The Return of the Age of Power: Why the World Order Is Falling Apart

By Matthew Parish
Wednesday 18 November 2026
The world is experiencing more armed conflicts than at any time since 1946. Free trade is giving way to economic nationalism, international law is increasingly displaced by military and economic coercion and the institutions established after the Second World War appear incapable of restraining the great powers. What has gone wrong, and what sort of international order is emerging from the ruins?
There are moments in history when the assumptions upon which an entire international system has been constructed begin to collapse, almost simultaneously. The present appears to be one of those moments. The world has entered a period in which the principles that supposedly governed international relations for eight decades are being discarded, sometimes openly and sometimes through a gradual process of institutional decay. The consequences are already visible in the proliferation of wars, the abandonment of free trade, the reappearance of territorial ambitions and the growing conviction amongst political leaders that international relations are governed not by rules but by the capacity to inflict harm upon others.
The statistics are extraordinary. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the world experienced 65 state-based armed conflicts in 2025, the highest number recorded since systematic data collection began in 1946. Thirteen reached the intensity of wars, while the number of conflicts directly between states rose to eight. Approximately 245,000 people died in organised violence during that year. The war between Russia and Ukraine was the deadliest conflict on the planet, but it was only one manifestation of a much broader deterioration in international peace and security. From Sudan to Myanmar, from the Middle East to the eastern borders of Europe, political disputes are increasingly being settled by organised violence rather than diplomatic accommodation.
Meanwhile the economic architecture that was supposed to make such conflicts progressively less likely is coming under immense strain. The World Trade Organization reported in November 2026 that the accumulated stock of import-related restrictive and other non-facilitating trade measures introduced since 2009 covered approximately 21 per cent of global imports by the middle of the year. Governments are erecting tariffs, subsidising domestic industries, restricting exports of strategic technologies and treating international commercial relationships as instruments of national security. Although global trade continues to expand, the principle that international commerce should be governed by generally applicable rules rather than political favour is being progressively undermined.
These developments are not separate phenomena. They are manifestations of the same historical transformation: the decline of a system in which states were expected to restrain their immediate ambitions in exchange for the long-term advantages of predictable international cooperation. We are witnessing the return of an older conception of international politics in which sovereignty means freedom of action, economic relationships are subordinate to strategic calculations and international law is respected principally when it coincides with national interests.
To understand how this has happened, we must revisit the circumstances in which the previous international order was created.
The great settlement of 1945
The architects of the postwar international system were men who had witnessed the catastrophic consequences of unrestrained nationalism. Two world wars had demonstrated that industrial civilisation possessed the capacity to destroy itself. The international economic collapse of the 1930s had shown how protectionism, competitive currency policies and the disruption of international commerce could aggravate political extremism. The lesson drawn from these disasters was that peace could not rest indefinitely upon military balances alone. It required institutions that would make cooperation more profitable than confrontation.
The United Nations was intended to establish principles governing sovereignty, collective security and the prohibition of aggressive war. The Bretton Woods institutions sought to prevent the financial instability that had contributed to the Great Depression. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, eventually succeeded by the World Trade Organization, was designed to reduce commercial discrimination and encourage the progressive liberalisation of international markets. These institutions reflected the conviction that the arbitrary exercise of state power could be restrained through rules, procedures and mutual commitments.
The settlement was never entirely successful. The Cold War divided the world into antagonistic military blocs, while colonial wars, proxy conflicts and interventions by the superpowers frequently contradicted the principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter. The Soviet Union imposed its authority upon Eastern Europe through force, while the United States sometimes intervened in foreign countries in ways difficult to reconcile with its professed commitment to sovereign equality. International law was always applied imperfectly, and the great powers enjoyed privileges denied to smaller states.
Nevertheless something genuinely new had been created. The major Western economies increasingly accepted that their prosperity depended upon stable commercial relationships governed by common understandings. The United States, in particular, undertook to provide military security, monetary stability and access to its enormous domestic market in exchange for political cooperation. It was an arrangement involving substantial American advantages, but it also supplied international public goods from which many other societies benefited.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 appeared to confirm the superiority of this model. Liberal democracy, market economics and economic globalisation seemed to offer a universal formula for prosperity. European states reduced their armies, manufacturing moved across continents and the expansion of international institutions was regarded as a natural consequence of progress. There was a widespread assumption that countries becoming economically interdependent would gradually lose their appetite for territorial conquest.
