Syria: What's Going On?

Background: Regime Change and the New Order

• On 8 December 2024, a coalition of rebel forces led by Hayʾat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an organisation that ran an area of northwest Syria autonomously, supported by Turkish-backed Syrian National Army units, overthrew Bashar al-Assad’s regime. 

  
  

• Ahmad al-Sharaa (also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) emerged as interim President. A caretaker government was first formed, and by March 2025 a transitional constitution (a constitutional declaration) was signed and a 23-member transitional cabinet installed. 

  
  

• The interim government abolished the 2012 Assad-era constitution, dissolved many institutions tied to the Assad regime, and declared the beginning of a five-year transition period. 

Key Geopolitical Tensions and Dynamics

The new government faces a web of competing pressures. Below are the major arenas where tensions are concentrated.

1. Domestic Fragmentation & Minority and Armed Groups

• Territorial and authority gaps: Several parts of Syria remain outside the government’s full control. In the northeast, the Kurdish-led SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) has reached preliminary agreements with al-Sharaa to integrate some institutions and border/control crossing points, but distrust remains. 

  
  

• Minority grievances: Druze, Alawite, Christian and Kurdish communities have expressed concerns about how inclusive the new government is and whether guarantees for minority rights will hold up. The constitutional declaration recognises equality for all citizens, but critics argue power is overly centralised and that representation remains limited—both in high-security ministries and in mechanisms of oversight. 

  
  

• Armed integration versus demobilisation: Many rebel factions have been rolled into state structures, particularly the Ministry of Defence; but it is unclear how smoothly integration will proceed. Some local militias, tribal forces, and regions with strong local identities resist, especially where there are fears of reprisals or loss of autonomy. 

2. Constitutional, Legal, and Governance Legitimacy

• The interim constitution gives the president significant powers: direct appointment of ministers, strong oversight, limited checks in parliament, and significant influence over judiciary and security forces. Dissenters fear this could replicate some of the authoritarian abuses of the past. 

  
  

• Although the government has promised transitional justice, abolition of political repression, closing of Assad-era prisons, and prosecution of human rights abuses, implementation has been slow and opaque. 

3. International Relations & Regional Pressures

• Balancing foreign powers: Syria is trying to recalibrate her relationships. While Russia’s influence has waned somewhat, she still remains an important actor. Meanwhile Turkey, Arab states and to an extent the West and other regional players are seeking influence, reconstruction contracts, trade, energy deals and the like.

• Sanctions and international engagement: Lifting or easing of Assad-era sanctions is a major diplomatic and economic goal. International actors have responded to the new government with cautious optimism. Some sanctions have been eased, and foreign investment has started to reenter, particularly in the energy and infrastructure sectors. But many sanctions remain, especially those tied to terrorism designations, human rights abuses and other issues. 

  
  

• Israeli security concerns and border disputes: Israel has made new proposals for security agreements and demilitarised zones near the Syrian-Israeli border. For its part, the Syrian government has been drafting counter-proposals. These tensions have involved foreign airstrikes, border security, and relations with neighbouring states not just including Israel. 

4. Economic Challenges and Reconstruction

• After decades of war, infrastructure is heavily damaged, services are weak, refugee flows huge, and the economy heavily distorted. The transitional government must deal with widespread needs—electricity, water, roads, public transport, healthcare—while navigating the constraints of damaged institutions and limited revenue. 

  
  

• Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states have begun providing assistance (for example, Saudi Arabia supplying crude oil) to help with energy shortfalls and reconstruction. Such assistance is politically useful but also comes with geopolitical strings and expectations. 

Risks and Contradictions

While the transition offers real opportunities, multiple risks could derail stability or hollow out reform:

• Risk of relapse into authoritarian patterns: With strong presidential powers, limited electoral oversight during the transition, and with HTS holding dominant positions, there is concern that some of the same abuses or exclusionary practices of the previous regime might return in new form.

  
  

• Sectarian tensions: Minority communities, especially Alawites and Druze, may feel insecure or alienated. Clashes and massacres in some coastal or mixed Sunni/Alawite areas have raised fears of sectarian reprisals or cycles of communal violence. 

