The Price of Donetsk: Should Ukraine Exchange Territory for NATO Membership?

By Matthew Parish
Sunday 22 November 2026
There are moments in the history of nations when the choices confronting their leaders become so disagreeable that the conventional language of morality, patriotism and international law seems inadequate to describe them. Ukraine may be approaching one such moment. After almost five years of full-scale warfare, and more than twelve years of Russian military aggression, the United States has reportedly proposed an extraordinary bargain: Ukraine should surrender the remaining portions of Donetsk Oblast that she controls in exchange for admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. If the proposal is genuine, and if it can be translated into binding international commitments, it represents one of the most consequential diplomatic ideas to emerge since Russia's invasion of February 2022.
President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on 14 November 2026 that American negotiators had raised the possibility of Ukraine withdrawing from the remaining Ukrainian-controlled territories of Donbas in exchange for NATO membership. Subsequent reporting in the Wall Street Journal indicated that the idea had been discussed by senior American negotiators, including Jared Kushner, although the extent to which Washington is genuinely committed to delivering full NATO membership remains uncertain. Meanwhile Russia continues publicly to reject Ukrainian membership of NATO, and Russian officials have even expressed opposition to arrangements resembling NATO's collective defence guarantees. The essential ingredients of the proposed bargain have therefore not yet been assembled.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss the idea without examining its implications. For all her enormous sacrifices, Ukraine cannot fight an indefinite war without exhausting her people, her economy and eventually her capacity to sustain a viable democratic society. Equally, no responsible Ukrainian government can contemplate surrendering strategically important territory merely in exchange for another collection of Western promises that may dissolve when the political winds change in Washington, London, Berlin or Paris.
The question is therefore not simply whether Ukrainian land should be exchanged for NATO membership. It is whether a limited territorial concession, made under exceptionally stringent conditions, could purchase something that Ukraine has never possessed throughout her modern independence: a durable place within an international security architecture sufficiently powerful to make another Russian invasion prohibitively dangerous. And if that objective is attainable, we must consider whether the price is bearable, whether the constitutional obstacles are surmountable and whether there exists any practical method of ensuring that all the parties perform the obligations they undertake.
The military significance of the remaining Donetsk territories
We should begin by abandoning the fiction that the areas under discussion are simply pieces of land upon which flags may be exchanged. The surviving Ukrainian-controlled portions of Donetsk Oblast are amongst the most strategically consequential territories in the entire country. They include the principal urban centres around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, together with an interconnected series of settlements, roads, industrial installations and defensive positions that have acquired exceptional importance during years of warfare.
These cities constitute the heart of what military analysts call Ukraine's fortress belt. It is a defensive system developed since 2014, incorporating urban terrain, physical fortifications and geographical features that complicate Russian offensive operations. The Institute for the Study of War has repeatedly emphasised that surrendering this system without corresponding military safeguards would expose other parts of Ukraine to considerable danger. Its assessments have continued to identify the seizure of this defensive belt as a principal Russian operational objective.
The significance of this fact cannot be overstated. Russia is demanding through diplomacy territories that her armed forces have struggled to conquer through military operations over a succession of years. A voluntary Ukrainian withdrawal would save the Russian military substantial losses in men, equipment and time. It might also release Russian military resources for deployment elsewhere along the front line. What might appear to an American negotiator as a relatively modest cartographic adjustment is therefore potentially a profound transformation in the military balance between Ukraine and Russia.
Nor are these territories depopulated wastelands. They contain communities that have maintained their Ukrainian identities and institutions throughout years of extraordinary hardship. Many residents have already endured repeated displacement, the destruction of their homes and the deaths of friends and relatives. Asking them now to accept Russian administration, with all the uncertainties this would entail for their personal safety, property rights, language and political freedoms, is not an abstract diplomatic calculation. It is an ethical decision involving the lives of actual human beings.
The relinquishment of Donetsk would consequently be a much greater concession than a simple comparison of the territory's surface area might suggest. It would give Russia a substantial military advantage, allow her to proclaim a political victory and impose further humanitarian costs upon a population that has already suffered disproportionately from the war. Any Ukrainian government contemplating such a course must therefore demand benefits of equally exceptional magnitude.