This was the great intellectual complacency of the post-Cold War era. Economic interdependence can make warfare expensive, but it does not necessarily make warfare impossible. National pride, ideological ambition, historical grievance and the desire for domination do not disappear because international trade raises living standards. Indeed, economic prosperity may provide authoritarian governments with the resources necessary to pursue increasingly ambitious military objectives.
The paradox of globalisation
One of the central contradictions of the contemporary international order is that globalisation has succeeded economically while producing political consequences that threaten its own survival. International commerce has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, transformed technologically backward societies into industrial powers and created levels of material abundance previously unimaginable. Yet the distribution of the gains has been profoundly unequal, both between countries and within them.
China provides the most important illustration. Its integration into the global trading system, culminating in accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, accelerated one of the greatest economic transformations in human history. Western businesses obtained access to inexpensive manufacturing, consumers benefited from cheaper products and China accumulated wealth and industrial expertise on an extraordinary scale. The assumption in many Western capitals was that economic liberalisation would eventually encourage political liberalisation, or at least moderate Chinese strategic ambitions.
That assumption proved mistaken. China became economically integrated without adopting the Western understanding of liberal political government. Its leadership combined participation in international markets with authoritarian political control, extensive industrial planning and increasingly sophisticated military capabilities. Economic globalisation had facilitated the emergence of a strategic competitor capable of challenging the country that had done most to establish the global trading system.
The United States therefore confronted an uncomfortable paradox. The institutions through which it had exercised international leadership were facilitating the rise of a rival that did not necessarily share its political values or strategic interests. What had once appeared an instrument of American influence increasingly seemed a constraint upon American freedom of action. The resulting transformation of American commercial policy, across successive administrations, was not merely a temporary enthusiasm for tariffs. It represented a fundamental reconsideration of the relationship between economic openness and national power.
Donald Trump has accelerated this transformation, but he did not invent its underlying causes. American scepticism towards globalisation preceded his political rise and reflected genuine anxieties about industrial decline, the erosion of manufacturing communities, technological dependence and the perceived failure of international institutions to secure reciprocal treatment. His political achievement was to transform these concerns into a broader ideological assault upon the assumption that international economic cooperation is necessarily advantageous.
The problem is that protectionism seldom restores the world that its advocates imagine has been lost. Modern manufacturing depends upon intricate international supply chains, specialised technologies and the ability to purchase components wherever they can be produced most efficiently. Tariffs raise costs as well as protect selected industries. Economic nationalism may strengthen particular strategic capabilities while impoverishing consumers and creating new opportunities for political favouritism.
Nevertheless the political attraction of economic sovereignty is powerful. A government that can promise control over factories, energy supplies, strategic minerals and technological infrastructure offers something more emotionally compelling than the abstract efficiencies of comparative advantage. The economist may explain that international trade creates aggregate prosperity. The politician promises that the nation will no longer depend upon foreigners for the essentials of its existence.
The distinction matters because international trade itself has not collapsed. The WTO estimated in October 2026 that world merchandise trade volumes would grow by 3.9 per cent during the year, while approximately 72 per cent of global merchandise trade continued to take place under its most-favoured-nation tariff framework. What is deteriorating is not necessarily the volume of commercial exchange but the political consensus supporting open and predictable markets. Goods will continue crossing borders, but increasingly along routes shaped by security alliances, political pressure and government intervention.
We are moving not towards the end of globalisation but towards its politicisation.
The erosion of international legitimacy
A second explanation for the breakdown of the international order lies in the gradual loss of legitimacy suffered by the institutions that were supposed to uphold it. International rules work best when the governments subject to them believe that the rules are reasonably impartial and that violations will attract meaningful consequences. When powerful states can disregard their obligations without effective sanction, weaker states eventually conclude that the system is founded upon hypocrisy.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 inflicted substantial damage upon the moral authority of American international leadership. Whatever the arguments advanced concerning Iraqi weapons programmes or the character of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, the decision to launch a war without a fresh express authorisation from the United Nations Security Council was widely perceived as evidence that the United States reserved for itself freedoms it denied to others. The subsequent disorder in Iraq, together with the failures of the intervention in Afghanistan and the destructive aftermath of the intervention in Libya, weakened confidence in the proposition that Western military power would reliably produce political stability.
