivan and Turkey, plus an opportunity to reframe herself as a regional hub. The reputational challenge remains: critics argue a treaty cannot sanitise the humanitarian record surrounding Karabakh’s depopulation. 

Turkey: A clear strategic beneficiary. A reliable overland chain from the Caspian to Anatolia integrates with Ankara’s Middle Corridor vision and reduces reliance on routes vulnerable to Russia or Iran. While not a formal party, Turkey’s influence stands to grow. 

Russia: A conspicuous loser in narrative terms. Moscow’s peacekeeping brand and broker role have withered, and a US-branded corridor through Armenia is symbolically jarring. The Kremlin can still play spoiler with energy and security levers, but its centrality is diminished. 

Iran: Tehran has consistently opposed any corridor scheme that it reads as slicing Syunik or projecting NATO/US influence on its northern border. Expect louder objections, more coordination with Armenia on alternatives via Iran, and possible attempts to complicate implementation short of open confrontation. 

EU: Brussels, which invested in its own mediation track, gains from reduced conflict risk along energy corridors to the Caspian. The EU can complement the deal with funding for infrastructure, border management and reforms, even if it is not the broker of record. 

Implementation headaches to watch

Corridor modalities: If the route is under Armenian sovereignty with international guarantees, it will require carefully drafted protocols on customs, policing, dispute resolution and liability. If it strays towards extraterritoriality, Armenian ratification politics become much harder. The text, which has not been fully published, is the determinant. 

Security incidents: Any border skirmish, sabotage, or incident involving corridor traffic could trigger a crisis of confidence. A credible joint incident-prevention mechanism, with hotlines and third-party monitors, will be essential.

Refugees, rights and memory: The agreement will not, by itself, resolve the humanitarian aftermath of Karabakh. Victims’ claims, cultural heritage protection and accountability debates will continue in courts and international bodies, potentially straining the new normal. 

Domestic politics: Both leaders must sell the deal at home. In Armenia, opposition forces and the diaspora will test the government’s mandate; in Azerbaijan, the expectation is smooth ratification, but the tolerance for perceived delays by Yerevan will be low.

Regional pushback: Russia and Iran have tools to signal displeasure, from economic nudges to intelligence operations. The durability of the settlement will depend on how insulated the corridor and border arrangements are from external pressure. 

Geopolitical consequences

A re-centred South Caucasus: If implemented, the agreement shifts the region’s centre of gravity away from Russian tutelage towards a more plural balance with US, Turkish and EU roles, and with the South Caucasus positioned as part of a mid-continent trade spine from Central Asia to Europe. 

Energy and logistics: The corridor complements existing Caspian–Anatolian energy lines and offers redundancy to routes through Russia and Iran. Over time, that diversifies Europe’s access to Caspian hydrocarbons and underpins east–west freight options that bypass Russian rail. 

Norms and precedents: Retiring the Minsk Group acknowledges that frozen-conflict templates anchored in Russian co-chairmanship have run their course. Washington’s visible imprint sets a precedent for post-Soviet settlements in which Western economic guarantees, rather than Russian troops, underwrite stability. 

Bottom line

The White House ceremony marks a genuine diplomatic watershed, but treaties are judged by their trenches, not their table shots. The corridor’s legal design, border-security mechanics, and the management of Karabakh’s humanitarian aftershocks will decide whether the deal becomes a platform for normalisation or a new source of friction dressed in celebratory prose. With Moscow distracted and Tehran wary, the United States has assumed both the prestige and the risk of guarantor. Translating that into quiet borders and open roads is the real test ahead.