The extraordinary value of NATO membership
Yet there is another side to this argument. The military and political significance of genuine NATO membership is itself difficult to exaggerate. Since independence in 1991, Ukraine has occupied an uncomfortable geopolitical position between Russia and the Western security institutions that Moscow regards as her principal adversaries. This ambiguity has arguably been amongst the most important structural causes of Ukraine's persistent insecurity. Ukraine has been sufficiently Western-oriented to attract Russian hostility, but insufficiently integrated into Western defence institutions to enjoy their collective protection.
The fundamental promise of NATO is contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. An armed attack against one member is treated as an attack against them all, obliging each member to assist by taking such action as it considers necessary, including potentially the use of armed force. Contrary to a common misunderstanding, Article 5 does not automatically compel every member to declare war or dispatch soldiers. Nevertheless, the political and military credibility of the provision rests upon the proposition that an aggressor cannot confidently predict the limits of the collective response.
If Ukraine were genuinely admitted to NATO, Russia would confront an entirely different strategic calculation. The possibility of a renewed invasion would no longer involve confronting Ukraine alone, supplemented by uncertain supplies of foreign weapons. It would involve risking direct military confrontation with the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Poland and the other members of the Alliance. Whether Moscow would consider such a confrontation worthwhile is a question that has been answered, at least in practice, by the absence of direct Russian attacks upon NATO territory throughout the present war.
From Ukraine's perspective, the benefits would extend beyond military deterrence. NATO membership would facilitate long-term defence planning, access to integrated military structures, intelligence-sharing, standardisation of military equipment and a much greater degree of predictability in defence expenditure. It would also send a powerful signal to international investors that Ukraine was no longer a geopolitical territory whose continued existence depended upon the unpredictable calculations of foreign governments.
The historical analogy most frequently invoked in this context is West Germany. When the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955, Germany remained divided and the Western powers did not recognise the division as an acceptable permanent resolution of the German question. Nevertheless, West Germany became an integral part of the Western security system, and reunification eventually followed in 1990.
There are obvious limitations to this analogy. The division of Germany arose from the Second World War and the subsequent occupation arrangements, rather than an ongoing Russian war of conquest against an independent Ukrainian state. The arrangements governing West Germany's borders and her relationship with NATO were substantially different from those that would be required today. Nevertheless, the precedent demonstrates that contested territorial arrangements need not necessarily preclude membership of a collective defence organisation.
Indeed, it is possible to imagine a Ukraine in which peace, NATO membership and substantial reconstruction transform the country's economic and political prospects so dramatically that the loss of immediate control over parts of Donetsk, however painful, becomes less consequential over the course of decades. A prosperous, democratic and militarily secure Ukraine might exert a political and economic attraction upon neighbouring Russian-occupied territories that no amount of artillery bombardment could achieve.
Such a prospect is not guaranteed. It depends upon the future development of Russia herself, the sustainability of NATO's commitments and Ukraine's capacity to overcome the formidable challenges of post-war reconstruction. Nevertheless, it is a strategic possibility that deserves serious consideration.
The difference between surrendering territory and surrendering sovereignty
At this point a fundamental distinction becomes necessary. Ukraine need not necessarily recognise Russian sovereignty over any part of Donetsk simply because she agrees to withdraw her armed forces from a defined area. International law distinguishes between the factual control of territory and lawful sovereignty over it. A country may lose control of territory without relinquishing her legal title to that territory.
This distinction is vital because any agreement expressly transferring sovereignty over part of Donetsk to Russia would establish a deeply troubling international precedent. It would suggest that the systematic application of military force, accompanied by prolonged destruction of civilian infrastructure, can eventually secure legal recognition of territorial conquest. The implications would extend far beyond Ukraine, affecting the security of numerous other countries whose borders are contested by more powerful neighbours.
A more defensible formulation would provide for a cessation of hostilities, a carefully defined line of military control and a temporary administrative arrangement, while expressly preserving Ukraine's legal sovereignty over the territories concerned. Such a settlement might acknowledge that Russian authorities would exercise de facto control over certain areas without accepting that this control was lawful or permanent.
This is not merely a semantic distinction. A peace agreement ought to specify that the new arrangements are without prejudice to Ukraine's internationally recognised borders, that no territorial transfer is recognised in law and that disputes concerning sovereignty remain capable of eventual resolution by peaceful means. Ukraine should also be entitled to pursue her claims diplomatically and through international judicial institutions without being accused of violating the settlement.