This history does not excuse Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The deliberate conquest and annexation of another country's territory is a particularly direct assault upon the prohibition of aggressive war. Nor does the existence of Western misconduct render all violations of international law morally or legally equivalent. Nevertheless the perception of inconsistent standards has proved enormously useful to authoritarian governments seeking to discredit the international legal order.
Russia has exploited these contradictions relentlessly. Her rulers present international law as an instrument of Western power rather than a set of genuinely universal obligations. In Russian political rhetoric, the sovereignty of smaller countries is conditional upon their geopolitical location and their willingness to accommodate Moscow's strategic preferences. Such arguments attempt to replace the principle of sovereign equality with the older doctrine that great powers are entitled to control neighbouring territories.
The difficulty is that international institutions were never provided with independent means of enforcement adequate to restrain the strongest states. The United Nations Security Council embodies this contradiction in its very structure. The permanent members enjoy veto powers intended to secure their participation in the international system, but those same powers can prevent collective action against their own misconduct or that of their allies. The organisation created to prevent aggressive war may therefore be institutionally paralysed precisely when its intervention is most necessary.
International commercial law faces a related difficulty. The appellate mechanism of the World Trade Organization has been unable to function normally since December 2019 because new members have not been appointed. Although alternative procedures continue to operate between participating states, the weakening of universal dispute settlement illustrates the vulnerability of international institutions when major governments withdraw the political consent necessary for their effectiveness.
These examples point towards a disturbing conclusion. International law has never existed independently of political power, but it has historically been capable of moderating that power when influential states considered legal predictability to be in their interests. As that calculation changes, the legal architecture remains standing while its foundations are gradually hollowed out.
The return of authoritarian power
There is also an internal political dimension to the international crisis. Liberal democracy is retreating in many parts of the world, and authoritarian forms of government have recovered an intellectual confidence that appeared to have vanished after the Cold War. The V-Dem Institute's 2026 research identified 44 countries undergoing processes of autocratisation, encompassing approximately 41 per cent of the world's population. The political optimism that followed the collapse of European communism has given way to a much darker understanding of humanity's constitutional future.
Authoritarian government has certain characteristics that make international confrontation politically attractive. Leaders facing limited domestic scrutiny can engage in ambitious foreign adventures without the same immediate electoral accountability imposed upon democratic governments. External enemies provide opportunities to mobilise nationalist sentiment, justify repression and conceal economic mismanagement. Military success can become a substitute for political legitimacy.
This is not to suggest that democracies are invariably peaceful or that dictatorships inevitably seek war. History supplies abundant examples disproving both propositions. The deeper difficulty is that concentrated political authority can reduce the institutional obstacles to catastrophic miscalculation. A leader surrounded by subordinates afraid to contradict him may acquire an increasingly distorted understanding of his country's strength, his adversaries' determination and the likely consequences of military action.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provides a striking illustration. The Kremlin appears to have anticipated a relatively rapid military victory and the collapse of effective Ukrainian resistance. Instead it encountered a society determined to defend its independence, a military capable of rapid adaptation and a war that has consumed immense quantities of Russian manpower and material. The original calculation reflected not merely strategic ambition but a profound misunderstanding of the country Russia intended to conquer.
The increasing concentration of political authority also weakens the international habit of compromise. Democratic political systems generally require a continuous process of negotiation between competing interests, even when their leaders adopt aggressive foreign policies. Personalist authoritarian systems are more liable to identify compromise with weakness and political humiliation. Where the prestige of the ruler becomes inseparable from the reputation of the state, a diplomatic concession may become psychologically more difficult than an expensive military confrontation.
The result is an international environment in which political disputes can escalate rapidly because leaders have attached their personal legitimacy to outcomes they cannot easily deliver.
Technology and the democratisation of destruction
Another profound transformation has received insufficient attention. The technologies of warfare have changed in ways that make violence more accessible to states, militias, insurgent movements and other organised groups. Military capabilities once reserved for wealthy industrial powers are increasingly available to much smaller actors.
