The Price of Friendship: Turkey, Russian Gas and the New Geopolitics of Energy
By Matthew Parish
Tuesday 10 November 2026
There is something faintly comical about the Turkish government complaining that Russian natural gas is too expensive. For decades, Moscow has sought to use its immense energy resources to exert political influence over its neighbours, constructing pipelines, negotiating long-term supply contracts and encouraging foreign governments to become dependent upon Russian hydrocarbons. Now Turkey, one of the few major European customers still willing to purchase Russian gas in substantial quantities, is suggesting that Moscow ought to lower its prices or risk losing more of its business. The Russians have discovered that their customers are not necessarily as grateful as they once were.
The Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar, has explained that Ankara's increasing purchases of American liquefied natural gas are motivated by economics rather than politics. Russian gas, he says, has become exceptionally expensive, and Turkey is entitled to seek cheaper alternatives. Yet this apparently straightforward commercial observation conceals a considerably more sophisticated geopolitical manoeuvre. Turkey is exploiting the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine to renegotiate the economic terms of its relationship with Moscow, while carefully avoiding any suggestion that it has joined the Western campaign to isolate the Russian state.
The distinction between economics and politics is, of course, largely artificial. Energy markets have always been political markets, particularly where natural gas is concerned, because the infrastructure necessary to transport gas requires enormous initial investments and creates long-term relationships between producers, transit states and consumers. Pipelines cannot simply be moved to another country when diplomatic relations deteriorate. Their locations are fixed by geography, engineering and the political agreements under which they were constructed. Once those investments have been made, both supplier and purchaser may find themselves committed to a relationship neither particularly enjoys.
For much of the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia appeared to understand this structural relationship better than its customers. Gazprom, the Russian state-controlled gas producer, constructed an extensive network of contractual and physical dependencies throughout Europe. Its pipelines were instruments of commercial exchange, but they were also expressions of political power. When disputes arose over gas prices, transit arrangements or broader diplomatic questions, Moscow could threaten to reduce supplies, demand concessions or make examples of particularly troublesome customers. The Kremlin came to regard control over energy resources as an indispensable component of its foreign policy.
The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 transformed this arrangement. European governments began the difficult and expensive process of reducing their dependence upon Russian energy, purchasing liquefied natural gas from alternative suppliers, developing new import terminals and accelerating investment in renewable electricity generation. Russia consequently lost much of the European market upon which its gas-export strategy had depended. The result was not merely a reduction in revenue, although that was important, but a fundamental reversal in the balance of bargaining power between Moscow and those countries that remained prepared to purchase Russian gas.
Turkey has recognised this opportunity with characteristic commercial intelligence. Ankara has no ideological objection to purchasing Russian hydrocarbons, nor has President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan demonstrated any enthusiasm for joining Western economic sanctions against Moscow. Nevertheless Turkey understands that Russia's alternatives have become more limited. A seller who has lost a substantial proportion of his customers must eventually become more accommodating towards those who remain, even if he is selling a commodity of considerable strategic importance.
This is the essential logic behind Turkey's complaints about Russian gas prices. Moscow may regard Turkey as an indispensable partner, but Turkey increasingly regards Russia as one supplier amongst several. The distinction is enormously important. In international politics, as in ordinary commercial negotiations, the party with the greater number of credible alternatives is generally the party with the stronger negotiating position.
Turkey has been working systematically to develop those alternatives. The country has expanded its liquefied natural gas import capacity, allowing it to receive shipments from the United States and other producers rather than relying exclusively upon gas delivered through pipelines. Azerbaijan has become another important supplier, while domestic production from Turkey's Black Sea gas reserves offers the possibility of reducing imports over the longer term. Russia's share of Turkish gas imports has consequently fallen substantially from its historical position of dominance, although Moscow remains a major supplier.
The significance of liquefied natural gas is not simply that it introduces additional suppliers. It changes the structure of the market in which Turkey purchases energy. Gas delivered through a pipeline is ordinarily governed by agreements negotiated years in advance, frequently using complicated pricing formulas linked to oil or European gas benchmarks. Liquefied natural gas, by contrast, can be purchased from a range of international producers and transported by ship to whichever terminals offer commercially attractive conditions. This does not necessarily make American gas cheaper than Russian gas, since liquefaction, shipping and regasification all entail costs. It does, however, give Ankara the ability to compare competing offers and threaten credibly to transfer some of its purchases elsewhere.
The actual prices paid under Turkey's Russian contracts are not publicly disclosed, and therefore it is impossible to establish independently whether Moscow's supplies are intrinsically uncompetitive. The comparison depends upon contractual formulas, delivery schedules, transport costs and prevailing international market conditions. Indeed this uncertainty is part of the diplomatic game. By publicly asserting that Russian gas is too expensive, Ankara may be seeking to establish a negotiating position rather than offering an impartial economic assessment.