There would remain substantial difficulties. Russia would almost certainly demand that Ukraine recognise her annexation claims, not merely tolerate an indefinite territorial dispute. The Kremlin has already purported to incorporate Donetsk and several other Ukrainian regions into the Russian Federation. It would be politically inconvenient for President Vladimir Putin to accept an international agreement that explicitly preserved Ukraine's sovereignty over territory Russia claimed as her own.
Yet if Russia genuinely wanted a durable peace, this distinction would have to form part of the negotiations. An agreement that required Ukraine to surrender legal sovereignty would be much more difficult to reconcile with international law, Ukrainian constitutional arrangements and the legitimate expectations of the Ukrainian people.
Ukraine's Constitution and the democratic question
There is a further problem that cannot be resolved by the personal agreement of presidents. Article 73 of the Ukrainian Constitution provides that questions concerning alterations to the territory of Ukraine are to be decided exclusively by an all-Ukrainian referendum. Article 157 also restricts constitutional amendments that would undermine Ukraine's territorial indivisibility and prohibits constitutional amendment during martial law.
These provisions create formidable difficulties for any agreement formally surrendering Ukrainian territory. Moreover, current Ukrainian legislation does not permit a national referendum while martial law remains in force. The Central Election Commission has acknowledged the practical and legal complications involved in submitting the terms of a peace agreement to the electorate.
A withdrawal arrangement that leaves sovereignty legally unchanged raises different constitutional questions from an outright territorial cession. It would nevertheless be dangerous to assume that the Ukrainian executive could evade the constitutional problem simply by describing a permanent transfer of control as temporary. The legality of any proposed instrument should be established through the appropriate Ukrainian constitutional procedures before binding commitments are undertaken.
There is also the question of democratic legitimacy. According to polling conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology between 8 and 16 October 2026, 61 per cent of respondents regarded withdrawal from the remaining Ukrainian-controlled parts of Donbas in exchange for American and European security guarantees as categorically unacceptable. Approximately 35 per cent were prepared to accept such a concession, although many regarded it as deeply painful. That survey concerned general security guarantees rather than a fully specified offer of actual NATO membership, so it cannot conclusively establish how Ukrainians would respond to the latter proposition.
Any agreement therefore needs more than the approval of the President and his negotiating advisers. It requires parliamentary scrutiny, appropriate constitutional review and, where legally required, a genuine national referendum conducted under conditions in which soldiers, displaced persons and refugees abroad can participate freely.
If the bargain were sufficiently attractive, it is conceivable that a majority of Ukrainians might eventually approve it. But it would be a grave political error to confuse public exhaustion with public consent. A peace agreement imposed through diplomatic pressure, without the opportunity for informed democratic deliberation, might produce a bitterly divided Ukraine even if it succeeded in ending the fighting.
Making NATO membership irrevocable before territorial concessions take effect
We now arrive at the central problem. If Ukraine were to contemplate relinquishing control over her remaining Donetsk territories, what guarantees could possibly ensure that the United States and other NATO members delivered their side of the bargain?
The starting principle must be straightforward: Ukraine should not withdraw from territory she presently controls in exchange for a promise that she will subsequently be admitted to NATO. The legal machinery of accession must be completed before any irreversible military withdrawal takes place.
Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of a new member requires the unanimous agreement of the existing members. Accession is not something that the President of the United States can promise on her behalf, still less something that American diplomatic negotiators can deliver through private conversations with Russian representatives. Each NATO government must agree, and the necessary national ratification procedures must be completed.
This means that Ukraine should insist upon a formal accession protocol, unanimous Allied approval and completion of the required ratifications, followed by the actual deposit of Ukraine's instrument of accession. A declaration that Ukraine will be admitted at some unspecified future date would be wholly inadequate.
It would also be necessary to clarify precisely how the North Atlantic Treaty would apply to Ukrainian territory. NATO's existing provisions were not drafted with the contemporary Ukrainian situation in mind. The Alliance would therefore need an authoritative and legally robust arrangement addressing the status of the territories under Russian occupation and defining the circumstances in which Article 5 obligations would arise.
For example, an accession arrangement might provide that NATO's collective defence commitments would operate immediately in respect of a clearly defined Ukrainian-controlled area, without requiring NATO members to undertake the military liberation of territories already occupied by Russia. Such a construction would need to be carefully reconciled with Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty and approved by the Allies through an appropriate legal instrument. It must not create a zone of ambiguity in which Russian forces could undertake offensive operations while NATO governments debated whether their obligations applied.