Unmanned aerial vehicles, inexpensive precision guidance, commercially available satellite imagery, encrypted communications and sophisticated software have altered the economics of armed conflict. Small organisations can sometimes threaten infrastructure, maritime commerce and military formations that would previously have required substantial conventional forces to attack. The distinction between civilian technological innovation and military capability is becoming increasingly blurred.
Ukraine has become one of the principal laboratories of this transformation. The rapid evolution of drone warfare, electronic countermeasures, battlefield communications and decentralised military innovation has demonstrated how an economically weaker country can exploit technology to resist a substantially larger aggressor. At the same time, Russia has adapted its own methods of warfare, employing mass-produced drones, missiles and electronic systems to impose enormous costs upon Ukrainian society.
Technology does not abolish the fundamental importance of industrial capacity, manpower or strategic geography. It changes the means through which they are employed. The ability to manufacture large numbers of inexpensive weapons, deploy them rapidly and continually adapt their software may increasingly matter as much as the possession of smaller numbers of technologically exquisite conventional platforms.
Artificial intelligence may intensify these changes. Automated intelligence analysis, machine-assisted targeting, autonomous navigation and rapidly accelerating technological research are likely to transform military organisation. They may also shorten decision-making cycles, create new opportunities for error and encourage governments to fear that technological hesitation will leave them permanently vulnerable to their adversaries.
The consequences for international stability are ambiguous. More accessible military technology may allow weaker societies to defend themselves against conquest, thereby strengthening deterrence. Equally it may permit militant organisations and revisionist governments to initiate conflicts at costs they would previously have considered prohibitive.
What seems increasingly clear is that the monopoly over sophisticated violence once enjoyed by the greatest military powers is eroding. This complicates the maintenance of any international order founded principally upon their ability to impose discipline.
The disappearance of American certainty
At the centre of the contemporary transformation lies the changing role of the United States. For much of the period following 1945, American military and economic power supplied the ultimate security guarantee behind the Western international system. Its allies could pursue prosperity under an American strategic umbrella, while its adversaries understood that certain forms of aggression might provoke an overwhelming response.
This arrangement was expensive, imperfect and frequently resented, including within the United States itself. Nevertheless it reduced uncertainty. European governments could maintain comparatively modest armed forces because American protection was treated as a durable commitment. International commerce benefited from American support for maritime security and financial stability. Even countries hostile to Washington often profited indirectly from an international system whose principal guarantor was prepared to bear substantial costs.
That assumption is now much less secure. The relative economic weight of the United States has declined as other societies have become wealthier, while American domestic politics has become increasingly sceptical of the obligations associated with international leadership. The United States remains an extraordinarily powerful country, but its willingness to subordinate immediate national preferences to the maintenance of international institutions has diminished.
This creates a strategic vacuum. European governments are discovering that security cannot indefinitely be purchased through diplomatic declarations while essential military capabilities remain inadequate. Asian states must calculate the reliability of American commitments against China's growing regional power. Middle-ranking countries increasingly seek diversified relationships rather than exclusive allegiance to one political bloc.
The challenge is not simply that American power is declining in relative terms. It is that American intentions have become less predictable. Military deterrence depends upon an adversary's confidence that certain actions will provoke a response. If allies and opponents alike are uncertain about the circumstances in which Washington will employ its considerable resources, the risk of miscalculation increases.
There is a further paradox here. The international system may become less favourable to American interests precisely because the United States is attempting to free itself from the constraints of international cooperation. Rules that limit the discretion of a dominant power can also make other countries more willing to cooperate with it. A hegemon that insists upon unlimited freedom of action may discover that its allies begin searching for protection against the hegemon itself.
The rise of the transactional world
What, then, is replacing the international order constructed after 1945?
The most plausible answer is not a return to a simple division between two ideological blocs, as existed during the Cold War. The contemporary distribution of power is too complicated for that. China and the United States are strategic competitors but remain commercially entangled. Russia and China cooperate against Western influence while retaining differing long-term interests. India maintains relationships with competing powers, while Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia and several Gulf states pursue foreign policies designed to maximise their own strategic independence.
The emerging system is better understood as transactional multipolarity. States are increasingly inclined to form arrangements around particular interests rather than permanent commitments to universal principles. A government may cooperate with one country on energy, another on military technology and a third on investment, without accepting any broader political alignment.
