The Mask Falls: Wang Yi's Candid Admission and What It Means for Ukraine - and the world

By Robert Harris

For more than three years, the world has watched the brutal conflict unfold in Ukraine, and throughout it all, China has maintained a meticulously crafted (albeit increasingly questionable) façade of neutrality. Beijing has consistently called for peace, urged dialogue, and refrained from overtly condemning Russia's actions, all while deepening its self-described "no-limits" partnership with Moscow. A few Western leaders (especially what is commonly called the “Reagan faction” of America's Republican Party) have openly cried “foul”, accusing China of openly aiding Russia's war effort. Most, however, clung to a sliver of hope that perhaps, just perhaps, China could be the stabilizing force they professed themselves to be, or at least one that wouldn't actively undermine efforts to support Ukraine.

That changed earlier this month, with an unabashed admission from Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to European diplomats: "China cannot afford a Russian defeat in Ukraine". The reason? Beijing reportedly fears that a vanquished Russia would allow the United States to shift its entire strategic focus onto China, a fear which is probably not unfounded given US President Trump's openly anti-China rhetoric and policies. Regardless, with Minister Wang's admission, that carefully constructed neutral mask slipped, revealing a stark, self-serving geopolitical calculation. For the West, who had long debated the true nature of China's stance, this wasn't just a slip of the tongue; it was a blatant, and painful, confirmation of their deepest suspicions, carrying profound implications for future international relations and the intricate dance of global power.

Wang Yi's statement, though not publicly broadcast, sent ripples through diplomatic circles. It wasn't merely an acknowledgment of China's economic ties to Russia or a general desire for what the Chinese Communist Party calls “regional stability,” meaning “an environment where China has a free hand in Asia because the West is busy elsewhere.” Instead, it laid bare a fundamental strategic imperative: Beijing is quite openly and quite clearly on Russia's side, and they are not even shy about admitting this anymore. The implication is clear: Russia's conflict in Ukraine is not just a European issue but one of several theaters of a much larger geopolitical confrontation: a China-led bloc, versus the West.For years, China’s official line has been one of non-interference and respect for sovereignty (Taiwan, Tibet, Japan's Senkakku Islands, the Philippines' Panatag Shoal and Indonesia's Sulu Sea notwithstanding), coupled with a consistent emphasis on “multilateralism,” which George Friedman of STRATFOR describes as “a term used to paper over China and Russia's shared resentment of perceived US hegemony without addressing the fact that each one sees themselves and not the other as the new hegemon”.

They’ve blamed NATO expansion for the conflict (without acknowledging that NATO's last eastward expansion before the 2022 full-scale invasion was in 2004), preached the importance of dialogue, and offered vague peace plans that never quite gained traction, largely because they managed to give absolutely no side any of what they wanted. All the while, trade between China and Russia boomed, particularly in energy (largely due to Russia having no other potential partners due to heavy Western sanctions), and Beijing abstained from or voted with Russia on key UN resolutions. This created a dual narrative: one for public consumption, painting China as a responsible global actor, and another, slightly less visible one, of quiet strategic alignment with Moscow. But that was then, and this is Mao.Wang Yi's admission ripped away the veil from this second narrative, leaving little room for doubt about where China’s true allegiances and anxieties lie. So, what are the groundbreaking implications of this candid confession for the West, particularly for those who harbored some belief in China's "neutrality"?

Firstly, and perhaps most immediately, it's a massive blow to trust. Any lingering faith in China's impartiality as a mediator, and what little faith was left in its commitment to the stated principles of international law, at least concerning this conflict, has been , to say the least, severely eroded. When China speaks of peace or a "political settlement" for Ukraine, it must now be viewed through the lens of self-interest rather than genuine concern for the conflict's resolution. This makes any future diplomatic overtures from Beijing on the Ukraine crisis inherently suspect in Western eyes (and frankly Ukrainian eyes as well). It confirms that China is not a dispassionate observer but a strategic player deeply invested in a particular outcome, and that outcome is a Russian triumph, something the West should not -and Ukraine cannot- allow under any circumstance.

