The deteriorating relations between Japan and China

Friday 9 January 2026

Relations between China and Japan have entered a prolonged period of deterioration, shaped by unresolved history, clashing strategic ambitions and a rapidly changing security environment in East Asia. While periods of pragmatic cooperation have punctuated the relationship since the normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1972, the underlying structural tensions have grown sharper rather than softer, and recent years have exposed how shallow the foundations of mutual trust remain.

At the heart of the relationship lies the burden of history. Japanese imperial expansion in China during the first half of the twentieth century, culminating in the Second Sino-Japanese War, remains a central element of Chinese national memory and political education. Official Chinese narratives emphasise Japanese wartime atrocities and portray contemporary Japan as insufficiently repentant. In Japan, by contrast, successive governments have expressed remorse in formal statements, but domestic debates over school textbooks, museum narratives and visits by politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine periodically reignite Chinese anger. These disputes are not merely symbolic: they shape public opinion, constrain diplomatic manoeuvre and provide ready-made tools for nationalist mobilisation on both sides.

Territorial disputes have further poisoned relations, most notably over the uninhabited islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. Although economically insignificant in themselves, the islands carry immense strategic and symbolic weight. They sit astride important sea lanes and are believed to lie near potential hydrocarbon resources. More importantly, they have become a litmus test of sovereignty and resolve. Chinese coastguard patrols near the islands have become routine, while Japan has steadily reinforced her administrative control and surveillance. Each incident carries the risk of escalation, not because either side seeks war but because domestic political pressures make backing down appear as weakness.

The broader regional balance of power has magnified these frictions. China’s rapid military modernisation, particularly her naval and air capabilities, has altered the strategic landscape of the western Pacific. Japan, long constrained by her post-war pacifist constitution, has responded by incrementally expanding the role of her Self-Defence Forces and deepening security cooperation with allies and partners. Tokyo’s reinterpretation of constitutional limits on collective self-defence was viewed in Beijing not as a technical legal adjustment, but as evidence of resurgent militarism aligned with American containment strategies.

Economic interdependence has not proved the stabilising force that many once hoped. China and Japan remain deeply intertwined through trade, investment and supply chains, yet economic ties have increasingly become arenas of competition and suspicion rather than mutual reassurance. Japanese companies worry about political risk and intellectual property protection in China, while Beijing views Japanese participation in alternative regional economic frameworks as part of a broader effort to dilute Chinese influence. The use of informal trade restrictions and regulatory pressure as political tools has further eroded confidence.

Domestic politics on both sides have also hardened positions. In China nationalism has become an increasingly prominent pillar of regime legitimacy, making compromise with Japan politically costly. In Japan, a more assertive national identity has gained ground, driven by demographic anxiety, regional insecurity and scepticism about China’s long-term intentions. Leaders in both countries operate within political environments that reward firmness and punish conciliation, even when strategic logic might suggest restraint.

The involvement of external actors adds another layer of complexity. Japan’s alliance with the United States is central to her security policy, and American commitments to defend Japanese-administered territory inevitably affect Chinese calculations. From Beijing’s perspective Tokyo is not merely a bilateral interlocutor, but a key node in a wider network perceived as constraining China’s rise. This perception encourages China to test Japanese resolve in ways calibrated to avoid outright conflict while signalling dissatisfaction with the regional order.

Despite this bleak trajectory, deterioration is not synonymous with inevitability. China and Japan share profound interests in regional stability, open sea lanes and the avoidance of armed conflict that would devastate both economies. Diplomatic channels remain open, crisis-management mechanisms exist, and neither side shows enthusiasm for a decisive break. Yet the relationship has shifted from cautious optimism to guarded coexistence, marked by low expectations and persistent mistrust.

In the absence of a fundamental reconciliation over history or a clear accommodation of strategic ambitions, relations between China and Japan are likely to remain strained. The danger lies less in deliberate aggression than in miscalculation, driven by nationalist sentiment, ambiguous signalling and the pressure to demonstrate resolve. Managing deterioration, rather than reversing it, may therefore be the most realistic objective for policymakers in both capitals.