There is an additional irony. For many years, Russia sought to use energy dependence to divide the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, cultivating bilateral relationships with European governments that might prove more sympathetic to Moscow than the Western alliance as a whole. Turkey, itself a NATO member, was one of the most important countries in this strategy. The construction of the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines appeared to consolidate a durable relationship between Ankara and Moscow, permitting Russian gas to reach Turkey and, through TurkStream, parts of southeastern Europe without passing through Ukraine.
Yet these investments have not produced the political loyalty Moscow might have anticipated. Turkey has retained its independence of judgement, cooperating with Russia when convenient while simultaneously supplying military equipment to Ukraine, maintaining relations with Western governments and pursuing its own regional ambitions. Erdoğan has never regarded geopolitical relationships as obligations of personal fidelity. They are arrangements to be revised whenever Turkey's national interests require it.
This transactional approach to diplomacy is sometimes criticised in Western capitals as cynical or unreliable. Nevertheless it has enabled Turkey to occupy a position of unusual flexibility in the contemporary international system. Ankara can maintain productive relations with Moscow while participating in NATO, compete with Russia in regional theatres while cooperating with it economically and present itself as a mediator between states that scarcely communicate directly with one another. In a world increasingly divided into antagonistic geopolitical blocs, Turkey has made a virtue of refusing to belong unequivocally to either side.
The current dispute over gas prices reflects the strengths of this approach. Ankara can tell Washington that it is purchasing increasing quantities of American energy, thereby contributing to a reduction in European dependence upon Russia. Simultaneously it can tell Moscow that it remains interested in Russian gas, provided the commercial terms are sufficiently attractive. The Turkish government thereby converts the geopolitical competition between Russia and the United States into an instrument for reducing its own energy costs.
For Russia, the choices are considerably less comfortable. If Gazprom refuses to reduce its prices, Turkey may continue transferring its purchases to alternative suppliers. If Moscow agrees to substantial discounts, it preserves export volumes but sacrifices revenue from a market that has become increasingly important following the collapse of its traditional European business. Either outcome illustrates the erosion of Russian economic power that has accompanied the war in Ukraine.
The European Union's decision to phase out Russian natural gas imports further intensifies this dilemma. Under legislation adopted in January 2026, the remaining long-term imports of Russian liquefied natural gas are to cease from January 2027, with long-term pipeline imports prohibited from the end of September 2027 or, where specified conditions apply, by the beginning of November. Russia therefore faces the prospect of losing additional customers at precisely the moment when Turkey is demanding more competitive prices. The timetable matters because Moscow's negotiating weakness is not merely theoretical. It is being progressively institutionalised through European law.
There are obvious implications for Ukraine. Every reduction in Russian energy export revenue potentially diminishes the financial resources available to the Kremlin to sustain its war. Russia's military operations depend upon the continued functioning of an economy in which hydrocarbon exports remain exceptionally important. When major customers demand discounts, the Russian state may have to accept lower returns from the sale of resources that would once have commanded a more favourable price.
However, Ukraine should not confuse Turkey's commercial opportunism with political solidarity. Ankara is not proposing to stop buying Russian gas because it objects to Russian aggression. It is proposing to pay less for that gas, and the distinction matters. A discounted Russian gas contract may reduce Moscow's earnings per unit sold, but it can also provide valuable revenue that would otherwise be unavailable. Indeed Turkey's willingness to continue purchasing Russian energy may help the Russian economy withstand some of the consequences of European sanctions.
The Ukrainian interest is therefore more complicated than it first appears. If Turkey's bargaining pressure deprives Moscow of income that Russia would otherwise have earned, Ukraine benefits indirectly. If, however, Turkish purchases sustain Russian production and export infrastructure that might otherwise have become uneconomic, the relationship may prolong the Kremlin's financial capacity to continue the war. The decisive question is not simply whether Turkey pays less for Russian gas, but how much revenue Russia ultimately earns compared with the alternatives available to it.
There is also the question of Turkey's ambition to become a regional energy trading centre. Erdoğan has long entertained the possibility of transforming Turkey into an intermediary through which gas from Russia, the Caspian region, the Middle East and international liquefied natural gas markets might be traded into Europe. Such a position could confer considerable commercial advantages and increase Turkey's diplomatic importance. Yet the European Union's increasingly stringent restrictions on the importation of Russian gas complicate this ambition, particularly where the origin of gas passing through international trading arrangements must be established.