  
  

• Opposition from excluded groups: Kurdish elements (particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces or other Kurdish political bodies) have expressed discontent with exclusion or incomplete representation, especially in decisions about border governance or control over territory. Their unwillingness to fully submit could lead to parallel structures or instability.

  
  

• Foreign intervention and proxy competition: Israel, Turkey, Iran even Western powers are all watching closely. Israel’s demands for demilitarisation south of Damascus and along borders risk sparking confrontation with the central government. Turkey’s role is complex: shared interests in keeping certain militant groups in check, but also concerns about Kurdish influence and Syrian border security. Iran’s influence, which was extensive under Assad, may be contested; how much al-Sharaa allows or curtails it will be a key determinant of Syria's future relationships with the major powers.

  
  

• Economic fragility and humanitarian stress: Even with reconstruction aid, the scale of need is very large. High displacement, damaged infrastructure, poverty, food insecurity—all pose real risks of unrest, public dissatisfaction or collapse of services which could undermine legitimacy.

Possible Trajectories

Given the dynamics, here are plausible scenarios for where Syria may head over the next few years:

1. Managed transition with limited liberalisation: The government maintains strong central control, gradually integrating armed groups, tightening laws, but allowing modest pluralism and international engagement. Some reforms occur, but many rights or freedoms remain restricted in practice.

   
   

2. Federal or decentralised accommodation: To appease minority and regional groups, the government may grant limited autonomy in some governorates (especially Kurdish or Druze areas), with local administration and recognition of local cultural or political rights. This risks angering more centralist factions.

   
   

3. Return to authoritarianism: If instability mounts, foreign threats intensify, or economical pressure becomes overwhelming, the government might reassert hardline control, roll back inclusive policies, crack down on dissent and consolidate power, especially via security apparatuses.

   
   

4. Fragmentation or renewed conflict: If the government fails to integrate armed groups or reconcile with excluded minorities, parallel authority structures may strengthen. External intervention or airstrikes (e.g. from Israel or due to border disputes) could stretch the state’s capacity, leading to renewed conflict in certain regions.

The bottom line

Since December 2024, Syria has entered a new, fragile chapter. The overthrow of Assad has opened possibilities for institutional reform, international reengagement, and rebuilding. But the new government under Ahmed al-Sharaa must balance internal inclusion and legitimacy, convincing excluded groups to participate; manage regional pressures from Israel, Turkey, Iran, and others; and deliver visible economic recovery under severe constraints. Geopolitical tensions—over borders, identity, foreign alliances and security—remain high. Whether Syria’s transition becomes a sustainable one will depend heavily on how the government navigates these competing demands, and whether external actors support stability over narrow interests.

---

Syria’s New Government and the External Powers: Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States

The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government have forced Syria’s external patrons and rivals to recalibrate their policies. The vacuum left by Assad’s ouster has unsettled old alliances and created both opportunity and danger. Each of the four principal external powers—Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States—has sought to secure its interests in a Syria that is politically fragile and geopolitically contested.

Russia: From Dominant Patron to Diminished Player

For over a decade, Russia was Assad’s indispensable ally, providing air power, arms, and diplomatic cover at the United Nations. With Assad gone, Moscow’s leverage has been reduced, though not eliminated.

• Military presence: Russia retains her naval base at Tartus and air base at Hmeimim. These installations give it continuing influence, but Moscow’s ability to project power has been constrained by the war in Ukraine and resource diversion.

  
  

• Diplomatic position: Russia presents herself as a guarantor of stability, calling for dialogue and non-Western mediation. Yet her credibility is weakened by her inability to save Assad, and by the new government’s scepticism about Russian promises after the 2020s.

  
  

• Economic stake: Moscow fears losing oil, gas, and construction contracts signed under Assad. The new government has hinted that old deals will be reviewed, leaving Russian companies uncertain.

  
  

• Overall trajectory: Russia is no longer Syria’s dominant patron. It remains a factor—especially militarily—but increasingly is being edged out by regional actors, notably Turkey.

Iran: Defensive but Marginalised

Iran invested heavily in Assad’s survival, funding militias, embedding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and mobilising Lebanese Hezbollah to fight in Syria. The new order threatens to roll back that influence.

• Military footprint: Iranian-backed militias still operate in parts of Damascus, Homs, and near the Israeli border. However, the al-Sharaa government has signalled discomfort with a large Iranian military presence, wary of provoking Israel and alienating Sunni constituencies.

