The forthcoming summit between Trump and Xi

Tuesday 12 May 2026

The forthcoming meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Beijing is shaping up to be one of the most consequential diplomatic encounters of 2026. It comes at a moment when the world’s two largest economies are simultaneously interdependent and profoundly suspicious of one another. Both governments speak the language of stabilisation, yet both continue preparing for long-term strategic rivalry. The paradox is characteristic of the age.

The summit is expected to focus upon trade, tariffs, Taiwan, artificial intelligence, rare earth minerals, energy security, the war involving Iran and wider questions of strategic influence in Asia and beyond. Yet unlike many previous meetings between American and Chinese leaders, this summit will be heavily conditioned by President Trump’s particular conception of foreign policy. Trump has never viewed geopolitics primarily through the lens of ideology, democratic solidarity or liberal internationalism. He views international relations as a sequence of transactions, bargains and leverage exercises between powerful states. Hence he and Xi may understand one another better than either publicly admits.

The diplomatic atmospherics already suggest this. American officials have been signalling that the summit is intended not to transform China’s economic system but rather to manage friction within it. The rhetoric of forcing Beijing into western liberalisation appears largely absent. Instead, the emphasis is upon reciprocity, trade balances and sectoral agreements.

This is important because it marks a subtle but profound shift in American strategic assumptions. During the decades following the end of the Cold War, successive American administrations assumed that integrating China into the global economy would eventually make her more politically liberal and economically convergent with western norms. That assumption has plainly failed. Xi Jinping’s China is more centralised, more nationalistic and more state-directed than China was a decade ago. Trump, unlike many of his predecessors, appears less interested in changing China internally than in extracting advantageous bargains from her externally.

Consequently the summit is unlikely to produce grand ideological declarations. Instead it will probably resemble an enormous commercial negotiation between rival empires.

Trade will sit at the centre of discussions. The tariff war between the United States and China has already damaged both economies, even if each side publicly claims resilience. The two governments previously agreed to a fragile truce after tariff escalations reached extraordinary levels. Neither side truly wishes to return to uncontrolled economic confrontation because both economies remain deeply connected through supply chains, financial markets and industrial inputs.

Trump’s instinct is transactional: if China buys more American goods, he can present that domestically as an American victory irrespective of the broader structural imbalance. Consequently the summit is likely to produce announcements of substantial Chinese purchases of American agricultural products, Boeing aircraft and energy exports. Such agreements fit perfectly within Trump’s political worldview because they create visible, quantifiable outcomes that can be presented as successful dealmaking.

Energy may become particularly important. China’s energy security has been shaken by instability surrounding Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. Beijing therefore has incentives to diversify suppliers. American liquefied natural gas, propane and ethane exports offer an attractive option if tariff barriers can be partially reduced. Trump meanwhile has always preferred policies that visibly increase American exports and domestic industrial production. An energy arrangement therefore offers mutual political advantages.

Rare earth minerals will likely form another area of bargaining. China retains enormous leverage through her dominance of rare earth processing, essential for advanced manufacturing, defence systems and electronics. Washington wants more reliable access to these materials, while Beijing wants relief from American export controls on semiconductors and advanced technology.

This raises the possibility of a limited technological détente. The United States is unlikely to abandon restrictions on the most advanced artificial intelligence chips or semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Such technologies are increasingly regarded in Washington as matters of national security rather than ordinary commerce. Nevertheless Trump may be willing to relax restrictions in less strategically sensitive sectors if Beijing offers sufficiently valuable concessions elsewhere. This is precisely the kind of compartmentalised bargaining approach Trump favours.

Artificial intelligence itself is expected to appear prominently in discussions. Both governments increasingly recognise that uncontrolled competition in AI carries systemic risks, including cyber warfare escalation, automated military decision-making and economic disruption. Yet neither side wishes to surrender strategic advantage. Consequently the most realistic outcome is not a comprehensive AI treaty but the establishment of communication mechanisms, expert forums or “boards” intended to reduce misunderstandings between the two powers.

