Richard Nixon: The Good That Survived the Disgrace

By Matthew Parish
Wednesday 18 November 2026
The tragedy of Richard Nixon was not that he was an incompetent or wicked man who somehow found his way into the White House. It was that a man of extraordinary intelligence, considerable achievements and genuine public service destroyed his own Presidency through the very weaknesses of character that had accompanied him throughout his remarkable life. Yet the story of Nixon neither began nor ended with Watergate, and history owes him a more generous assessment than the caricature of a disgraced President.
In March 1994, an elderly American statesman arrived in Kyiv. He was 81 years old, he had been out of public office for almost twenty years and he was suffering from the accumulated physical and emotional exhaustion of an exceptionally turbulent life. He came to meet Ukraine's first President, Leonid Kravchuk, to understand the political and economic difficulties of the newly independent republic and to consider what the United States might do to help it. His name was Richard Milhous Nixon, and within six weeks he would be dead. It was one of the final acts of public service undertaken by a man whose reputation had been destroyed by his own catastrophic errors, but whose intellectual curiosity and devotion to international affairs had never deserted him.
To understand Nixon properly, one must first appreciate how far he had travelled. Born in California in 1913 into a modest Quaker family, he possessed neither inherited wealth nor the social connections that made political advancement comparatively straightforward for some of his contemporaries. His childhood was marked by financial insecurity and the deaths of two of his brothers. He worked in the family grocery business, studied with extraordinary diligence at Whittier College and won a scholarship to Duke University Law School. Throughout his life he retained the habits of a man who had been required to struggle for everything he achieved. He was industrious, intellectually serious, suspicious of privilege and possessed of an almost painful determination to prove himself worthy of admission to the highest circles of American society.
He was also, from an early age, a man of profound insecurity. There was something awkward about Nixon, something insufficiently polished for the increasingly theatrical world of American politics. He did not possess John F. Kennedy's easy charm, Franklin Roosevelt's patrician confidence or Ronald Reagan's reassuring warmth. He had to work at being liked, and the effort frequently showed. Yet behind the perspiring forehead and uncomfortable smile was a formidable intelligence, an exceptional memory and a capacity for mastering complicated political and international questions that many of his more attractive contemporaries could scarcely equal.
During the Second World War, Nixon served as a United States naval officer in the Pacific, undertaking aviation logistics duties in forward areas. His service was neither glamorous nor distinguished by some spectacular act of battlefield heroism, but it was honourable and useful. Like millions of other young Americans, he performed the unromantic administrative work without which armies cannot fight and wars cannot be won. When he returned home, he had acquired an understanding of the seriousness of public duty, the importance of organisation and the immense responsibilities that the United States had assumed in the world.
Elected to Congress in 1946, Nixon entered American politics at a moment when the future of Europe was in considerable doubt. The continent was devastated, its economies exhausted and communist parties were threatening to take advantage of the political dislocation produced by the war. In 1947, as a young congressman, Nixon travelled to Europe as part of a congressional committee examining the need for American economic assistance. He returned convinced that the United States had a moral and strategic obligation to help rebuild the continent. Although he represented constituents amongst whom foreign assistance was deeply unpopular, he supported the Marshall Plan. It was an early example of a quality that would repeatedly emerge in his public life: an ability to recognise the importance of international stability and to act upon that recognition even where the immediate domestic political advantages were uncertain.
This achievement deserves particular emphasis. The Marshall Plan was not merely an instrument of Cold War competition, although it was certainly that. It helped restore the material foundations of European civilisation after an almost unimaginable catastrophe. Its beneficiaries included families requiring food, workers needing employment, factories requiring machinery and democratic governments struggling to survive. Nixon understood that the prosperity and security of the United States could not sensibly be separated from the prosperity and security of its allies. It was a lesson that would inform his later diplomacy with both China and the Soviet Union, although his understanding of the limitations of American power would become considerably more sophisticated.
Nixon's early political career was not without its darker aspects. His investigation of Alger Hiss brought him national prominence, and his fierce anticommunism sometimes encouraged the exaggerations and personal attacks characteristic of that unfortunate period in American public life. Nevertheless, the Soviet espionage threat was real, and it would be unreasonable to dismiss everyone who sought to investigate it as an opportunist or a fanatic. Nixon was a young politician operating within an atmosphere of considerable anxiety, and he undoubtedly contributed to some of its excesses. His reputation as a ruthless political combatant was not invented by his enemies, but neither did it encompass the entirety of his character.