  
  

• Political influence: Iran has lost privileged access to the Syrian presidency. It is lobbying for guarantees that its cultural and religious networks will remain tolerated, but its leverage is weaker than during Assad’s rule.

  
  

• Regional tension: Israel’s strikes on Iranian positions continue, now justified as protecting the fragile new Syrian order. Gulf Arab states, re-engaging with Damascus, press the new government to distance itself from Tehran.

  
  

• Overall trajectory: Iran is still present but increasingly isolated. Its future influence depends on whether it can adapt by shifting from heavy military presence to softer forms of engagement, such as trade, education, and religious institutions.

Turkey: The Ascendant Regional Arbiter

No external actor has gained more from Assad’s fall than Turkey. Ankara played a central role in supporting anti-Assad factions, including those that helped install the new government.

• Security goals: Turkey seeks to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region tied to the PKK along its border. The new government has aligned with Ankara on curbing Kurdish separatism, though tensions remain over how far autonomy will be restricted.

  
  

• Political influence: Turkish advisers are active in border security, reconstruction projects, and administrative reforms. Ankara presents itself as Syria’s patron, backing both the government and allied factions.

  
  

• Economic role: Turkish firms are moving into northern Syria’s reconstruction, trade, and infrastructure. Border commerce has surged, giving Turkey an outsized role in Syria’s economic survival.

  
  

• Overall trajectory: Turkey is now the key external power shaping Syria’s trajectory. Its partnership with al-Sharaa is tactical and pragmatic, but it risks making the new Syrian government appear beholden to Ankara’s priorities.

The United States: Guarded Engagement and Strategic Ambiguity

Washington was long ambivalent about Syria: opposed to Assad, concerned about terrorism, and wary of entanglement. The change of government has prompted cautious re-engagement.

• Military posture: US forces remain in eastern Syria, officially to fight Islamic State remnants and to support Kurdish partners. The new government has tolerated this presence, but negotiations are ongoing about its future.

  
  

• Diplomatic stance: The US has welcomed Assad’s departure, but insists that Syria’s new government must pursue genuine inclusivity, protect minorities, and prevent the resurgence of terrorism. Aid and recognition are conditional on these principles.

  
  

• Economic influence: Washington has lifted some targeted sanctions, allowing limited trade and humanitarian assistance. However, full normalisation remains far off, especially while HTS figures dominate parts of the government.

  
  

• Regional strategy: The US sees value in supporting a government less aligned with Russia and Iran, but worries about empowering Islamist factions. It is also balancing Syria policy against wider priorities—Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific and Iran.

  
  

• Overall trajectory: American involvement is cautious, transactional and conditioned. The US wants to prevent Syria from collapsing again or becoming an Iranian corridor, but will not commit to large-scale military or economic engagement.

Conclusion

Syria’s new government exists in a precarious balance of external forces. Russia clings to bases but has lost its privileged role. Iran struggles to defend gains in the face of Israeli and Arab pressure. Turkey is ascendant, using military, political, and economic levers to shape Syria’s path. The United States is cautiously supportive, hedging between the need for stability and concerns over governance.

This crowded geopolitical environment leaves Damascus little room for manoeuvre. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government must balance between foreign patrons without appearing dominated by any, all while attempting to rebuild a shattered state. The ultimate question is whether Syria can assert a sovereign course—or whether her future will be shaped primarily by the competing designs of these outside powers.

---

Syria 2025: Three plausible futures under the post-Assad transition

Below are three forward-looking scenarios for Syria since the December 2024 change of government, each with core dynamics, early-warning indicators, and policy implications. They are not predictions but structured possibilities grounded in current reporting on security talks, sanctions shifts, external military postures and economic conditions. 

1. Consolidation under Turkish patronage

One-liner: Damascus stabilises by leaning heavily on Ankara for security, trade, and reconstruction—trading autonomy for near-term order.

Drivers

• Deepening Turkish security role along the northern belt; joint mechanisms with Damascus to constrain SDF/PKK structures and police border crossings.

• Fast-tracked Turkish commercial presence (construction, logistics, light industry) that kick-starts recovery in the north and radiates south via customs and energy deals. 