Secondly, the admission shines a spotlight on the reality of a burgeoning anti-Western bloc centered around Russia, China and Iran. For those who hear echoes of World War 2 in Russia's aggression against Ukraine (indeed, comparing Ukraine now to Czechoslovakia then and Donbas to Sudetenland has been a common theme in political discourse almost since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion), it is especially chilling to realize Iran's leadership has openly referred to this tripartite alliance as “a new Axis.” Ties between Russia and Iran are hardly news, as anyone in Ukraine who has spent several years learning to recognize the sound of Shahed drones can attest. China's presence as the third in that triangle, however, has been somewhat debated. For a while, the "no-limits" partnership between China and Russia was often dismissed as rhetorical flourish.

Wang Yi's admission, however, lent significant weight to the idea that Beijing and Moscow are increasingly aligned in their fundamental opposition to the US-led global order (and their willingness to wage war against civilians in order to overthrow it). This isn't just about resource sharing or military exercises; it's about a shared vision of a world where Western influence is diminished, imperialistic wars against neighboring civilian populations are perfectly acceptable on the basis of “might makes right,” and their own authoritarian models can thrive. It signals that both nations view their relationship as a cornerstone of a new geopolitics, designed to counter American power. This understanding will undoubtedly accelerate discussions in Washington, Brussels, and other Western capitals about the need to diversify supply chains, strengthen alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and reduce strategic dependencies on China, but there is a more immediate concern. One of the principal reasons for some Western leaders to hesitate to take action against Russia has been China. Some viewed Russia as a “distraction” from China, whom they view (not unreasonably) as an even greater threat. A few have even stated that the reason they did not want to put much pressure on Russia was because they wanted it to be as intact as possible so it could be co-opted as an ally against China by tapping into the highly-publicized distrust of China which is present within the Russian intelligence community. Well, in the wake of Wang's admission, both groups of China hawks, just like those who viewed China as a potential source of additional pressure on Russia, must take into consideration the fact that Russia and China have less and less geopolitical daylight between them.

Thirdly, it demands a recalibration of Western strategy towards China. For some time, Western nations have grappled with the dual challenge of competing with China while also cooperating on global issues like climate change or pandemic response. This admission leans heavily towards the "competition" side of the ledger. It suggests that China's primary concern is not global stability or shared prosperity, but its own strategic positioning vis-à-vis the United States. This will likely lead to increased pressure on Beijing to cease any indirect support for Russia, whether through economic lifelines or technology transfers that aid Moscow's war effort. Sanctions evasion, for instance, will be scrutinized even more intensely. Furthermore, it reinforces the rationale for strengthening alliances like AUKUS and the Quad, as well as for fortifying NATO's eastern flank, as the war in Ukraine is now undeniably linked to a broader global power struggle. At the risk of being too dramatic, those who have advocated limiting their support for Ukraine out of fear that it might lead to World War 3 may have to face the reality that World War 3 is already underway.

Fourthly, it reveals China's strategic anxieties in stark terms. Wang Yi's explanation – fear of the US focusing its "entire efforts" on China – is incredibly telling. It exposes Beijing's deep-seated concern about being the sole target of American strategic resources. This isn't a new fear, but the admission confirms its centrality to China's foreign policy calculus. It means that China views the current global landscape as a zero-sum game, where one power's gain is another's loss. It also shows that China has no problem employing aggressive proxies, such as Russia, to carry out wars on its behalf in order to inflict losses on its Western rivals (which, in this view, equals a net gain for China). It also highlights China’s perceived vulnerability, despite its growing economic and military might, to a united and focused United States.

Finally, this admission shows the glaring hypocrisy of one of Russia's most common propaganda points, namely, that the West is “using” Ukraine to fight a “proxy war against Russia.” After several years of hearing Russian propagandists claim “Washington wants to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian,” Wang Yi has now rather plainly admitting it is China who is waging a proxy war, and Russia's centuries-old view of its own imagined destiny to rule the world as the “Third Rome” made them a willing proxy.

In conclusion, Wang Yi's unvarnished admission was a watershed moment. It peeled back the curtain on China's true strategic interests, confirming suspicions that Beijing’s “neutrality” was little more than a thinly veiled veneer for a deep-seated alignment with Russia, driven by a desire to counter US global influence. For the West, it’s a stark reminder that our strategic thinking needs to shift from “who should we confront: China, Russia, or Iran?” to “how should we confront China, Russia, and Iran?” The road ahead will require a little greater clarity, a lot less wishful thinking, and a firm, unified approach as the West -and the world- grapples with the fallout of an uncomfortable reality now laid bare.

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Robert Harris is a teacher in Lviv and the author of Smells like BULL-Shevik to ME! - A Conservative Talks to Conservatives About Russian Lies.