As Vice-President under Dwight Eisenhower between 1953 and 1961, Nixon demonstrated abilities that were particularly valuable to the administration of a great power. He travelled widely, acquired a detailed familiarity with foreign governments and assumed substantial responsibilities during periods when Eisenhower's health gave cause for concern. In Venezuela in 1958, his motorcade came under violent attack, and his composure under genuine physical danger attracted considerable admiration. In Moscow the following year, he famously confronted Nikita Khrushchev in what became known as the Kitchen Debate, arguing that the ordinary comforts and freedoms of American life represented achievements that Soviet communism had failed to reproduce.
There was also a less frequently remembered side to Nixon's vice-presidential years. He chaired a federal committee concerned with discrimination in government contracting and developed working relationships with prominent civil rights leaders, including Martin Luther King. He actively supported the Civil Rights Act of 1957, an imperfect but significant legislative step towards dismantling the institutional racism that continued to disfigure the United States. Nixon was no revolutionary on racial questions, and his subsequent record would be inconsistent, but he was capable of recognising injustice and of supporting practical measures to remedy it. His political conservatism did not automatically exclude sympathy for those whose opportunities had been restricted by circumstances beyond their control.
His defeat by Kennedy in the presidential election of 1960 was extraordinarily narrow, and the subsequent failure of his campaign for Governor of California in 1962 appeared to mark the end of his public career. He retreated into legal practice, endured the indignities of political rejection and watched other men occupy the positions for which he believed himself exceptionally well qualified. Yet Nixon possessed the remarkable resilience sometimes found in people who have experienced hardship early in life. He reorganised himself, rebuilt his political connections and emerged in 1968 as the Republican candidate most capable of uniting a deeply divided country. His election to the Presidency represented one of the most impressive political recoveries in modern American history.
The United States that Nixon inherited in January 1969 was in profound difficulty. The Vietnam War was consuming American lives and resources, racial conflict had shaken the country's cities, political violence had claimed Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy and confidence in public institutions had been badly damaged. Nixon was elected in part because he promised competence, stability and a restoration of national purpose. Although the Vietnam War would prove a terrible moral and political burden upon his administration, his domestic achievements were more substantial and progressive than the conventional image of his Presidency might suggest.
Consider, first, the environment. Under Nixon, the United States established the Environmental Protection Agency, enacted the landmark Clean Air Act amendments of 1970 and adopted important measures protecting endangered species, marine mammals and the quality of the natural environment. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration was established during his Presidency, as was a modern federal framework for occupational health and safety. Nixon's environmental convictions were not always profound or consistent, and he sometimes resisted the costs of implementing the legislation he had supported. Nevertheless, he understood that industrial prosperity could not justify unlimited pollution and that government had legitimate responsibilities towards the natural world.
These measures changed the everyday lives of millions of Americans. They helped reduce dangerous industrial emissions, improved the protection of public health and established enduring institutions through which scientific expertise could influence public policy. Their significance is not diminished by the fact that Congress, environmental campaigners and changing public opinion supplied much of the impetus. Successful government consists partly in recognising the direction in which society must move and creating institutions capable of giving that movement practical effect. By that standard, Nixon's environmental Presidency deserves considerable credit.
His administration also presided over substantial advances in social policy. Nixon signed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibited sex discrimination in federally funded educational programmes and became a foundation of women's equality in American education. He signed the National Cancer Act of 1971, strengthening the national effort to understand and treat one of humanity's most destructive diseases. Food assistance expanded substantially, and the creation of Supplemental Security Income established a lasting form of financial support for elderly, blind and disabled people with limited means. His government also ended military conscription in favour of an all-volunteer armed forces, completing a transition of considerable importance to the liberty of individual Americans.