The practical difficulty is that Russia may regard Ukraine's accession before withdrawal as unacceptable, while Ukraine would be unwise to withdraw before accession. This is a genuine negotiating impasse, not a problem that can be eliminated through clever drafting. A workable settlement would probably require an initial ceasefire along the existing contact line, followed by the completion of NATO accession procedures and only then a carefully monitored, conditional alteration of military positions.
Even after accession, no legal document can make membership literally irrevocable. Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty permits withdrawal upon the prescribed notice, while the credibility of collective defence always depends in part upon political will. The objective must therefore be to make the commitments legally effective, militarily credible and politically expensive to abandon, rather than pretending that any international arrangement can eliminate all future uncertainty.
The necessity of military guarantees on the ground
NATO membership, although indispensable to this hypothetical bargain, would not be sufficient by itself. The Alliance would also have to demonstrate that it intended to defend Ukraine in practice.
The most credible expression of that intention would be a permanent or long-term multinational military presence within the territories remaining under Ukrainian administration. Such a deployment could include air defence units, logistics formations, training establishments, intelligence facilities and other defensive capabilities contributed by a number of NATO governments. Its purpose would not be to prepare offensive operations against Russia but to establish beyond reasonable doubt that a renewed Russian attack would immediately engage the security interests of several NATO members.
The distinction between a guarantee on paper and a credible military deterrent is crucial. Russia might calculate that Western governments would hesitate to intervene on Ukraine's behalf despite their formal obligations. She would face a much more difficult calculation if her military operations threatened American, British, French, Polish and other Allied personnel already deployed in Ukraine.
Ukraine should simultaneously retain a large and well-equipped national army. No agreement should restrict her armed forces to an arbitrary numerical ceiling, prohibit the development of defensive drone and missile technology or subject Ukrainian military procurement to Russian approval. Russia's previous insistence upon Ukrainian demilitarisation is fundamentally incompatible with the idea of a sovereign Ukraine capable of defending herself.
The United States and European governments would also have to underwrite the costs of establishing new defensive infrastructure behind any revised line of military control. Surrendering the existing fortress belt would leave Ukraine facing an expensive and potentially vulnerable process of constructing alternative defensive positions. These positions would need to be prepared before any withdrawal, not improvised after Russian troops had occupied the cities being relinquished.
A further requirement would be the establishment of reliable ceasefire monitoring arrangements. Satellite observation, independently verified reporting, agreed inspection procedures and an international monitoring mission could help identify violations and establish responsibility. Yet monitoring must not be confused with enforcement. International observers may witness aggression without possessing either the authority or the means to stop it. Their presence would be valuable only as one element of a wider military and diplomatic system capable of responding to violations.
The sequence of obligations
Much of the fate of any peace settlement would depend upon the order in which its provisions took effect. International agreements frequently fail not because their terms are necessarily unreasonable, but because one party performs an irreversible obligation before the other party has fulfilled its corresponding commitments.
In Ukraine's case, the sequencing would have to be exceptionally stringent.
An immediate, verifiable ceasefire along the existing line of contact should precede negotiations concerning any territorial withdrawal. During this initial period, Russia should be required to suspend offensive military operations and attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, while Ukraine should receive continued defensive military assistance. Neither country should be permitted to use the ceasefire as an opportunity for renewed offensive preparations inconsistent with the agreement.
The NATO accession process should then proceed in parallel with Ukrainian parliamentary and constitutional procedures. The arrangement should be subject to defined deadlines, but those deadlines must not automatically penalise Ukraine for delays caused by the domestic ratification processes of other NATO members.
Only when NATO membership had become legally effective, the agreed defence arrangements were operational and the necessary Ukrainian authorisations had been obtained should any staged withdrawal from designated areas be contemplated. Each stage would have to be accompanied by independent verification of Russian compliance, protection for civilians and the establishment of the agreed defensive arrangements.
There should be no unilateral Ukrainian withdrawal based upon an anticipated future diplomatic outcome. The principle of reciprocal performance must govern the agreement from beginning to end.
Even then, the military withdrawal itself would be exceptionally difficult to reverse. An agreement could provide that material Russian violations would suspend Ukraine's further obligations and trigger predetermined international responses. It could not realistically guarantee the restoration of territory already transferred to Russian military control. This asymmetry is precisely why the Western benefits must be substantially delivered before Ukraine makes her most consequential concession.