Indeed one of the more intriguing proposals reportedly under discussion is the creation of formal “Board of Trade” and “Board of Investment” mechanisms to institutionalise economic negotiations. Such structures would fit Trump’s preference for personalised but continuous bargaining relationships. They would also suit Beijing because they reduce unpredictability and provide channels for dispute management.

Yet the most dangerous subject will remain Taiwan.

For Beijing, Taiwan is not merely another diplomatic disagreement but an issue tied to legitimacy, nationalism and Xi Jinping’s historical ambitions. Chinese officials have already indicated that Taiwan will be at the very top of their agenda. Beijing wants limits upon American arms sales, softer American rhetoric regarding Taiwanese sovereignty and perhaps symbolic reaffirmations of the “One China” framework.

Trump’s position here is unusually difficult to predict because his instincts pull in contradictory directions. He has often displayed scepticism about costly overseas commitments and alliances. From a purely transactional perspective, Taiwan may appear to him as a dangerous liability capable of dragging the United States into catastrophic war. However abandoning Taiwan outright would provoke enormous domestic political backlash in Washington and severely undermine American credibility throughout Asia.

Therefore the most probable outcome is ambiguity. Trump may offer rhetorical moderation, delayed arms announcements or softer language concerning Taiwanese independence in exchange for economic concessions from Beijing. He is less ideologically committed to Taiwan than many traditional American foreign policy figures. That creates anxiety in Taipei, where officials reportedly hope there will be “no surprises” emerging from the summit.

This illustrates a broader truth about Trumpian geopolitics: almost everything becomes negotiable.

Traditional American foreign policy often treated alliances and strategic commitments as quasi-sacred obligations grounded in shared values. Trump instead tends to view them as contingent arrangements whose continuation depends upon reciprocal benefit. Xi Jinping almost certainly recognises this and may believe that sustained personal diplomacy with Trump can gradually soften American resistance on issues Beijing regards as existential.

Iran will also loom unexpectedly large over the summit. The United States reportedly hopes China will use her influence with Tehran to reduce tensions and protect maritime energy flows. Here again Trump’s transactional instincts are visible. Rather than treating China exclusively as an adversary, he appears willing to invite Beijing into selective strategic cooperation where American interests require it.

This may ultimately become the defining characteristic of the new Sino-American relationship under Trump: competitive coexistence rather than ideological confrontation.

Neither side believes genuine friendship is possible. Both governments increasingly regard the other as a systemic rival. Yet both also understand that total rupture would be economically devastating and strategically dangerous. Trump’s worldview may paradoxically make stabilisation easier because he places less emphasis upon moral confrontation and more emphasis upon bargaining equilibrium.

The danger however is that transactional diplomacy can generate instability of its own. If everything is negotiable, then allies become nervous, adversaries become opportunistic and strategic clarity disappears. Countries throughout Asia will watch the summit carefully for signs that Washington and Beijing are drifting toward a “G2” arrangement in which the great powers carve out spheres of influence over the heads of smaller states.

Europe, too, will observe with unease. European governments increasingly fear that an overtly transactional American foreign policy could leave them marginalised in wider strategic calculations. If Washington and Beijing can reach temporary bargains over trade, technology and security, then Europe risks becoming strategically secondary despite her economic weight.

The summit therefore matters far beyond bilateral relations. It concerns the future architecture of global order itself.

Perhaps the most likely outcome is not a historic breakthrough but a managed pause — a stabilisation mechanism allowing both superpowers to reduce immediate tensions while continuing their long-term competition. Tariffs may be moderated, trade forums established, energy deals announced and diplomatic language softened. Yet beneath these arrangements the structural rivalry will persist.

Indeed one might argue that Trump and Xi, despite their profound differences, share an underlying realism about power. Neither believes international politics is fundamentally governed by universal moral principles. Both view states as civilisational actors pursuing advantage within an anarchic world. Both prefer direct bargaining between powerful leaders over multilateral proceduralism. Both understand leverage instinctively.

That may make this summit surprisingly productive in the short term.

Whether it makes the world safer in the long term is another matter entirely.