Perhaps even more striking was his administration's record on Native American rights. Nixon repudiated the federal policy of terminating the special relationship between Native American tribes and the United States government, recognising that assimilation imposed from Washington was an inadequate substitute for genuine self-government. In 1970 he supported the return of the sacred Blue Lake lands to the Taos Pueblo people, correcting a longstanding historical injustice. The Menominee Restoration Act of 1973 restored federal recognition to a tribe that had suffered under the previous policy. These were not simply symbolic gestures. They reflected an important change in the relationship between the American state and peoples who had endured generations of dispossession, discrimination and the systematic erosion of their political autonomy.
The Nixon administration also implemented the most dramatic phase of school desegregation in the American South. Much of the driving force came from the courts, civil rights organisations and earlier legislation, and Nixon himself was frequently reluctant, particularly where compulsory busing was concerned. Yet his government ultimately helped enforce changes that transformed the educational experiences of millions of African American children. The proportion attending entirely segregated schools in the South declined dramatically during his first term. It would be foolish to portray Nixon as an uncomplicated champion of racial equality, particularly given the prejudices revealed in his private conversations, but equally foolish to ignore the very substantial social progress that occurred under his administration.
In foreign policy, Nixon's achievements were greater still. His opening to China in 1972 was an act of strategic imagination of the highest order. For more than two decades, Washington and Beijing had existed in a condition of hostility and mutual suspicion. Nixon recognised that this arrangement was neither inevitable nor desirable. Working with Henry Kissinger, he initiated a diplomatic transformation that altered the global balance of power, created possibilities for economic and political engagement and demonstrated that even apparently irreconcilable ideological adversaries could find common interests. Whatever one may think of the subsequent development of communist China, the decision to establish a relationship with it was an extraordinary exercise in practical statesmanship.
His diplomacy towards the Soviet Union was similarly consequential. Nixon understood that the possession of enormous nuclear arsenals imposed responsibilities upon their owners that transcended conventional political antagonism. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks produced the first major agreements limiting aspects of the American and Soviet strategic nuclear competition, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. These agreements did not end the Cold War, nor did they eliminate the danger of nuclear annihilation. They did, however, introduce important constraints into a confrontation that had threatened the survival of civilisation itself. Nixon's willingness to negotiate with ideological enemies was a triumph of prudence over rhetoric.
There was a deeper philosophy behind these achievements. Nixon understood that international politics could not be conducted entirely upon the basis of moral denunciation. States possessing formidable military power had to find ways to coexist even when their internal political systems were profoundly objectionable. He recognised the importance of compromise, the utility of personal diplomacy and the necessity of distinguishing between the interests that could be negotiated and the principles upon which a country could not yield. His approach was sometimes cold and excessively calculating, but it represented a serious attempt to make international relations less dependent upon the passions of the moment.
Yet the tragedy of Nixon's Presidency cannot be separated from its darker aspects. His handling of the Vietnam War involved appalling misjudgements. Although he inherited the conflict and ultimately negotiated the withdrawal of American forces, he prolonged the war while seeking terms he considered politically and strategically acceptable. The secret bombing of Cambodia, the expansion of military operations into neighbouring countries and the devastating bombing campaigns against North Vietnam caused enormous suffering. The Paris Peace Accords of 1973 brought American military involvement towards an end, but they did not create a lasting peace, and South Vietnam collapsed two years later. The human cost of Nixon's decisions cannot be excused by the undoubted diplomatic achievements occurring elsewhere.
Nor were his mistakes confined to Southeast Asia. His administration's hostility towards Salvador Allende's elected government in Chile contributed to the destabilisation that preceded the military coup of 1973, with disastrous consequences for Chilean democracy. His support for Pakistan during the atrocities committed in East Pakistan in 1971 was another grave moral failure, encouraged by strategic calculations associated with the opening to China. Such policies reveal the limitations of a foreign policy in which geopolitical advantage could sometimes become detached from basic humanitarian considerations. Nixon understood the importance of peace between great powers, but was less consistently attentive to the suffering of smaller nations caught within their rivalries.
Then came Watergate. It is tempting, particularly for those sympathetic to Nixon, to describe the scandal as an unfortunate lapse of judgement, or a relatively minor episode of political misconduct exaggerated by hostile journalists and political opponents. Such an interpretation will not do. The burglary at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in June 1972 exposed a much broader culture of illegal surveillance, political intimidation, obstruction of justice and the abuse of governmental authority. Although it has never been established that Nixon personally ordered the original break-in, his participation in the subsequent cover-up was demonstrated by his own recorded conversations. The President of the United States had become involved in obstructing the investigation of crimes committed by people associated with his political organisation.