Sanctions, reconstruction and the economic price of peace
The financial dimensions of the proposed agreement should be treated as integral to the security settlement rather than as charitable supplements.
Ukraine's economy has suffered enormous damage. Her energy infrastructure, housing, transport systems and industrial capacity have been subjected to repeated attacks. Millions of Ukrainians have experienced displacement, significant economic hardship or the loss of family members. A peace settlement that leaves Ukraine financially exhausted would create conditions for renewed political instability and military vulnerability.
The United States, the European Union, Britain and other supporting states should therefore negotiate a binding, multi-year reconstruction and defence-financing framework, backed by appropriated funds and enforceable institutional commitments wherever constitutionally possible. It should cover essential infrastructure, military reconstruction, displaced persons, housing and the recovery of productive industries.
The treatment of Russian assets would also require resolution. Frozen Russian sovereign assets and associated revenues could play an important role in financing reconstruction, subject to applicable law and the claims of competing creditors. The legal complexities should not be minimised, but neither should the international community abandon the principle that Russia bears responsibility for the damage caused by her aggression.
Sanctions relief should be conditional and incremental. The immediate and comprehensive lifting of sanctions in exchange for a signed peace document would surrender one of the West's principal instruments of leverage. Instead, the relaxation of sanctions should be tied to independently verifiable compliance, with predetermined consequences for renewed aggression.
These consequences might include the restoration of suspended sanctions, restrictions on Russian financial transactions, further asset freezes and accelerated military assistance to Ukraine. Where possible, the necessary domestic legal authorities should be established in advance, reducing the capacity of future governments to obstruct implementation.
Nevertheless, sanctions alone cannot substitute for effective military deterrence. There is no credible basis for believing that economic restrictions, however severe, would necessarily prevent Russia from resuming hostilities if her government concluded that military aggression remained profitable.
The rights of the people being left behind
There is a dimension of this debate that negotiators sitting in comfortable hotels in Abu Dhabi, Washington or European capitals may find comparatively easy to overlook. The inhabitants of the Ukrainian-controlled parts of Donetsk are not objects to be transferred between governments.
Any agreement must therefore include detailed and independently monitored guarantees concerning their personal security, property and civil rights. Those who wish to leave should receive safe passage, relocation assistance and compensation for abandoned or lost property. Those who remain should be protected against arbitrary detention, forced conscription, persecution for previous service to Ukraine, the confiscation of property and discrimination on grounds of language or political allegiance.
The International Committee of the Red Cross and other appropriate humanitarian organisations should receive reliable access to the transferred territories, subject to arrangements consistent with their independent mandates. Families should retain practical means of communicating across the new line of control, and the agreement should regulate pensions, citizenship documentation, education and access to essential medical care.
Prisoners of war and unlawfully detained civilians should be addressed through specific, independently verifiable obligations, rather than vague declarations of goodwill. The return of Ukrainian children unlawfully transferred or deported to Russia or Russian-controlled territory must form part of any settlement, together with arrangements for family reunification and tracing missing persons.
These provisions would be especially difficult to enforce once Russia assumed physical control of the territory. That difficulty is another argument for demanding independent access arrangements, financial conditions and continuing international scrutiny before the Ukrainian withdrawal is completed.
There should also be a mechanism for adjudicating property claims and providing compensation. Residents who refuse Russian citizenship should not thereby forfeit their homes or businesses. Ukraine should not be required to renounce responsibility for her citizens merely because she no longer exercises day-to-day administration over the places in which they live.
The moral credibility of the settlement would depend substantially upon whether these obligations were actually implemented. A peace agreement that secured NATO membership for the inhabitants of Kyiv and Lviv while abandoning the inhabitants of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk to persecution would represent an unacceptable division of national responsibility.
Can Russia be trusted to honour such an agreement?
The most obvious objection is that Russia has repeatedly violated international commitments concerning Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the subsequent arrangements following the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014 and the broader principles of the United Nations Charter have not prevented Moscow from attempting to change Ukraine's borders by force.
It would therefore be reckless to assume that Russia would observe a new agreement merely because she had signed one.