Such arrangements offer flexibility, but they also diminish predictability. Alliances become more conditional, diplomatic commitments more ambiguous and international negotiations more explicitly dependent upon relative bargaining power. Economic sanctions, access to technology, financial infrastructure and control over strategic raw materials become instruments through which political concessions can be extracted.
The vocabulary of international politics is accordingly changing. We hear less about collective security and more about strategic autonomy. Free trade gives way to economic resilience. Multilateral cooperation is supplemented by coalitions of willing states. Global supply chains are reorganised according to political risk, while industrial policy becomes inseparable from national defence.
This transformation will not affect all countries equally. Great powers possess the military, financial and technological capabilities to negotiate favourable arrangements. Smaller countries may find themselves exposed to coercion unless they can secure credible alliances or develop sufficient defensive capacity to make aggression prohibitively expensive.
For states possessing valuable natural resources, strategic geographical positions or specialised technologies, transactional multipolarity may create opportunities to bargain between competing powers. For countries lacking such advantages, it may produce a much harsher environment than the imperfect but comparatively predictable system of multilateral rules.
The danger is the emergence of a hierarchy in which formal sovereignty survives but substantive independence becomes increasingly conditional upon the preferences of stronger neighbours.
Three possible futures
The present upheaval does not necessarily lead to a single predetermined outcome. History rarely moves in straight lines, and international systems often evolve through periods of prolonged experimentation before a durable settlement emerges.
One possibility is the consolidation of rival spheres of influence. The United States, China and perhaps other major powers might increasingly attempt to establish privileged strategic domains in which neighbouring states are expected to accommodate their security and economic preferences. International rules would remain formally in existence but would be subordinate to informal understandings between powerful governments. Such a system might produce temporary stability where spheres of influence were mutually recognised, but it would do so at the expense of smaller nations and would carry immense risks wherever rival claims overlapped.
A second possibility is prolonged disorder without a stable replacement. Great powers might remain too competitive to cooperate but insufficiently dominant to impose a coherent new settlement. Regional conflicts would continue to proliferate, international institutions would struggle to resolve them and commercial relationships would become increasingly vulnerable to political intervention. This would resemble certain periods of nineteenth-century great-power rivalry, but with the added dangers of nuclear weapons, cyberwarfare, global financial interdependence and rapidly developing autonomous military technologies.
A third possibility, more hopeful but by no means guaranteed, is the gradual construction of a revised international order. The failures of existing institutions might eventually persuade governments that some degree of mutual restraint remains indispensable. International trade could be reorganised around updated rules addressing strategic subsidies, technological competition and security vulnerabilities. Regional organisations might develop stronger enforcement mechanisms, while middle-ranking powers could cooperate to prevent the international system from becoming entirely subordinate to the ambitions of its largest members.
Such a reconstruction would require political imagination and a willingness to acknowledge the failures of the previous system. It could not simply reproduce the assumptions of the 1990s. Economic integration would have to be reconciled with legitimate concerns about national security, industrial resilience and unequal economic outcomes. International legal institutions would need credible mechanisms for implementation, while powerful states would have to accept that restraint upon their own conduct is the necessary price of a stable international environment.
There is no guarantee that governments will reach these conclusions before further catastrophes occur. The settlement established after the Second World War was made possible in considerable part because the preceding international disorder had produced devastation on an unimaginable scale. The disturbing historical question is whether humanity can reconstruct international cooperation without first experiencing another disaster of comparable magnitude.
Ukraine and the future of sovereignty
For Ukraine, these questions are not abstract. They concern the immediate survival of the state and the future of European civilisation. Russia's war is a direct challenge to one of the most important principles established after 1945: that internationally recognised borders cannot lawfully be changed by aggressive military conquest.
Should Russia achieve substantial political or territorial rewards through its use of force, the consequences would extend far beyond Eastern Europe. Governments elsewhere would be encouraged to reconsider the balance between the opportunities offered by military aggression and the risks imposed by international opposition. Countries threatened by stronger neighbours would have additional reasons to doubt the protection afforded by legal principles alone.