What makes Watergate so extraordinary is its utter pointlessness. Nixon was an exceptionally powerful incumbent President, facing an opposition party that was in considerable disarray. In November 1972 he won re-election by a landslide, carrying forty-nine states. His electoral victory did not require burglary, secret operations or the intimidation of political opponents. Yet Nixon's accumulated suspicions and resentments had produced a political environment in which he and some of his closest associates increasingly treated the constitutional restraints upon executive power as obstacles to be evaded. The President who had demonstrated such remarkable subtlety in dealing with Mao Zedong and Leonid Brezhnev proved incapable of applying comparable judgement to the management of his own administration.
The resulting disgrace was deserved. Nixon's resignation on 9 August 1974 was the necessary consequence of an intolerable breach of public trust. The tapes revealed not merely political misjudgement but a willingness to employ the institutions of government for improper personal and partisan purposes. His conduct damaged the authority of the Presidency, undermined public confidence in democratic government and destroyed the credibility upon which much of his earlier statesmanship had depended. His subsequent pardon by Gerald Ford spared him the prospect of criminal prosecution but did not, and could not, erase the moral gravity of what had occurred.
And yet it is here that the story becomes more interesting than the conventional morality tale. Nixon did not disappear into a comfortable retirement of golf, ceremonial dinners and self-congratulation. He endured humiliation, financial difficulties and prolonged public hostility. His interviews with David Frost in 1977 revealed both his continuing defensiveness and his awareness that he had failed the country he had sought to lead. His attempts at rehabilitation were undoubtedly motivated in part by wounded pride and the desire to recover his historical reputation. But his subsequent activities also demonstrated that the intellectual abilities and interest in public service which had brought him to high office had not been extinguished by his removal from it.
Over the following two decades, Nixon became an unusually prolific writer and commentator on international affairs. He produced serious books examining relations with the Soviet Union, China and the wider developing world, the future of American strategic power and the international consequences of the end of the Cold War. His works included The Real War, Real Peace, 1999: Victory Without War and Seize the Moment. These were not simply exercises in self-justification. They reflected sustained engagement with the great strategic questions of the age and offered ideas that continued to command attention across political divisions.
Presidents and senior officials, including members of administrations that had little reason to admire Nixon personally, increasingly recognised the value of his experience. He maintained relationships with foreign leaders, undertook international journeys and offered private assessments of political developments to those occupying the office he had forfeited. He had no constitutional authority, no electoral mandate and no ability to command the machinery of government. What remained to him was the authority of experience, supported by a formidable capacity for analysing political personalities, national interests and the changing structure of international relations.
His advice after the collapse of the Soviet Union was particularly significant. Nixon understood that the end of communist rule had not eliminated the historical problems created by Russian imperial power. He believed the United States had a substantial interest in assisting the economic transformation of the former Soviet republics, but he also recognised that the new political order was fragile and that the relationship between Russia and its neighbours would become one of the central questions of European security. At a time when much of the Western political establishment was celebrating the supposed permanent triumph of liberal democracy, Nixon retained the scepticism of a man who had spent his entire adult life studying the ambitions and anxieties of great powers.
This brings us back to Kyiv in March 1994. During his visit, Nixon expressed concern about the increasingly assertive tone of Russian politics and the vulnerability of Ukraine's newly acquired independence. He met President Kravchuk and discussed the country's economic difficulties, relations with Russia and the necessity of continued American engagement. He subsequently wrote to President Bill Clinton offering his assessment of the region. The old Cold Warrior, whose greatest triumphs had involved negotiating with the Soviet Union, was amongst those who recognised that Ukraine was not merely a peripheral consideration in Russian affairs but an independent country with legitimate interests of its own.
His words in Kyiv are worth recalling today. Nixon declared that an independent and prosperous Ukraine, enjoying political and economic freedom, should be a primary objective of American foreign policy. There was no immediate personal political advantage to be gained from such a statement. He was a private citizen, approaching the end of his life, visiting a country that most Americans scarcely understood. Yet his recognition of Ukraine's importance reflected the best elements of his political intelligence: an understanding of history, sensitivity to the dangers of imperial ambition and appreciation of the relationship between national independence and international stability.
