Could Moldova’s EU accession help Ukraine counter Putin’s influence?

By Peeter Helme

Tuesday 10 November 2026

The European Commission said last week that Moldova could conclude EU membership talks by early 2028 if it maintains the pace of reform. Ukraine is aiming for the end of 2028, but the Commission says Kyiv will need to move faster to meet even that target. That is a reversal. Three years ago, Ukraine was ahead of Moldova in European Pravda’s comparison of the Commission’s assessments. Now Moldova could be the first of the two to join.

For Ukrainians who expected the two countries to enter together, that can be hard to hear. I suspect a slightly patronising view of their small southwestern neighbour also accounts for some of the disappointment. Being overtaken by Moldova can feel a bit shameful.

Yet there are several reasons why admitting Moldova first could benefit the EU, Moldova and Ukraine itself.

Firstly, Moldova covers about 34,000 square kilometres, a little more than Belgium. Its population is about 2.4 million, excluding Transnistria—slightly more than Slovenia’s. Ukraine, on the other hand, is a behemoth, larger than France. Even after years of war and emigration, an estimated 28–29 million people live in government-controlled territory alone. That would make it the sixth-largest EU country by population, between Poland and Romania.

The EU has extensive experience integrating countries of Moldova’s size, from Estonia in the north to Cyprus in the south. Of the countries that have joined the Union this century, only Poland and Romania are comparable to Ukraine in population. Ukraine would require adjustments on a much larger scale.

That makes a case for completing Moldova’s accession first, while continuing to prepare Ukraine’s. Both countries face several similar problems, including strengthening their courts, curbing corruption and reducing the influence of wealthy business interests over politics. Similar problems, on a different scale.

The EU and Moldova could work through reforms whose successes and failures would give Brussels and Kyiv something concrete to draw on. Some of that exchange is already happening. Ukrainian Justice Ministry officials visited Chișinău in July to discuss reforms connected with EU accession. In October, Ukrainian and Moldovan representatives took part in discussions on judicial integrity checks. Moldova’s further progress would give that cooperation more practical experience to draw on.

Then there is Russia. Moldova is not at war, but Russian troops remain in Transnistria, outside Chișinău’s control. If that situation persists, the EU will have to decide how membership could work in a country whose government cannot enforce European rules throughout its territory. Any arrangement would deserve close attention in Kyiv. It could help identify practical ways to manage a future line separating Ukrainian-controlled and Russian-occupied territory, should one remain when Ukraine is ready to join.

If Moldova joins despite Putin’s efforts to obstruct it, Ukraine would gain a practical example of how to advance towards EU membership under Russian pressure. Kyiv can study which European commitments helped Moldova get there and seek comparable backing for itself.

Both countries also deserve enough attention for their particular problems to be understood and addressed individually. In 2004, the EU admitted ten countries at once. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007. Those enlargements show that Brussels can handle several accessions together. Whether it should do so with Moldova and Ukraine is a separate question. I would favour completing the smaller country’s accession first and using that experience when negotiating the larger country’s terms.

Kyiv would have a front-row seat to Moldova’s integration into the EU. If something fails, there is still time to work out why and seek a better solution. And even if something succeeds, Kyiv needs time to understand whether methods that work in small Moldova would do the trick in large Ukraine.

The same applies to the EU’s efforts to help Moldova withstand Russian interference. Ukraine would benefit from knowing how much European governments are prepared to do when Moscow tries to obstruct a country’s integration.

The understandable worry in Kyiv, of course, is that once Moldova is in, some European governments will decide they have done enough about enlargement for a while. That is a reason to press them for commitments on Ukraine’s negotiations now. Ukraine needs time to do this properly. The EU can use that time to move forward with Moldova’s accession and tackle the parts of Ukraine’s bid that will take the longest to resolve.