European governments have learned that changing the name of the intermediary does not necessarily change the political character of the underlying commodity. Russian gas remains Russian gas even if it is sold through a Turkish trading company, blended with supplies from other sources or delivered through infrastructure located outside the European Union. The European regulatory framework increasingly seeks to distinguish the geographical origin of gas from the commercial identities of the companies trading it. Turkey may therefore find that its opportunities to profit from Russian energy exports into Europe are substantially more limited than they once appeared.
Nevertheless Ankara's energy relationship with Moscow cannot be reduced to the price of natural gas. Russia is also deeply involved in the construction of Turkey's Akkuyu nuclear power station, a project intended to introduce substantial nuclear generating capacity into the Turkish electricity system. This arrangement establishes a different kind of long-term dependency, involving nuclear technology, financing, fuel and specialised operational expertise. While Turkey may gain increasing flexibility in her gas purchases, she is simultaneously accepting a durable technological relationship with the Russian nuclear industry.
The paradox is characteristic of modern energy geopolitics. Countries seek independence from foreign suppliers, but the technologies through which they pursue that independence often create new forms of dependency. A nuclear power station reduces the need for imported fossil fuels, yet may require continuing cooperation with foreign reactor manufacturers and fuel suppliers. Liquefied natural gas terminals reduce dependence upon particular pipelines, yet expose consumers to international shipping markets and fluctuations in global gas prices. Renewable energy reduces fuel import requirements but creates demands for electricity storage, transmission infrastructure and industrial supply chains that are themselves internationally interconnected.
Turkey's newly announced energy strategy extending to 2040 reflects an awareness of these challenges. It envisages substantially greater electrification of the economy, increased domestic energy production and extensive investment in electricity infrastructure, with the government outlining an overall investment ambition of approximately $500 billion. These are substantial aspirations, although their realisation will depend upon financing, technology and the ability of Turkish institutions to implement projects over many years.
Such ambitions also reveal a deeper transformation in the meaning of energy security. During the twentieth century, energy security was principally associated with the ownership of oil and gas reserves and the physical capacity to transport them. In the twenty-first century, it increasingly depends upon the ability to switch between different fuels, suppliers and technologies without suffering intolerable economic disruption. The most secure state is not necessarily the one with the greatest natural resources. It may be the one with the most diversified infrastructure and the strongest capacity to adapt when international circumstances change.
Russia's tragedy, viewed from the perspective of political economy, is that she possesses extraordinary natural resources but has progressively undermined the institutional and diplomatic relationships necessary to exploit them profitably. The Kremlin mistook dependence for loyalty, assuming that countries relying upon Russian energy would inevitably accommodate Russian political ambitions. Instead it discovered that dependence creates resentment and encourages customers to develop alternatives as soon as opportunities arise.
Turkey has responded to this transformation more effectively than many other states because her political leadership has never confused strategic cooperation with permanent allegiance. Erdoğan understands that friendships between governments are rarely unconditional and that commercial relationships must be continually assessed against changing circumstances. This may not be an especially attractive philosophy of international relations, but it is one that produces tangible advantages for a country determined to preserve its room for manoeuvre.
The broader lesson is that economic power cannot be measured merely by the possession of valuable resources. It also depends upon the willingness of other states to purchase those resources on terms favourable to the seller. Russia still possesses immense natural gas reserves, an extensive pipeline network and considerable technical expertise in hydrocarbon production. What it increasingly lacks is the ability to dictate the commercial and political conditions under which its customers conduct business.
Ukraine's resistance has been central to producing this outcome. By preventing Moscow from achieving the swift military victory that the Kremlin evidently anticipated in 2022, Ukraine helped transform a regional war into a prolonged confrontation with profound consequences for European energy markets. Western diversification, sanctions and the gradual reconstruction of international gas trading relationships have all contributed to diminishing Russia's capacity to use energy exports as a geopolitical weapon.
Turkey's demand for cheaper Russian gas is therefore more than an ordinary disagreement between a buyer and a seller. It is a symptom of the reorganisation of economic power across Eurasia, in which Russia increasingly finds herself negotiating from a position of weakness while countries that once depended upon Moscow acquire greater freedom of choice. The irony is that Russia's own attempt to impose its will upon Ukraine has helped produce this reversal.
For President Vladimir Putin, who has spent much of his political career presenting Russia as an indispensable energy superpower, there can be few more humiliating developments than discovering that an important customer considers Russian gas overpriced and is publicly advertising its willingness to purchase American alternatives. The infrastructure remains, the reserves remain and the gas continues to flow. What has changed is the balance of power at the negotiating table.
And in the end, that may be one of the more enduring economic consequences of the war in Ukraine. Russia sought to remind the world that she possessed resources without which other countries could not survive. Instead, she is increasingly being reminded that possessing something valuable is of limited advantage when the people who might buy it have learned how to shop elsewhere.