The subsequent history of Ukraine has given his observations an additional poignancy. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated the dangers inherent in treating Ukrainian independence as a secondary question to be negotiated principally between Moscow and Washington. Nixon did not predict all these events, and it would be misleading to present him as a prophet of the modern war. But he understood something essential that later Western governments sometimes struggled to appreciate: the future of Ukraine was a matter of fundamental importance to the European political order, not simply an inconvenient detail in the management of relations with Russia.
Nixon died on 22 April 1994, barely five weeks after his visit to Kyiv. At his funeral, President Clinton appealed for his countrymen to judge Nixon upon the entirety of his life and career rather than solely upon the circumstances of his disgrace. It was a generous sentiment, but also a historically sensible one. To assess a human being exclusively by reference to his worst actions is to abandon the difficult business of understanding the complexity of moral character. To disregard those actions, however, would be an equally serious error. Historical judgement must be capable of holding contradictory truths together.
Nixon was a man who helped rebuild Europe, advanced significant civil rights measures, transformed American environmental protection, expanded aspects of the social safety net, recognised important Native American claims, opened diplomatic relations with communist China and negotiated nuclear arms limitations with the Soviet Union. He was also a man whose strategic calculations contributed to immense suffering abroad, whose resentments poisoned his political judgment and whose deliberate abuses of power brought his Presidency to an ignominious end. Both assessments are true, and neither can properly be understood without the other.
There is something distinctly tragic about such a life. Nixon's greatest strengths and greatest weaknesses were intimately connected. His determination arose partly from insecurity, his strategic brilliance from suspicion, his extraordinary industry from an inability to be satisfied with himself. He could understand the motives of foreign adversaries with remarkable clarity while misunderstanding the loyalties and intentions of those closest to him. He could negotiate the most delicate questions of nuclear confrontation while allowing a trivial political burglary to become a constitutional catastrophe. He was extraordinarily intelligent, but intelligence alone could not protect him from the destructive consequences of his own character.
Perhaps the most sympathetic interpretation of Nixon is not that he eventually redeemed himself, because redemption is a matter upon which history is poorly equipped to pronounce. It is rather that he continued to make himself useful after the destruction of everything for which he had worked. He remained curious about the world, concerned with its future and willing to devote his remaining energies to understanding it. His post-presidential activities could never undo Watergate, and they did not compensate for the victims of his foreign policy. But they demonstrated that disgrace need not extinguish a person's capacity to make a serious contribution to public life.
There are lessons here extending far beyond American politics. Human beings are neither wholly good nor wholly wicked, and the most accomplished amongst them are frequently possessed of weaknesses commensurate with their talents. Political history is full of men who achieved remarkable things while also committing terrible errors, and whose reputations depend disproportionately upon the circumstances of their departure from power. A mature understanding of history requires us to resist the temptation to convert complicated lives into simple moral fables.
For those of us living in Ukraine, there is a particular reason to remember Richard Nixon with a measure of gratitude. In the final weeks of his life, long after the loss of the office that had defined him, he travelled to Kyiv and recognised the importance of this country's freedom. It was not the most spectacular achievement of his career, nor the one for which future generations will principally remember him. But it was a good and thoughtful thing for an elderly statesman to do, and it revealed an intellectual generosity that survived the destruction of his political reputation.
Richard Nixon was not a great man in every sense of that expression, and he was certainly not a consistently good man. He was, however, a man who did many great and good things, who did some dreadful things and who ultimately paid an enormous price for his failures. That distinction is worth preserving. The Presidency he lost through his own misconduct was only one chapter in a long and extraordinary life, and the interests of historical justice require that we remember the chapters that came before it and those that followed.
In the end, perhaps Richard Nixon's greatest misfortune was that the qualities which enabled him to accomplish so much were accompanied by the weaknesses that destroyed him. His greatest achievement after his disgrace was that he refused to allow those weaknesses to dictate the remainder of his life. There is something profoundly human, and even moving, in the image of that ageing former President travelling to an uncertain Ukraine, still asking questions, still analysing the world and still trying, in whatever modest way remained available to him, to do some good.




