The dangers of ignoring OPSEC

A recently published Dutch-language article concerning the death of humanitarian volunteers in Ukraine — in which a Dutch snack-bar owner from Helmond known as “Franky” recounts how two of his Ukrainian friends were killed despite having spoken to him by telephone only the day before — offers a vivid and tragic reminder of the real and lethal risks for international civilian volunteers operating on or near the front line of the war in Ukraine. 

Drawing on the details of that case, it is important to issue a stark warning: volunteering in a conflict zone is never benign, and when civilian volunteers place themselves in areas of active combat or immediate front-line proximity without rigorous operational security (OPSEC) measures, the consequences can be fatal.

The incident and what it reveals

In the reported case, the Dutch volunteer and his Ukrainian friends were evidently operating deep enough into the war theatre that they came within lethal reach of Russian strike assets. The article records the friends as being “our best friends… we had daily contact” yet they were killed by an enemy strike that did not discriminate between humanitarian, volunteer or combatant status. 

Although the article does not name the exact weapon used for the strike, it sits squarely within the category of threats posed by modern Russian loitering munitions and kamikaze drones. One salient example is the Russian-made loitering munition system known as the ZALA Lancet. It is publicly reported to have a maximum range of approximately 40 km, a maximum take-off weight in the order of 12 kg, and can dive at speeds of up to 300 km/h in its terminal attack mode. 

Put simply, this type of drone means that any position within roughly 25–40 km of the front—indeed any location (e.g. a shelter, an evacuation point, a meeting place) that is visible to the adversary—is vulnerable to a precision strike, regardless of whether the people present are civilians or volunteers. There is no guarantee of immunity by virtue of being “merely humanitarian”.

Why civilian international volunteers are especially at risk

1. Highly attractive target sets: Civilian volunteers tend to concentrate in front-line or near-front-line sectors precisely because the humanitarian need is greatest there. That proximity puts them within the envelope of range of these strike drones.

   
   

2. Relatively low OPSEC discipline: Many volunteer initiatives, however laudable, may lack professionalised security procedures. Locations may be publicised (for example on social media), movement patterns predictable, communications unsecured or unencrypted, staff un-briefed on combat zone threat profiles.

   
   

3. Misconception of immunity: Volunteers may assume that because they are non-combatants, they are safe. This is dangerously mistaken. Modern targeting systems often do not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants; the criterion is exposure and target value (human presence, electronics, vehicles, gathering points).

   
   

4. Limited escape and contingency planning: Unlike military or well-equipped agencies, volunteer groups often lack layered defences, redundant extraction plans or hardened shelters. When a loitering munition arrives, there may be little time or capability to evade.

What proper operational security must include

Given the demonstrated lethality of weapons such as the Lancet, volunteer groups must adopt OPSEC protocols at least equivalent to those used by professional NGOs operating in high-intensity conflict zones. Key measures include:

• Maintaining strict noise, movement and communications discipline: avoid public announcing of routes, locations, times.

  
  

• Avoiding predictable patterns: change location, use varied routes, do not linger in open zones near the line of contact.

  
  

• Employing secure communications: encrypted telephony or messaging, avoiding visible telecom signatures when possible.

  
  

• Establishing “safe stand-by” behaviour: hardened shelters or dispersed personnel when there is heightened threat; evacuation and contingency plans in place.

  
  

• Restricting visibility of the mission to hostile observers: limiting large concentrations of people, marked vehicles, obvious logistic convoys in forward zones.

  
  

• Maintaining a distance buffer: unless absolutely essential, remain out of the envelope likely to be covered by loitering munitions (for example greater than 30-40 km behind the active line of fire, or within heavily protected positions).

  
  

• Liaising with security-aware partners: working with institutions that understand the threat environment, ideally contracting local security consultants with contacts with the Ukrainian Armed Forces or Security Services knowledgeable about the adversary’s drone strike tactics.

A final caution

The tragedy described in the article is not an isolated aberration but part of a wider pattern in the Ukraine war where Russia’s use of precision loitering munitions has enabled strikes deep behind the front line with increasing frequency. As one assessment puts it, the Lancet is “one of the most effective new capabilities deployed by Russia in Ukraine over the last 12 months”. 

International civilian volunteers must recognise: entering a theatre of war—even in a humanitarian capacity—carries lethal risk. The enemy does not distinguish based on intent; exposure is vulnerability. It must be accepted that no civilian mission is automatically safe. Unless volunteers adopt rigorous OPSEC and risk mitigation, they may become casualties—not just observers—to the very violence they seek to alleviate.