  
  

• Western and Gulf tolerance—if not enthusiasm—so long as Iran’s footprint recedes and counter-terrorism baselines hold. 

What to watch

• Formal MOUs granting Turkish advisory or air-defence roles on Syrian soil; expanded cross-border trade regimes.

• A steady but limited US drawdown in the east alongside de-confliction protocols with Ankara. 

  
  

• EU and UK licensing that privileges Turkish-linked reconstruction consortia. 

Upside/Risks

• Upside: Faster service restoration and job creation; reduced front-line volatility; easier access to European markets via Turkish corridors. 

  
  

• Risks: Perception of tutelage over Damascus; Kurdish alienation spurring insurgency; Israeli concern about new Turkish air-defence footprints complicating its Syria freedom-of-action. 

Policy implications

• Prioritise trilateral channels (Turkey–Syria–US/EU) on border governance and de-escalation.

  
  

• Tie reconstruction finance to minority protections and demobilisation benchmarks in mixed areas.

2. Balanced multipolarity (managed hedging)

One-liner: Damascus plays a careful balancing act—limited security understandings with Israel, guarded US presence in the east, Turkish economic primacy in the north, and a downsized Russian/Iranian role.

Drivers

• Israel–Syria back-channeling on new separation arrangements southwest of Damascus to reduce strike cycles and keep Iran-aligned units at arm’s length.

• Targeted sanctions relief by the EU/US paired with governance conditions; multilateral humanitarian and infrastructure packages to arrest economic free-fall. 

  
  

• Russia retains bases but has less bandwidth; Iran shifts from hard to soft influence where she can. 

What to watch

• Any public outlines of DMZ/no-fly provisions between Damascus and the Golan frontier; UN Security Council briefings referencing new verification tasks. 

  
  

• Incremental licences for banking/energy transactions and multilateral tenders; World Bank and UN technical missions scaling up. 

  
  

• Continued, modest US posture at al-Tanf and in the northeast tied to ISIS containment and leverage in talks with Damascus. 

Upside/Risks

• Upside: Lower probability of interstate spillover; diversified investment; space for intra-Syrian political bargains.

  
  

• Risks: The center must constantly placate competing patrons; any spoiler (e.g., an Israeli–Iranian flare-up) can unravel the balance. 

Policy implications

• Build a sequenced “sanctions-for-benchmarks” roadmap (detention transparency, local power-sharing, armed-group integration).

  
  

• Resource a verification architecture if any Israel–Syria security understandings mature.

3. Relapse into proxy conflict

One-liner: Talks stall; security incidents multiply; sanctions relief reverses; the economy backslides and parallel authorities harden.

Drivers

• Israel–Syria security negotiations collapse amid contested red lines; renewed strike-response cycles target Iranian-aligned assets and strategic airfields. 

  
  

• Kurdish-Damascus arrangements fail, prompting clashes and a sharper US–Turkey competition over the northeast; Damascus courts Moscow/Tehran for reinforcement.

• Humanitarian and macroeconomic shocks (wheat deficits, power outages) fuel protests and militia racketeering. 

What to watch

• Expanded Israeli strike packages against airbases and logistics hubs; visible militia redeployments toward the south. 

  
  

• EU/US snap-back of licences; Gulf aid pauses; commodity queues and price spikes across major cities. 

  
  

• ISIS attack tempo uptick in the central/eastern deserts testing thin security lines. 

Upside/Risks

• Upside: None beyond short-term clarity about alignments.

  
  

• Risks: Renewed displacement, fiscal collapse, and a hardened north–east–south fragmentation that is difficult to reverse. 

Policy implications

• Pre-position humanitarian corridors and contingency financing for energy and grain; insulate aid from sanctions whiplash.

  
  

• Ring-fence de-confliction amongst Israel, Turkey, the US and Russia to avoid inadvertent escalation.

Bottom line

The most stabilising path is balanced multipolarity—untidy but workable—so long as (i) Israel–Syria security understandings reduce strike incentives, (ii) Western sanctions relief remains conditional but predictable, and (iii) Ankara’s influence is channelled into economic normalisation rather than indefinite tutelage. Any two of the three can sustain a fragile peace; lose all three, and relapse risks rise sharply.