The next Iranian revolution

Saturday 10 January 2026

The next Iranian revolution, if and when it comes, is unlikely to resemble the dramatic rupture of 1979. It will not be led by a single exiled cleric, nor will it coalesce around a unified ideology capable of sweeping aside the state in a matter of months. Instead it is more likely to unfold as a prolonged, uneven struggle between a brittle theocratic system and a society that has already, in many respects, moved beyond it.

Iran today is governed by the structures created after the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy, embodied in the Islamic Republic and dominated by clerical authority, revolutionary legitimacy and coercive power. Yet the social foundations of that system have eroded. The population is younger, more urban, more educated and far more globally connected than the generation that rallied behind Ayatollah Khomeini. The revolutionary narrative that once justified sacrifice, isolation and repression has lost its emotional force for many Iranians, particularly those born after the Iran–Iraq War.

At the heart of the coming upheaval lies a profound legitimacy crisis. The Islamic Republic still commands formidable instruments of control, including the security services, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. What it lacks is consent. Elections no longer function as a credible mechanism for representation, clerical authority is widely mocked rather than revered and the promise of moral governance has been undermined by corruption, economic mismanagement and visible elite privilege. Revolutions do not begin when people suffer most, but when they cease to believe that suffering is meaningful or temporary. Iran appears increasingly close to that point.

The social character of a future revolution is already visible. Women have emerged as its most potent symbol and, in many respects, its leading force. The protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody demonstrated how questions of personal autonomy, bodily control and everyday dignity have become politically explosive. These demands are not narrowly feminist in the Western sense; they cut to the core of how the state defines citizenship and obedience. When women publicly remove compulsory headscarves, they are not merely defying a dress code but repudiating the regime’s claim to moral sovereignty.

Equally significant is the decentralised nature of dissent. Unlike 1979, there is no single organisation or figure capable of directing events nationwide. Protest movements arise spontaneously, spread through social media and often fade under repression, only to re-emerge months later in new forms. This frustrates the opposition’s ability to seize power, but it also deprives the state of a clear enemy to decapitate. The next revolution may therefore look less like a decisive moment and more like a cumulative erosion, in which repeated cycles of protest, repression and partial retreat hollow out the regime from within.

Economic pressure will remain a critical accelerant. Sanctions, inflation and unemployment have reshaped daily life, particularly for the urban middle and working classes who once formed a stabilising pillar of the system. While the leadership continues to frame hardship as the price of resistance to foreign enemies, that argument rings hollow when wealth visibly concentrates around those with connections to power. The perception that sacrifice is unevenly distributed is politically lethal, and no amount of ideological rhetoric can fully neutralise it.

The decisive question for any Iranian revolution is the behaviour of the coercive apparatus. As long as the security forces remain cohesive and willing to use force, the regime can survive even profound unpopularity. Yet loyalty is not immutable. The rank and file of the police and conscript elements of the armed forces share many of the same grievances as the protesters they are ordered to suppress. A fracture within the security services, whether driven by economic distress, moral fatigue or elite infighting, would dramatically alter the balance of power.

Leadership succession also looms large. The eventual departure of the current Supreme Leader will create a moment of vulnerability, regardless of how carefully managed the transition appears on paper. Succession struggles tend to expose hidden rivalries and weaken the aura of inevitability that authoritarian systems depend upon. A revolution need not topple the state overnight; it may instead seize upon such a moment to force irreversible concessions, gradually transforming the system into something recognisably different.

International factors will shape, but not determine, the outcome. Foreign governments often overestimate their ability to engineer change in Iran, and overt external involvement is more likely to discredit domestic movements than empower them. Nonetheless global attention, diaspora activism and the symbolic resonance of Iranian protests abroad can influence calculations inside the country, particularly when repression risks diplomatic or economic costs.

The next Iranian revolution, then, is best understood not as a single event but as a process. It will be driven less by ideology than by a demand for normality: for accountable government, personal freedom and an end to perpetual crisis. Whether this process culminates in a peaceful transition, a negotiated reform of the existing system or a more violent rupture remains uncertain. What is increasingly clear is that the social contract forged in the aftermath of 1979 has broken down. The question is no longer whether Iran will change, but how much upheaval will be required before that change becomes irreversible.