The Shape of the Next Russian Revolution: A Speculative Scenario

Russian revolutions are rarely anticipated. They erupt suddenly, like an earthquake long predicted but impossible to time precisely. When they come, they seem inevitable in retrospect but unthinkable the day before. The Decembrists of 1825, the workers of 1905, the soldiers and Bolsheviks of 1917, the reformers of 1991—all caught the outside world unprepared, even though the structural weaknesses of the Russian state were visible for years. Today, as the war in Ukraine grinds into its fourth year, observers again ask whether Russia stands on the cusp of another transformative rupture. What might such a revolution look like in the 2020s?

The Structural Preconditions

A number of familiar elements already exist in today’s Russia. The state is highly centralised around a single ruler. Economic strains, aggravated by war and sanctions, gnaw at living standards despite official reassurances. War casualties accumulate and cannot be disguised forever. Most importantly, legitimacy rests upon the perception of stability and victory; should either falter, the system could unravel.

Yet revolutions in Russia have never been triggered by social discontent alone. They require fractures within the elite. In 1917, it was the military and aristocracy that abandoned the tsar. In 1991, it was Communist reformers who challenged the hardliners. For a revolution in the 2020s, the catalyst would likely be a split within Putin’s circle of siloviki (intelligence and security officials) and technocrats (those who run the economy), pitting hardliners committed to indefinite war against pragmatists seeking to preserve Russia’s financial and international position.

The Spark: Military Defeat or Elite Overreach

The decisive spark may come from the battlefield. A sudden Ukrainian breakthrough, perhaps enabled by new Western weaponry, could lead to large-scale Russian retreats, exposing the fragility of the war effort. As in 1917, military defeat abroad would corrode authority at home. Alternatively, the spark might be an overreach by hardliners—an escalation of repression or a reckless military gamble that alienates technocrats and regional elites. The failed August Coup of 1991 shows how attempted over-centralisation can backfire, encouraging defection rather than loyalty.

The Actors: A Coalition of Discontent

A future Russian revolution would likely not be driven primarily by street protests, at least in its early stages. Surveillance and repression make mass mobilisation difficult. Instead the initial actors would be elites—governors, oligarchs, intelligence officials—who sense the Kremlin’s weakness and seek to protect their own interests. Once they fracture, however, the streets would awaken. Workers angered by inflation, conscripts’ families mourning their dead, students frustrated by censorship—all could join in a spontaneous wave of protest, legitimising elite defection and creating momentum.

Exiled opposition figures might play a symbolic role, but their absence from the country makes them unlikely leaders of a new order. Instead, a figure from within the system—a regional leader, a disillusioned minister, or even a general—could emerge unexpectedly as the face of change, much as Boris Yeltsin did in 1991.

The Form: Collapse Rather than Insurrection

Unlike the Bolshevik coup of 1917, a Russian revolution in the 2020s would likely resemble 1991: a collapse rather than an insurrection. The Kremlin’s control is so personalised that if Putin’s authority crumbles, the system could dissolve rapidly, with ministries, regions and the army shifting allegiance to whoever appears strongest. Rather than a storming of the Winter Palace, the image might be a regional governor declaring autonomy, or an army commander refusing to obey orders, triggering a cascade of defections.

The Aftermath: Fragmentation or Renewal

The most uncertain question is what would follow. Russian history offers two main models. The Bolshevik Revolution produced a centralised, violent, ideological state. The Soviet collapse produced fragmentation, disorganised privatisation, and a chaotic semi-democracy. Either scenario could repeat. If hardliners prevail, Russia might descend into a harsher dictatorship, justifying repression as the defence of sovereignty. If reformists emerge, Russia might attempt another experiment with liberalisation, although the legacies of war and authoritarianism would make this fraught.

A more radical possibility is fragmentation. Russia’s size and diversity make her vulnerable to centrifugal pressures. In the 1990s, Chechnya tested the integrity of the federation. In the 2020s, regions in the Caucasus, the Far East, or Tatarstan might see an opportunity to assert independence if Moscow weakens. Such a scenario could transform not only Russia but the entire map of Eurasia.

The International Dimension

No Russian revolution occurs in isolation. In 1917, foreign powers intervened in the civil war. In 1991, the West supported reformers and welcomed new independent states. In a future Russian revolution, Ukraine would be central, for the war is both the cause of the crisis and the context in which its outcome would be judged. The United States, Europe and China would each manoeuvre to protect their interests, whether by supporting stability, reform or fragmentation. The global order would be shaken by the fate of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal passing through revolutionary turbulence.

The Unpredictability of the Inevitable

A Russian revolution in the 2020s is not preordained, but the ingredients are present: over-centralisation, war, economic strain, and brittle legitimacy. History suggests that when change comes, it will come suddenly, triggered by elite fracture and catalysed by war. It will not necessarily bring democracy or peace; it may bring dictatorship, disintegration or chaos. Yet it will remind the world once again of a truth evident since the Decembrists first marched into Senate Square: that in Russia, stability is only ever temporary, and revolutions are never as distant as they seem.