Conversely, if Ukraine succeeds in preserving its independence and imposing costs sufficient to deter further Russian expansion, it will have demonstrated that military power does not automatically translate into political authority. The determination of a smaller society to defend its sovereignty, reinforced by international assistance and technological ingenuity, can impose substantial limitations upon the ambitions of a larger state.
This is why Ukraine's struggle is so consequential for the emerging world order. It is not simply a dispute over particular territories or the strategic orientation of one European country. It is a test of whether sovereignty remains a meaningful legal and political principle when confronted by a powerful neighbour determined to deny it.
There is, however, a lesson that Ukraine and its supporters must draw from the deterioration of the international system. Legal principles cannot protect themselves. They require the support of institutions, economic resources, credible military capabilities and governments willing to accept the costs of enforcing them. The postwar order became vulnerable partly because its beneficiaries gradually confused the existence of rules with the existence of the power necessary to sustain them.
Europe must therefore rediscover the relationship between military preparedness and political liberty. The defence of international law cannot be entrusted exclusively to diplomatic declarations or judicial decisions. Nor can European security depend indefinitely upon assumptions about American policy that are no longer entirely reliable.
A continent wishing to preserve the principle that might does not make right must possess sufficient might to ensure that violations of right carry consequences.
The end of innocence
The deepest significance of the present historical transformation may be philosophical rather than military or economic. For several generations, much of the developed world lived under the impression that history possessed a broadly progressive direction. International commerce would encourage prosperity, prosperity would stimulate liberalisation, liberalisation would strengthen international institutions and those institutions would gradually reduce the likelihood of war.
The experience of the twenty-first century has undermined almost every element of that comforting narrative. Wealth has enabled authoritarian rearmament as well as democratic prosperity. Technology has facilitated repression and destruction alongside extraordinary improvements in human welfare. International institutions have proved vulnerable to the refusal of powerful states to cooperate, while economic interdependence has become an instrument of coercion as well as mutual benefit.
Yet the collapse of historical optimism need not require the abandonment of international principles. The fact that rules cannot enforce themselves does not mean that they are worthless. It means that their preservation requires continuous political effort, institutional renewal and an accurate appreciation of the capacity of human beings to pursue destructive ambitions.
The greatest error would be to imagine that the emerging world is governed by entirely new laws of politics. In reality many of its characteristics are ancient. The pursuit of territorial advantage, the rivalry of empires, the temptation to exploit weaker neighbours and the subordination of moral principles to immediate political interests have accompanied organised human societies for millennia.
What was historically unusual was the extent to which the international system constructed after 1945 succeeded in moderating these impulses. It did so imperfectly and selectively, but sufficiently effectively to permit unprecedented economic development and comparatively durable peace between many of the world's major powers.
We may now be discovering that this achievement was more fragile than its beneficiaries understood.
The world is not inevitably returning to the 1930s, nor is a third world war unavoidable. Economic integration remains extensive, most governments retain powerful incentives to avoid catastrophic conflict and the institutional foundations of international cooperation have not disappeared. But the direction of travel is unmistakably troubling. Military expenditure is rising, political restraints are weakening and governments increasingly regard power as the ultimate guarantee of their interests.
The decisive question is whether humanity can develop a new equilibrium in which power once again supports rules rather than replaces them. Such an achievement would require the strongest states to recognise that durable security cannot be obtained simply by maximising their freedom to coerce others. It would also require smaller states to cooperate more effectively in defending the principles upon which their independence depends.
For those living in Ukraine, the distinction between a rules-based and a power-based international order is already painfully familiar. It is the distinction between a country entitled to determine its own destiny and a country whose future is to be negotiated by foreign governments according to the relative strength of their armies.
The history of the coming decades may turn upon whether the rest of the world learns that distinction before it is forced to experience it.
The tragedy of the present age is not that humanity has forgotten how to construct an international order. We know perfectly well how to do so, because we inherited one built by people who had survived the greatest catastrophe in modern history. The tragedy is that we are forgetting why they considered such an order necessary, and why they were prepared to sacrifice so much to sustain it.
International civilisation is not the natural condition of mankind. It is an achievement, and like all human achievements it can be destroyed. Whether we are witnessing its temporary retreat or its definitive unravelling will depend upon whether the world's governments rediscover the value of restraint before the consequences of abandoning it become irreversible.




