German versus US ammunition production

Monday 11 May 2026

The proposition that Germany has overtaken the United States in the production of conventional ammunition would, had it been made a decade ago, have seemed improbable to the point of absurdity. The United States, after all, has long been the arsenal not merely of democracy but of a global security architecture in which industrial scale, logistical reach and technological sophistication were assumed to be unrivalled. Germany by contrast spent much of the post-Cold War period deliberately constraining her military-industrial base, both politically and culturally, in the shadow of her twentieth-century history.

Yet the war in Ukraine has unsettled a number of such assumptions. It has exposed not only the intensity of modern industrial warfare but also the fragility of Western defence production systems, particularly in relation to what might be termed the “unfashionable” end of military capability — artillery shells, propellant charges, and the innumerable components of conventional munitions that do not attract the glamour of advanced aircraft or missile systems. Against this backdrop, the claim regarding Germany’s relative position deserves careful scrutiny.

At the centre of Germany’s resurgence in ammunition production stands Rheinmetall, a firm whose transformation over the past four years has been nothing short of remarkable. Once a significant but politically constrained player in European defence, Rheinmetall has expanded production capacity at a pace driven by both state demand and private capital. New factories have been announced or constructed across Germany and in partner countries, with particular emphasis on 155mm artillery shells — the principal currency of the war in Ukraine.

Germany’s approach has been characterised by a degree of industrial coherence that contrasts with the more fragmented American system. Berlin’s policy shift following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 — often referred to as the Zeitenwende — unlocked substantial state financing and political support for rearmament. Crucially, this support has been channelled into long-term procurement contracts, giving firms such as Rheinmetall the confidence to invest in expanded capacity without the fear of abrupt demand collapse.

The United States by contrast entered the Ukraine war with a significantly larger but less flexible production base. American ammunition production has historically been structured around government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, with procurement cycles shaped by Congressional appropriations rather than sustained strategic planning. While the United States has made considerable efforts to increase output — particularly of 155mm shells — these efforts have often been constrained by bureaucratic inertia, labour shortages, and the complexities of scaling legacy infrastructure.

To suggest that Germany has overtaken the United States in absolute production volume would likely be an overstatement. The United States still possesses a deeper industrial base, greater access to raw materials, and a broader network of facilities. However in certain categories — especially in terms of growth rate, modernisation, and potentially even near-term European supply — Germany may indeed be approaching or surpassing American output. The distinction here is subtle but important: supremacy in momentum rather than in total capacity.

This distinction carries significant geopolitical implications. If Germany is able to sustain high levels of ammunition production, she effectively becomes the logistical anchor of European defence. This would represent a profound shift within NATO, where the United States has historically supplied the bulk of both matériel and strategic direction. A Germany capable of independently sustaining large-scale ammunition flows would not only enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy but also alter the internal balance of influence within the alliance.

For Ukraine, the implications are immediate and tangible. Artillery remains the defining weapon of the conflict, and the availability of shells directly correlates with operational tempo and battlefield survivability. A robust German-led supply chain reduces dependence on transatlantic logistics and mitigates the political uncertainties inherent in American domestic politics. In practical terms, it shortens supply lines and stabilises expectations — factors of considerable importance in a war of attrition.

Nevertheless Germany’s ascendancy in this domain raises questions about European defence integration. If Berlin emerges as the principal supplier of conventional ammunition, other European states may find themselves increasingly dependent on German industry. This could, over time, translate into political leverage — subtle perhaps, but nonetheless real. The historical sensitivities surrounding German leadership in Europe have not disappeared; they have merely been reframed within the context of collective security.

From the American perspective, the emergence of a more capable European industrial base is both a relief and a challenge. It alleviates pressure on American stockpiles and allows Washington to diversify its strategic focus, particularly towards the Indo-Pacific. However it introduces the possibility of a more autonomous Europe whose security decisions may not always align perfectly with American preferences.

There is also a broader lesson here concerning the nature of modern warfare. The conflict in Ukraine has underscored that industrial capacity — the ability to produce large quantities of relatively simple weapons — remains as decisive as technological superiority. In this respect, Germany’s recent trajectory reflects a rediscovery of an older truth: that wars between near-peer adversaries are ultimately contests of endurance as much as of innovation.

Nevertheless caution is warranted before drawing definitive conclusions. Germany’s expansion in ammunition production is still in progress, and many of the announced facilities have yet to reach full operational capacity. Similarly the United States retains the ability to scale production further should political will and financial resources be mobilised accordingly. The current moment may therefore represent a temporary convergence rather than a permanent reversal.

One is therefore led to a nuanced conclusion. Germany has not unequivocally overtaken the United States in conventional ammunition production in absolute terms. However she has, in a remarkably short period, repositioned herself as a central pillar of Western industrial warfare capacity, and in certain respects — particularly within the European theatre — she may already be setting the pace.

The geopolitical consequences of this shift are likely to unfold gradually. They will not be marked by dramatic declarations but by incremental changes in procurement patterns, alliance dynamics, and strategic assumptions. Yet over time, they may prove no less consequential for their subtlety — reshaping the architecture of Western defence in ways that would once have seemed unlikely, if not altogether inconceivable.