The New Digital Mandate: Max, Russia’s ‘National Messenger’, Comes Pre-Installed

In a move that only deepens the Kremlin’s grip on online life, Moscow has decreed that as of 1 September 2025, every mobile phone and tablet sold in Russia must come pre-loaded with Max—a state‑backed messaging app developed by VK, the Kremlin‑controlled technology firm. This edict is more than a technological shift; it is a declaration of intent in the ongoing battle for digital sovereignty. 

A Super-App with State Grip

Max is designed as a multifunctional platform, a sort of Russian WeChat. It combines messaging, voice and video calls, payments, mini‑applications, and integration with government services like Gosuslugi—the e‑government portal. Registration demands a valid Russian or Belarusian phone number, and virtual alternatives are barred. 

Moscow justifies Max as a secure, domestically controlled tool, insisting it requires fewer permissions than foreign rivals like WhatsApp or Telegram. Yet critics—including digital rights activists and opposition figures—see in it a “digital gulag”, a surveillance engine for comprehensive monitoring. Debate rages over how widely it can harvest personal data—from financial records to social activity—and how readily this might be accessed by Russia's State Security Service, the FSB. 

Pre-Loading the State’s Authority

The mandate covers all new smartphones and tablets, regardless of operating system. Moreover from 1 September, Apple devices will be required to include RuStore—the Russian app store already standard on Android—as a fixture. Complementing this, beginning 1 January 2026 all smart TVs sold in Russia must carry LIME HD TV, a free app streaming state‑controlled television. 

This goes beyond preferential treatment for domestic technology—it institutionalises surveillance. By embedding Max, RuStore and LIME TV into consumer devices, the Kremlin extends its control from servers into the pockets of citizens themselves. With WhatsApp and Telegram increasingly stifled—restricted or threatened with bans for failing to comply with law‑enforcement demands—the digital space narrows in Moscow’s favour. 

Implications for Society and Resistance

For Russian citizens, the implications are immediate. The ability to delete or avoid Max may be limited; refusal could restrict access to essential state services. Even installing foreign apps will be mediated through RuStore, giving the state unprecedented oversight over user choices.

This strategy is a logical extension of a broader campaign: blocking VPNs, censoring content, prosecuting “extremist” speech, and throttling Western platforms. Taken together, they form a digital architecture of control not far removed from the “Great Firewall” model used by the Chinese government. 

A Wider Geopolitical Signal

Ukraine and her allies will read this as more than domestic repression. In the context of the war—and Moscow’s attempts to secure the information domain behind closed borders—Max becomes part of the weaponry. Control over platforms equates to control over narratives, mobilisation and dissent. The West must therefore view this as a digital front in the broader confrontation.

Technology as the Kremlin’s Next Frontier

By mandating Max on every device, the Kremlin not only promotes a national app but promotes national data. It crafts a digital system structured for transparency—for the state. In the process, free communication is subordinated to control. Privacy, once measured in choice, is measured now by proximity to the state’s gaze.

This is not just software. It is power, coded into every handset sold in modern Russia.