However, international diplomacy does not require the parties to trust one another in a sentimental sense. It requires them to establish arrangements under which the costs of violating an agreement exceed the expected benefits. Indeed, some of the most durable security arrangements in modern history have been constructed between governments possessing profound mutual distrust.
The critical question is whether Russia could be persuaded that Ukraine's permanent incorporation into NATO, accompanied by a defensible military boundary and the possibility of limited economic normalisation, would be preferable to continuing an expensive war of uncertain duration.
There are reasons to doubt that Moscow would reach such a conclusion. Russia's declared objectives have extended well beyond the acquisition of Donetsk. Her demands have concerned Ukrainian neutrality, the limitation of Western military influence and the broader architecture of European security. Russian statements have suggested that even NATO-style guarantees falling short of actual membership remain objectionable to the Kremlin.
This exposes a paradox at the centre of the American suggestion. If Putin's principal objective is to prevent Ukrainian membership of NATO, why would he accept precisely that outcome in exchange for territory that Russia already claims and still hopes to conquer?
One possible answer is that Moscow's public declarations conceal a more pragmatic calculation. Russia may eventually value the achievement of territorial objectives more highly than preventing a Western security guarantee for the remainder of Ukraine. Another possibility is that American negotiators are substantially overestimating Russian flexibility.
The evidence presently available does not permit a confident conclusion. What it does suggest is that Ukraine must not agree to a territorial bargain until Russia's acceptance of the entire security arrangement has been established in a legally meaningful form.
And there is a further point. Russia should not be granted a permanent veto over Ukraine's membership of NATO. If Moscow refuses all credible collective security arrangements, that refusal should not become grounds for forcing Ukraine to surrender territory while remaining strategically exposed.
The problem of American political reliability
There is another potential source of instability that may prove just as consequential as Russia's intentions. The United States is a democracy, subject to changes of administration, disagreements between Congress and the executive, and fluctuations in public attitudes towards foreign commitments.
A diplomatic undertaking made by President Donald Trump cannot automatically guarantee the policies of his successors. Nor can a presidential declaration substitute for the constitutional procedures necessary to approve binding commitments within the American legal system.
That is one of the reasons why NATO membership is qualitatively different from an American bilateral security memorandum. NATO is an established treaty organisation supported by institutional structures, military planning arrangements and multiple governments. Its commitments do not depend solely upon the personal intentions of one American president.
Nevertheless, even NATO's strength should not be romanticised. The Alliance ultimately depends upon the willingness of its members to meet their obligations. An American administration determined to reduce the United States' overseas military commitments could weaken the practical credibility of collective defence without Washington formally withdrawing from the treaty.
Ukraine should consequently insist upon a genuinely multilateral arrangement in which the European NATO powers assume substantial responsibilities of their own. Britain, France, Germany, Poland and other European countries should make specific commitments concerning military forces, defence financing and logistical support. These commitments should be designed to survive changes in American political leadership.
No single government should have the capacity, through a unilateral change of policy, to dismantle the entire security settlement.
A more attractive alternative: peace along the existing front line
Before accepting any territorial concession, Ukraine must also ask whether the same strategic objectives could be achieved at a lower price.
The most obvious alternative would be a ceasefire along the existing line of contact, without Ukrainian withdrawal from the remaining Donetsk territories. Ukraine would retain her fortress belt and the communities within it, while negotiating NATO membership or equivalent security arrangements on the basis of the territories presently under her control.
This would be a considerably more attractive outcome. It would preserve Ukraine's defensive geography, avoid the political trauma of surrendering additional settlements and reduce the humanitarian difficulties associated with a large-scale withdrawal.
Russia might refuse such a settlement, arguing that she had not achieved her territorial objectives. But that refusal would reveal something important about the underlying negotiations. If Russia insists upon acquiring Donetsk regardless of the security arrangements offered to Ukraine, the purpose of the concession is not necessarily to establish a durable peace. It may simply be to reward an unsuccessful Russian military campaign.
Ukraine should therefore seek to establish whether the additional territorial concession is actually indispensable to an agreement that Russia will accept, rather than merely convenient for American negotiators eager to announce a diplomatic success.
There is no reason why Ukraine should begin negotiations by volunteering concessions that Russia has not demonstrated she could secure through continued military action.
What would constitute an acceptable bargain?
The proposition that Ukraine might exchange the remaining Ukrainian-controlled parts of Donetsk for NATO membership is not inherently irrational. It could, in principle, constitute a defensible strategic compromise if the result were to secure Ukraine's independence, end the mass killing and place the country permanently beyond the reach of future Russian military conquest.
But the conditions would have to be extraordinary. The agreement would need to provide for genuine NATO accession, completed through all necessary legal procedures, rather than vague aspirations or guarantees merely resembling Article 5. It would have to preserve Ukraine's sovereign territorial claims, secure constitutionally valid democratic approval and prevent any irreversible Ukrainian withdrawal until the essential Western security commitments were already operative.
It would also require meaningful multinational defence arrangements, the retention of a powerful Ukrainian army, extensive financing for reconstruction and new defensive infrastructure, independently monitored Russian obligations, continuing humanitarian protections and a sanctions system designed to penalise material breaches.
All of this would have to be contained within a carefully integrated series of international instruments, supported by domestic legislation in the participating countries and mechanisms for resolving disputes. The obligations should be structured so that failure to perform one material undertaking suspends the corresponding obligations of the other parties, insofar as that remains practically possible.
Even these protections would not ensure that every element of the agreement endured indefinitely. International law has no universal enforcement mechanism capable of compelling great powers to perform all their promises. The best that can be accomplished is to distribute obligations, provide credible deterrence, make compliance verifiable and ensure that the consequences of repudiation are sufficiently serious to discourage it.
This is a much more demanding exercise than arranging the signatures of three presidents beneath an attractively worded document. It would require sophisticated legal drafting, military planning, constitutional analysis and a sustained willingness by the participating governments to confront the consequences of their commitments.
In particular, there must be no ambiguity about the difference between NATO membership and a promise of NATO-like protection. The distinction is not academic. It may determine whether Ukraine survives the next generation as a secure European country or is compelled to fight another existential war.
Peace must be more valuable than the territory surrendered
It is tempting, after years of devastating warfare, to regard almost any plausible prospect of peace as intrinsically desirable. Yet peace agreements differ enormously in their durability. Some establish the foundations of prosperity and stability. Others merely suspend hostilities while allowing the aggressor to replenish her forces and prepare for the next campaign.
Ukraine cannot afford the latter.
The country has sacrificed too much to accept another arrangement in which her security depends upon Russian goodwill and Western diplomatic enthusiasm. The surviving Ukrainian-controlled cities of Donetsk are too important strategically, politically and morally to be surrendered in exchange for promises whose implementation remains uncertain.
My conclusion is therefore conditional, but firm. Ukraine should not presently agree to surrender the remainder of Donetsk. She should be prepared to examine such a possibility only if the Western powers can demonstrate, through completed legal acts and tangible military commitments, that the concession would purchase genuine, effective and durable membership of NATO. Even then, Ukraine's democratic consent and the protection of the people affected must remain indispensable conditions.
There is a deeper lesson here about the nature of international security. Nations cannot protect their independence solely by invoking principles, however compelling those principles may be. Nor can they protect themselves solely through military resistance, however heroic their soldiers. Lasting national security requires an alignment of law, institutions, military power, economic resources and political interests sufficiently resilient to withstand the ambitions of hostile governments.
Ukraine's ultimate objective should therefore not be the preservation of every military position at any conceivable cost, nor the conclusion of a peace agreement at any conceivable price. It should be the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state whose continued independence is no longer in serious doubt.
The remaining territories of Donetsk are an exceptionally high price to pay for that outcome. If NATO membership were absolutely guaranteed, legally established, militarily credible and supported by the Ukrainian people, the bargain might ultimately be worth considering. But if the choice is between retaining the fortress belt and surrendering it in exchange for something less than genuine collective defence, the correct answer is to retain it.
A nation should never exchange something she possesses for something that another government merely promises to provide.
And there is one final consideration. Ukrainians have already learnt, through bitter experience, that the words security assurance and security guarantee are not synonymous. One can be written upon paper and subsequently disregarded. The other must be supported by institutions and military power capable of changing the calculations of an aggressor.
The American proposal, if it is serious, should therefore be treated not as an invitation to bargain away Donetsk but as an invitation to establish whether the Western world is finally prepared to assume binding responsibility for Ukraine's security.
If it is, there may be grounds for negotiating a compromise of historic significance. If it is not, there is no reason for Ukraine to pay the price.
The ultimate test of a peace settlement is not whether it ends the present war. It is whether it prevents the next one.




